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" The Government and Administration of ’Iraq.”
The aim of the thesis is to examine the forces which ,since 
1914 ,have operated in bringing ’Iraq from a neglected and 
maladministered portion of the Ottoman Empire to its present 
position as a political unit amon : the nations* The establish­
ment and development of its political institutions are traced 
and evaluated from the standpoint of their contribution to 
this evolution and in their relation to British policy: tne 
safeguardin of the frontiers of and the routes to India.This 
policy is conceived to have remained the same during the 
period under review , as in the previous 15o years , the history 
of which is briefly sketched.
The early administration ,1914-1917, characterized by 
expediency and tne application of Indian methods, is shown to 
hav been dominated by military considerations and political 
motives which envisaged "Mesopotamia as an appendage of India."
The divergence of opinion between the so-called "Indian" 
and "dnarifian" schools of Arab politics is revealed to have 
been ,in reality, the more fundamental conflict between the 
traditional t eory of th duty of advanced nations to backwards 
peoples and the theory of self-determination ,of nationalism 
and of democratic consent. The influence of this conflict is 
indicated on the creation of administration, particularly 
between 1917- 1920, and on the constitutional proposals puc 
forward from Baghdad during that period.
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The growth of ’Iraqi nationalism is traced from hitnerto 
unutilized sources. The Influence of war-time promises and 
encouragement by the Allies,of the Arab movement elsewhere 
and of tne impact of Western ideas is analysed. The view that 
it hr d no local origins is rejected.
New light from official sources is given on the creation 
of Arab Government,tne Provisional Council of State,the accession 
of King Faisal, the drafting of the '-‘■’reaty of 1922 and the 
Organic™ which are analysed, and on the passing of the Treaty 
by the Constituent Assembly. The positions of the King and of 
the British Advisers are examined. The evolution of King Faisal’s 
position as a tool of British policy to that of a point of 
balance between the nationalists and the Mandatory Bower is 
indicated.
Tne development of administration is reviewed, and reasons 
suggested for the progressive curtailment of British responsib­
ilities. The conclusion is reached that, in spite of the 
theoretical triumph of nationalism and democratic consent , 
Great Britain has achieved practical recognition of her 
special Interests. While fundamental indigenous problems 
will long prevent ’Iraq from becoming the fully modern state 
she now claims to be , her national existence is assured as 
long as she facilitates the development of petroleum deposits, 
maintains the safety of international air communications and 
safeguards the Middle Eastern approach to India.
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writer’s own impressions or those facts obtained at first hand.
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study; interviews with practically every ’Iraqi statesman and
dignitary who has taken part in the creation of modern ’Iraq, a
list of whom would form a Who’s Who of ’Iraq; interviews with
the former High Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty in ’Iraq,
and with many of those British officials who from 1915 to 1932
participated in the affairs of government and of administration
in ’Iraq. In many cases the writer has had more than one
interview. To all of those who have permitted him to draw so
extensively on their time and knowledge, the writer is deeply 
indebted.
CHAPTER I.
GREAT BRITAIN GOES TO WAR 
IN TURKISH ARABIA.
Late In the day of 6 November, 1914, a detachment of the
16th Infantry Brigade under the command of Brig.-General W. S.
Delamain disembarked under the guns of H.M.S. Odin at Fao, the
southernmost point of Turkish Arabia. The guns of the fort
had been already silenced by the Odin and there was no further
resistance. Within a few minutes the Union Jack replaced the
(1)
Osmanli Crescent at the flagstaff.
Thus began the campaign which eventually was to wrest from 
the Ottoman Empire the whole of Turkish Arabia, as the Turkish
wilayets or provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were then
(2)
known in British official circles, and to lay the foundations
I
of the Kingdom of 1 Iraq.
In this engagement at Fao stands revealed, in brief, 
British policy in the Middle East: the control, direct or in­
direct, of the Persian Gulf and its natural extensions, the 
Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as the outpost of India, which, 
if jeopardized, must be safeguarded by force of arms when
(1) Dispatch of Brig.-Gen. W. S. Delamain to Chief of General 
Staff, 16 November, 1914. See also, Moberly, Brig.-Gen. 
F.J., (History of the Great War based on Official Documents) 
The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918 (London, 1923-7), 
vol. I, p. 107. Hereafter referred to as 0 .H. (Official 
History).
(2) See bibliographical note, infra, p. 12.
2peaceful means had failed. When, therefore, from August, 1914, 
Turkey had given almost unmistakable indication that she would 
join the Central Powers against the Allies, the significance 
of her potential menace in Turkish Arabia could not be ignored. 
Her obvious military preparations: the general mobilization,
the movement of an unprecedented number of troops to Basra and 
below, ostensibly directed against Kuwait and against Arab up­
risings, the seizing of coal and supplies at Baghdad and Basra, 
the fortification of the Shatt al-*Arab below Basra and 
Mohammerah could scarcely be dismissed as attempts, in time of 
universal war-fever, to set her house in order, as the Sublime
Porte repeatedly assured Sir Louis Mallet, H. M. Ambassador in
(1)
Constantinople•
The possibility of war with Turkey alone or allied with 
Germany in the Middle East had been anticipated by General Haig, 
when Commander-in-Chief in India in 1911, in a memorandum in 
which he proposed the reorganization of the Indian Army to meet 
such a contingency. The occupation of Fao and Basra was no 
new project. It had been formally proposed by a special com­
mittee, composed of Admiral Sir E. Slade, Naval Commander-in- 
Chief, East Indies; Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, Chief of 
Staff, India; Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. McMahon, Foreign Secretary, 
India; and Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, on 
15 January, 1912, as a measure whereby the British position in
(1) See Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture 
of relations with Turkey, Accounts and Papers, 1914-1916.
(Cd. 7628} LXXXlV, 179, especially 'Dispatches, Nos. 3, 6,
14, 18, 64, 84, 87, 94, 118, 121 and 164.
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Turkish Arabia might be established in the face of unfriendly 
Turkish officials. The Government of India had not then ap­
proved of the plan except as part of widespread hostilities.
The project had been revived again in January, 1914, in connec­
tion with the defense of the Anglo-Persian oilfields, but the
reply of the Government of India, to whom the matter had been
(1)
referred, was not received until 30 July, 1914* Movements
and particulars of Turkish troops in the Tigris and Euphrates
valleys had been carefully recorded by H. M. Consuls at Baghdad,
Mosul and Basra. Military handbooks on Turkish Arabia had
(2)
been published; map and geographical surveys had been
(3)
carried out over a considerable period.
The hesitation which attended the final decision to send 
an expeditionary force to the head of the Gulf in anticipation 
of the outbreak of war should be attributed, not to any failure 
to recognize the importance of the threatened Imperial interests, 
but rather to a reluctance, in the face of the existing circum­
stances, to take the inevitable plunge.
The Government of India, fearing that its internal strength 
had already been seriously weakened by the withdrawal of troops 
overseas, felt unwilling to spare further forces for the pro­
posed expedition. It also feared the disastrous effects which
(1) 0.H*, vol. I, pp. 72 ff.
(2) Military Reports on Eastern Turkey in Asia (Secret), War 
Office, in progress from T9o4.
(3) Notably Lorimer’s Geographical and Statistical Gazeteer 
of the Persian Gulf.
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the initiation of hostilities against Turkey and the ‘Commander
(1)
of the Faithful1 might have on the Indian Muslims. To ap­
pear blameless in the eyes of Islam became of greater import­
ance, for the moment, than the gaining of immediate military 
and political advantages at the head of the Persian Gulf.
H. M. Government, on their part, although fully appreciat­
ing the proposals of the India Office and the Admiralty, formu­
lated after numerous conferences, hesitated to dissipate men and 
energy on so distant a venture while every effort was being made 
to stem the German advance in France and Flanders, and while 
there was even a remote possibility that Turkey might not de­
clare war.
By the middle of September, however, it became apparent to 
the Foreign Office, to the Naval authorities of the Admiralty 
and to the Military and Political staffs of the India Office 
that precautionary action at the head of the Gulf could no longei 
be delayed. The belief that war was imminent, a matter, even, 
of a few days, and that immediate action should be taken, was 
expressed by General Barrow, Military Secretary to the Secretary 
of State for India, in an appreciation of the situation, dated 
26 September, in which he declared that troops should be sent 
at once to the Shatt alJArab and landed on Persian soil, !ostens“ 
ibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify 
the Turks we mean business and to the Arabs we are ready to
(1) For a critical view of the attitude of the Government of 
India to the Mesopotamia Expedition, see Minority Report 
by Cmdr. Wedgwood, in Report of the Commissioners ...to 
enquire into the operations of War in Mesopotamia. Cd. 8€>1^
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(1)
support them.1
On the basis of this appreciation, Lord Crewe, the Secre­
tary of State for India, with the concurrence of Lord Kitchener, 
warned the Viceroy, on the same day: 1 Situation as regards
Turkey most menacing and it may be necessary to demonstrate at 
the head of the Gulf.* He further indicated that a secret ex­
pedition to Abadan was probable* On 2 October, with cabinet 
approval, the diversion of an infantry brigade, two mountain 
batteries, a company of sappers, and necessary medical and trans< 
port units was ordered to Abadan* In secret instructions, it 
was stated that the whole of the 6th Division would follow as
(2)
quickly as possible, in the event of hostilities with Turkey.
The destination was later changed to Bahrain, where the expedi­
tion was to await further orders, in deference to the continued 
protests of the Viceroy and of the Government of India, as ex­
pressed In telegrams from the latter, deprecating the dispatch 
of troops to Abadan as furthering Germany1s desire to create the 
impression that Turkey was being attacked, and maintaining that
such action would be regarded as direct provocation and pretext
(3)
for Turkey declaring war.
The necessity of safeguarding Persian oil supplies for 
British consumption has been the usual reason given for the
(1) OjH., vol. I, p. 86 ff*
(2) Ibid., p. 99*
(3) Government of India to Secretary of State (hereafter S/S) 
for India, O.H*, vol. I, p* 93 ff. Viceroy of India to 
S/S for India, ibid., p. 93 ff.
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consent of H. M. Government to the dispatch of the expeditionary
(1)
force to Basra, It cannot be overlooked that protection of 
the oil refineries and of the pipelines in Persia was a powerful 
consideration. Oil supplies under British control in 1914, 
while enormous, as a result of Lord Fisher1 s !oil policy1, were 
by no means adequate for a long drawn-out struggle. Further­
more, H. M. Government had acquired, as recently as 10 August, 
1914, £2,000,000 in shares and control of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company# The loss of control over supplies representing so 
recent and so important an investment could not be viewed with 
equanimity by either H. M, Government or the British taxpayers.
Nevertheless, the necessity of protecting Persian oil 
supplies was rather the reason which kept the expeditionary 
force in Turkish Arabia, than that which originally sent it 
there. Whatever part Persian oil eventually played in 1 float­
ing the Allies to victory on a wave of oil1, to recall Lord
(2)
Curzon!s famous remark, there appears to be little evidence 
to indicate that the necessity of its protection occupied so 
great a part in the final decision as has since been assigned 
to it. The immediate importance of the oil supplies was dis­
counted by the Admiralty Itself. Mr. Winston Churchill, First 
Lord of the Adrairality, wrote, on 1 September, in a minute on a 
memorandum by Admiral Slade urging the dispatch of an expedi­
tion: * There is little likelihood of troops being available
(1) Parliamentary Debates, H. of L.. 5th Series, vol. 40 (1920). 
p. 66'*.
(2) Speech made to the Inter-Allied Petroleum Council,
21 November, 1918.
7for this purpose. Indian troops must be used at the decisive
(1)
point. We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere.1
Nor did the India Office take the view that oil was the
chief objective to be gained in sending the expedition. In
(2)
his appreciation of 26 September, General Barrow placed oil
as the last of five objectives to be thus gained. The Secretary
of State for India, writing in a private letter to the Viceroy,
after the expedition had been ordered to proceed, stated: ’Of
the various objeots to be attained by sending a force up the
Gulf, I have always regarded the moral effect on the Arab chiefs
as the primary and the protection of the oil stores as the
(3)
secondary.1 The Government of India also held that oil was
not so valuable as to outweigh the consequenoes of an attack
(4)
on Persia.
The menace of Basra as a fortified enemy port from which 
enemy ships, or even submarines transported piecemeal over the 
disjointed sections of the Baghdad Railway, would strike at 
Imperial communications in the Indian Ocean, might have carried 
more weight in the decision to send the expedition had the 
Baghdad Railway been completed, or had Turkey, with the aid of
(1) Quoted O.H., vol. I, p. 82.
(2) Supra.,pp. 4t5.
(3) Letter (private), Lord Crewe to Viceroy, 9 October, 1914, 
quoted in evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission.
Also in 0 .H., vol. I, p.95.
(4) Telegram to S/S for India, 7 October, 1914, cited 0 .H., 
vol. I, p. 94.
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Germany, had the opportunity before the outbreak of war to 
establish an adequate naval base and force in the Persian Gulf. 
Information that the Emden might take refuge in the Gulf was 
discounted by the Admiralty. Any attack on India from Basra 
was, under the circumstances, regarded as unfeasible.
The paramount danger, in the opinion of H. M. Government, 
from hostile powers in Turkish Arabia, athwart lines of communi­
cation to Persia, Afghanistan and beyond, and to eastern Arabia 
via Zubair and Kuwait, was not merely the military or naval 
action which the Central Powers might take there. It was 
rather the power of Turkey as the principal Islamic state, In­
fluenced and supported by German funds, and by German officers 
who never wearied of proclaiming the pro-Islamic sympathies of 
the German Emperor, to utilize the latent forces of religion, 
of political discontent and of unrest in the Near and Middle 
East, to undermine and probably destroy the position and the 
prestige on which much of that position rested, which Great 
Britain had created and had maintained in the previous three 
hundred years.
In a memorandum of 2 September, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Polit­
ical Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, wrote:
The Political effect In the Persian Gulf and in India 
of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict will be disastrous, 
and we cannot afford politically, to acquiesce in such a 
thing for an Indefinite period while the main issues are 
being settled elsewhere. Prom the military point of view 
a Turkish diversion in that region is doubtless negligible, 
though under German officers it may not be wholly ineffect­
ive; but it will be worked for all it is worth for the 
sake of the political effect which the Turks and Germans 
hope to produce through it on Muslim feelings on India.
-9-
Moreover we cannot begin by sacrificing the Shaikh of 
Kuwait. U)
The views of General Barrow were stated no less succintly 
in a minute on the above memorandum. He declared, that in the 
event of hostilities:
The oil tanks and installation on Abadan island and the 
pipe-line from the oil-fields are exposed to instant destruc­
tion. British interests at Baghdad and Basra will be swept 
out of existence. Our Allies, the Shaikhs of Mohammerah and 
Kuwait will be threatened and may consequently be attacked 
or seduced, in which case all our prestige and all our labours 
of years will vanish into air and our position in the Gulf 
itself will become precarious. Can we avert this? (2)
Even more serious was the prospect of Turco-Arab co-operat3ar 
and of a Jihad or Holy War which might be directed against the 
Suez Canal and Egypt and which might spread by means of Turkish 
and German encouragement through Persia and Afghanistan to India, 
where, combined with latent sedition and rebellion, it might 
spread like wildfire at a time when India would be least able to 
cope with it. The conviction that these threats were real and 
were most potent reasons why the expedition should be sent was 
recorded by General Barrow in his memorandum of 26 September:
Such a contingency (immediate war with Turkey) need not 
alarm us unless the Turks succeed in drawing the Arabs to 
their side. In that case they will proclaim a Jihad and 
endeavour to raise Afghanistan and the frontier trTEes 
against us, which might be a serious danger to India and 
would most certainly add enormously to our difficulties and 
responsibilities. This shows how important it is to us to 
avert a Turco-Arab coalition. It is known that Turkey has 
been intriguing right and left to win over the Arabs, and 
it is even said that Ibn Sa*ud, the leading Arab Chief, has 
been induced to join the Turks. If this Is true (3) we may
(1) O.H., vol. I, p. 80.
(2) Ibid., pp. 80-1.
(3) Later found to be untrue. O.H., vol. I, p. 86.
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(1)
expect serious trouble in Mesopotamia and in Egypt.
Although events after the outbreak of the war were to prove 
that effective Arab co-operation had been greatly overstressed 
in London, the fear of German and Turkish propaganda and sub­
versive activities had not been without foundation. A German 
mission composed of 32 members was known to be on its way in
(2)
September, 1914, to Afghanistan by way of Aleppo and Kerman. 
Other missions, sent to stir up the Muslims in India, in the
(3)
Yemen and in Egypt, had been reported. Attempts were being
(4)
made to alienate the loyalty of the Shaikh of Mohammerah and
to induce Ibn Sa!ud, Amir of the Najd, to take up arms for
(5)
Turkey. In early October, Enver Pasha admitted that efforts
were being made to enlist Bedouin sympathies for the Ottoman
(6)
Empire. Confirmation of this and other efforts to stir up
(1) O.H., vol. I, pp. 86 ff.
(2) Accts. and Papers, 1914-1916 (Cd. 7628) LXXXIV, 179; Dis­
patch No".100, Sir E. Grey to Sir Louis Mallet, 29 September, 
1914.
(3) Ibid.; Dispatch No. 44, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, 28 
August, 1914; No. 59, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey,
5 September, 1914; No. 127, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey,
14 October, 1914; No. 150, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey,
19 October, 1914.
(4) Wilson, Sir A. T., Loyalties, Mesopotamia, 1914-1917, p. 7 
(Hereafter Mesopotamia, 1914-1917);*^
(5) Accts. and Papers, 1914-1916 (Cd. 7628) LXXXIV, 179, Dis­
pat ch No". 100, Sir E. Grey to Sir L. Mallet, 29 September,
1914.
(6) Ibid.; Dispatch No. 107, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey,
W  October, 1914.
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anti-British and anti-Russian feeling among the Arabs had also
(i)
been reported from all sections of Turkey’s Arab dominions,
(2)
A mission had been reported as destined for Persia, where
the future revelation of the activities of Wassmus, Neidermayer,
Zugmayer and others was to confirm the pre-war suspicion that
every effort was being made not only to embarrass the British
and Russians by sporadic hostilities, but also to force Perfiia,
as the second Islamic state, into war against the Allies, and
thus prove Germany’s contention that Islam itself was on the
(3)
side of the Central Powers,
A British expedition into Turkish Arabia would not only 
negative such threats against British prestige and position but 
would have even a more positive result. The occupation of Basra 
and its hinterland would consolidate Great Britain’s position at 
the head of the Persian Gulf. It would enable her to convert 
her special privileges in Turkish Arabia, laboriously won from 
the Sublime Porte and as tenaciously held, into rights by con­
quest, as had been proposed in 1912. It was an opportunity too 
tempting to be allowed to slip, as earlier and more subtle 
opportunities had been allowed to pass, of settling in her 
favour, once and for all, the international rivalries which had,
(1) Ibid.: No. 129, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, 15 October, 
1514; No. 163, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, 23 October, 
1914; No. 173, Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, 28 October, 
1914.
(2) Ibid.: No. 59, Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, 8 September,im .
(3) Sykes, Sir Percy, History of Persia ( 2 vols., 1930, 3rd. 
Ed.) vol. II, pp. 442-50. For extracts from the Diary of
Zugmayer, see O.H., vol. I ,  App. I ,  pp. 3 4 4 - 5 .
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more than once, threatened the status quo in the Persian Gulf, 
and, in turn, the peace of Europe. Once established at Basra, 
Great Britain, in the event of a successful outcome of the 
general struggle, could look forward to the maintenance of her 
time-honoured policy of keeping guard over India through her 
supremacy in the Gulf and its extensions, to the possible util­
ization of these same regions as links in speedier communica­
tions with India and to the restoration of her ancient trade 
and commercial supremacy In the Middle East.
NOTE.
In referring to the regions now known as 1 Iraq, the term 
Turkish Arabia has been employed for the pre-war period when 
that name was in general though not exclusive use in British 
official ciroles. Mesopotamia has likewise been used for the 
war period. Although in former times, the term * Iraq was 
rarely applied to the entire territory now included in the 
Kingdom of 1 Iraq, it came into partial use in official circles 
in 1918. It was not generally employed, however, until 1920-1.
In the spelling of Arabic place-names, the system adopted 
by the Royal Geographical Society has been followed, although 
departures have been made in several cases, as, for example, 
in Dair uz-Zur and Kut al-»Amara.
12a
EH
(4) State Papers (East Indies) No. 753.
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CHAPTER II.
THE GROWTH OF BRITISH INTERESTS 
IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES VALLEYS.
It was trade which first brought the English to the Persian
(1)
Gulf and into the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as it had
first taken them to India, China and Japan. In 1616, the East
India Company, hoping to find new markets for its woollen cloth,
no longer a novelty in India, dispatched the James under the
(2)
terms of the three farmans obtained by Richard Steele and John
(3)
Crowther from Shah Abbas in September, 1615, to Jask, just
outside the Clarence Straits. A few years later, 1619, the
monopoly of the silk trade through the Persian Gulf was granted
(4)
to the Company by Shah Abbas.
From the island city of Hormuz, the Portuguese, for more 
than a century, after their treaty with Shah Isma!il in 1515, 
adopted a dictatorial attitude towards trade other than their 
own and towards the Persians themselves. Within a few years,
(1) John Newbery, Ralph Fitch and John Elred of the Turkey and 
Levant Co., founded in 1581, had already passed from Aleppo 
to Baghdad and thence down the Persian Gulf to India. See: 
Purchas His Pilgrimes (ed. 1625), lib. viii, p. 449.
Hakluyt, Tome II, i, pp. 245-71; also Birdwood, Sir G., 
Report on Miscellaneous Old Records at the India Office 
(1896), p. 196.
(2) Farman, following the Persian
(3) Purchas His Pilgrimes, lib. iv, cap. xiii, p. 524. For
an account of the opening of trade with Persia by the Moscovy 
Co., see Early Voyages in Russia and Persia (Hakluyt Society), 
edited by" Mar gan, E7 £>. and C o o t e, C. H., (2 vols., 1886).
(4) State Papers (East Indies) No. 753.
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however, after the capture of Hormuz, in 1622, by the combined
(1)
forces of English and Persians, they speedily lost the ascend­
ancy in the Persian Gulf.
The mastery of trade, however, passed not to the English, 
who had been allowed to set up their chief factory at Bunder 
Abbas (literally, the custom house of Abbas), as Gombrun on the 
mainland was renamed, but to the Dutch. Not until 1766, when 
the Dutch factory on Kharag Island was destroyed by the Persians, 
and the Dutch threats to sweep the English from the seas had 
come to nothing in Europe, were the English able to gain the 
ascendancy in trade in the Middle East. This supremacy they 
have retained to the present day, notwithstanding the acute 
rivalry of other powers, notably Germany and Japan in the 
twentieth century.
Prom the first, the East India Company had been obliged to 
undertake more than purely commercial activities. The pioneer­
ing nature of their ventures and the distance from the home 
government made it essential that they, in common with other 
trading companies of that age, should maintain their own armies 
and navies, provide their own charts and conduct most of their 
own political negotiations, activities which, in the end, were 
to overshadow the commercial origins of the companies. One 
condition of the Agreement of 1622 with Shah Abbas had been 
that the company should maintain two ships of war on the Gulf
(1) Low, C. R., History of the Indian Navy (1877), vol. I ,  
pp. 31-7. The terms of co-operation were never fully 
carried out by the Persians.
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to safeguard navigation. Although the company apparently did
(1)
not or could not keep the condition at all times, neverthe­
less, armed ships of the company and later of its Bombay Marine 
were usually stationed in the Gulf on political missions or for 
the protection of trade.
Interference with trade by pirates threatened to be a more
serious obstacle to the English than the hostility of their
(2)
European rivals, the company not being able, nor at one time,
even willing to eradicate the evil. In 1705, the English
Agent at Gombrun reported that Arab piracy had obstructed trade
to such an extent that the Persians were using it as an excuse
(3)
for not paying the arrears of customs due to the company.
The Moghul, who blamed the English for the continued menace
from pirates, went so far as to place an embargo on trade which
was withdrawn only when the English, French and Dutch promised
(4)
concerted action against the marauders.
The later reluctance of the company to suppress the pir­
ates may be attributed to orders sent out by the Court of 
Directors, in the latter part of the 18th century, that the 
company1s ships were to take no action against the pirates save
(1) Fryer, Dr. J., physician to the East India Company, 
1672-81, makes the statement that the company had failed 
to maintain the two ships. Travels, p. 222, p. 353.
(2) Low, op. cit., vol. I, p. 79 ff. Also, Miles, S. B., 
Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, (1919), vol. I. 
pp.” '£66 tt.-----------------------------
(3) Miles, op. cit., vol. I, p. 223.
(4) Low, op. cit., vol. I, p. 82.
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(1)
in self-defence. These orders, maintained literally by the
(2)
Governor of Bombay, condemned English commercial interests 
to a state of endurance and, at the same time, gave further en­
couragement to the pirates. These freebooters, of whom the 
Jawasmi (properly tribes, occupying the coast from
Ras Musandum to Qatar peninsula, were the most numerous and 
troublesome, required little incentive, since they had come un­
der Wahhabi influence which, with its emphasis on the Muslim in­
junction of death and plunder to unbelievers, had already stimu­
lated their well-developed predatory habits.
Aroused, finally, by the continued attacks not only on
merchant shipping but also on cruisers, the company dispatched
(3) (4)
a series of expeditions from Bombay, in 1806, 1809 and 1819,
(5)
which effectually broke the power of the Pirate Coast tribes.
These were forced to sign the General Treaty of Peace, 8 January, 
(6)
1820.
Prom this treaty originally dictated by the demands of 
safety for trade, may be dated the beginning of the political
(1) Low, op. cit., vol. I, p. 317.
(2) Ibid., p. 313.
(3) Ibid., p. 325.
(4) Ibid., p. 351.
(5) The section of coast inhabited by the Arab pirates was then 
so-called. After the treaty it became known as the 
Trucial Coast.
(6) Aitchison, C. U., Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and 
Sanads relating to fadia and Neighbouring Countries,
(Delhi, 1933, 5th ed.), vol. XI., Persian Gulf, No. XIX.
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supremacy of Great Britain over the Arabs of the Gulf. It was 
eventually replaced in 1853 by a Treaty of Peace in perpetuity!1  ^
This treaty stipulated that 1 perfect maritime truce* now estab­
lished »for evermore1 should be enforced by the British Govern­
ment. All acts of aggression were to be referred to the 
British authorities in the Persian Gulf.
Traffic in slaves in the Gulf had been forbidden in 
Article 9 of the Treaty of 1820, but it had not been notice­
ably affected by the prohibition. Additional treaties and
(2)
agreements attempted to deal with the traffic, but only the
presence of British men-of-war on patrol in the Gulf, with orders
to seize all slaving-ships, effectively suppressed it.
Experience gained from the early attempts to deal with the
pirates, especially after the expeditions of 1809 and 1819, had
shown that the pirates might easily escape in the innumerable
bays and inlets of the Persian Gulf where English ships, through
lack of charts, did not dare sail. A preliminary survey of the
(3)
coast had been undertaken in 1772, but not until 1785 was the
first really important survey of the coast and of the Shatt al-
•Arab as far as Basra, undertaken by Lieutenant McCluer of the
(4)
Bombay Marine. The survey was resumed in 1820, after the 
expedition against the pirates in 1819, and under Captain Philip
(1) Aitchison, ibid., vol. XI, Persian Gulf No. XXIV.
(2) Ibid., vol. XIII (Calcutta, 1933, 5th ed.) Persia NoS.'XV,
XVT7 XIX; ibid., vol. XI, Persian Gulf Nos. IX, XX, XXIII,
XXVIII, X X T T T
(3) Low, op. cit., vol. I, p. 185.
(4) Ibid., pp. 187 ff.
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Maughan, and later, Captain Guy, continued for nine years, 
forming the basis of the present day charts of the Gulf.
Other surveys, principally in Turkish Arabia, were made through­
out the century until the outbreak of the war in 1914*
The keeping of the peace, the suppression of piracy, the 
charting of the rivers and seas, the restriction of slave-trad­
ing and the control of the traffic in arms have often been 
claimed, and rightly so, as due entirely to the efforts of 
Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. To go further, hov/ever, 
and ascribe these self-imposed tasks to motives of disinterest­
edness or pure philanthropy, or to describe them as forming
! (2)
1 the most unselfish page in history , and to adduce there­
from, as has so often been done, the right of Great Britain to 
supremacy in the Persian Gulf and its extensions, the Tigris 
and Euphrates valleys, is to disregard the true nature of Great 
Britain’s activities in the Middle East.
(1) Chesney, in 1835-6, made surveys of the Tigris and
Euphrates, a work carried on by Cmdr. Henry Blosse Lynch, 
from 1837 to 1840, when he surveyed the Tigris from Mosul 
to Ctesiphon, and sections of the Euphrates. Capt. J. C. 
Hawkins explored the Euphrates with great difficulty for 
some 500 miles above Basra in 1838. In 1840-2, the Tigris 
below Baghdad was surveyed by Lieut. C. D. Campbell. Com­
mander Felix Jones, 1843-54, explored the Persian hills 
from Baghdad to Mosul, and made surveys from Musaiyib to 
Baghdad. In 1841-2, and again in 1856, Capt. W. S. Selby 
made surveys from Babylon to Samawa and up the Karun river. 
See: Wilson, Sir A. T., Persian Gulf, pp. 281 ff. Low,
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 31 ff., pp. 403 ff.: also, Hoskins, 
H. British Routes to India, pp. 180-2.
(2) Lord Curzon, 21 November, 1903. See Lord Curzon in India, 
(1906), p. 502.
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Nations do not vie among themselves for control over lands 
and seas, primarily to give justice, to raise standards of liv­
ing among the people, or to suppress disorder per se. If 
these blessings come, they come as secondary aspects or as by­
products of men1s efforts to enlarge their economic resources, 
or to safeguard that which they have already won. It Is a 
commonplace that where trading ventures have gone forth to new 
lands in search of wealth, fresh markets, new or cheaper 
sources of raw materials or commodities, the extension of the 
political authority of the mother country has eventually followed 
In direct proportion to the economic value of the territory 
concerned or to the degree of resistance which is offered by 
its inhabitants. Only political authority, with force at its 
disposal, can guard from external attack that which has already 
been won, or break the opposition of the native peoples and 
pave the way for further extension of territory. Only by the 
assumption of authority can a continuity of administration be 
provided, without which commerce cannot flourish. It only can 
maintain order, establish legal security, regulate tariffs and 
imposts, under which the economic development of the territory 
can proceed on the most favourable conditions to the nationals 
of the mother country.
If these benefits extend to the natives of the country it 
is because the latter cannot, in the very nature of the circum­
stances, help sharing them. If conscious efforts are made to 
extend improved conditions and to encourage the so-called arts 
of peace among the native population, it Is because any increase
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of their well-being must lead to their increased productiveness 
and purchasing power and to less costly methods of control and 
of administration.
It cannot be denied that individual officials and even the 
mother country itself are often genuinely concerned for the 
well-being of the peoples they have taken in charge. The 
records of India, for instance, are crowded with the names of 
soldiers and administrators who have given full measure of de­
votion to the peoples under them. In a conflict of interests, 
and these must inevitably occur, it is only natural that those 
of the mother country should come first, and that the good of 
the people themselves must, in reality, be subordinated to the 
expected material or political returns.
It is a further commonplace that once political authority 
has been established under such circumstances, it tends to for­
get the commercial origins which called it into being in the 
new territories. Its own maintenance becomes its chief object­
ive. In extenuation of such diversion of aim, it might claim 
that only thus can it facilitate economic development, provide 
opportunities for the employment of its own nationals, and in­
crease the prestige and power which are associated with the 
command of such territory.
The political authority is therefore constantly engaged in 
efforts to consolidate its control over the territory won, and 
to extend wherever possible, by conquest or peaceful penetration, 
its dominion. Its aim is not merely the increase of its own 
power and Importance. It also seeks to bring the new
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territories to strategical frontiers or to develop them along 
strategical lines of communication so that they may act as 
buffers to the original spheres of interest, particularly if 
these original spheres, by reason of their vastness and economic 
importance, have become vital to the continued well-being of 
the mother country*
These observations seem to be borne out particularly by the 
history of the relation between the Persian Gulf and Turkish 
Arabia, on the one hand, and India, on the other* Trade, as 
has already been shown, was the original objective of the East 
India Company in India and in the Persian Gulf. In the promo­
tion and the protection of trade, the company was led, as has 
been related, into activities which, taking on the inevitable 
political aspect, were to overshadow the company’s original aim.
European Politics and Development of British Political Influence 
in the Persian Gulf.
The increasing tendency, as the years passed, towards 
political sovereignty on a territorial or a quasi-territorial
CO
basis, while revealed early in the company’s attitude to India, 
became fully apparent in the Gulf and in Turkish Arabia when, 
as one of the three Middle East corridors to India and as a
(1) On 12 December, 1687, the company wrote to the President of 
Port St. George; ’That which we promise ourselves in a 
most especial manner from our new President and council is 
that these will establish such a politic of civil and 
military power and create and secure a large revenue to 
maintain both at that place as may be the foundation of a 
large, well grounded, sure English Dominion in India for 
all time to come.’ (Diary of Sir William Hedges, p. 117) 
See also, Resolution passed by the Court of Directors of 
the Company, 1689, Birdwood, op* cit., p. 230.
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flank to the other two routes, they were taken into the arena 
of European politics. The schemes of Napoleon to bring 
England to her knees by the invasion of India, to which the 
brilliancy of his military genius and his spectacular negotia­
tions with Russia, Turkey and Persia lent more colour than sub­
stance, and the subsequent Russian expansion to the south 
aroused both official and public opinion to fear for the safety 
of India, From that time, even to the present day, the polit­
ical control of all possible routes to India, by Herat or 
Baluchistan, by the Gulf, by the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, 
or by the long sea route around the Cape has become the object 
of special solicitude to the authorities in England and in 
India, Such concern has varied with the fears for the safety 
of India and the prevailing official view as to the necessity 
of controlling any particular route.
In the early 19th century, Great Britain1 s interest in the 
Persian Gulf and in Turkish Arabia was, primarily, their im­
portance as outposts of India, and as points from which Persia 
and the two other Middle East routes through Baluchistan and 
Afghanistan might be controlled, their passage by an unfriendly 
Power prohibited. The additional importance of the Gulf, to­
gether with the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, as an alternative 
or quicker route to India was realized first when the potential­
ity of steam as applied to river craft and railways became evi­
dent, and later, when the development of the internal combustion 
engine opened the way for Empire air communi cat ions •
The extension and consolidation of British political
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organization were among the first steps toward the conversion 
of the Persian Gulf into an Indian lake. A number of the 
points at which the East India Company had set up its represen­
tatives had already exercised considerable extra-commercial in­
fluence. Their political importance was recognized by the 
British Government in the establishment of consulates, as at 
Basra in 1764. At Bushire, the centre of Great Britain1 s in­
terests in the Gulf, a representative of H. M. Government re­
placed an official of the East India Company as Resident. 
Harford Jones, Resident at Basra, was sent, in 1798, to Baghdad 
as permanent Resident, with a double object: to arrange with
the Pasha for the transmission of official dispatches across
the Wilayet, and to observe and counteract the work of French
(1)
agents believed to be active in that region. It soon became
the chief centre of British influence in Turkish Arabia. By
1822, the entire establishment of the East India Company had
acquired a political status. Factors and brokers became
Political Residents and native Agents. The relations between
the Gulf and England had passed from the ledgers of merchants
(2)
to the dispatches of statesmen.
The political organization which was thus initiated to 
cover the vital points of the Persian Gulf area was augmented
(1) India Office Records, vol. 6, Loose Papers, Packet 11, 
Bundle 1, Nos. 7, 6. Jones was created a baronet for his 
services.
(2) Curzon, G. N., Persia and the Persian Question (2 vols., 
1892) vol. II, p.553. Until tlhe war tne Residents at 
Bushire and Baghdad, and the Consuls at Meshd, Shiraz, 
Mohammerah and Basra were nominated and paid by the Govern­
ment of India, but reported both to it and to the Foreign 
Office. Ibid. p. 624.
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by specific measures designed to meet events as they arose.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, Governor-General of Bengal, alarmed
for the safety of India, sent Sir John Malcolm, in 1800, to the
Shah1 s Court on a successful mission, of which the threefold
purpose was, in Malcolm's words:
To restore India from the annual alarm of Zemam Shah's 
(ruler of Afghanistan) invasion; to counteract the possi­
ble attempt of those villainous but active democrats, the 
French; and to restore some part of its former prosperity, 
a trade which has been in a great degree lost.(l)
(2)
When French influence nullified the work of the mission,
(3)
a squadron of cruisers was sent to patrol the Gulf, 1806-7.
Several other missions were sent to the Shah, including that of
Sir Harford Jones (later Brydges), former Resident at Basra and
Baghdad. He had been sent in 1808 by the British Government
as Envoy Extraordinary and proceeded, in his own words, 'to
throw the aegis of the British Crown over the imperilled destin-
(4)
ies of India.' A preliminary treaty of alliance with Persia
(1) Cited by Wilson, Sir A. T., Persian Gulf, p. 25. For 
treaties concluded by Malcolm: Aitchison, op. cit.,
vol. XIII, Persia Nos. Ill, IV. Cf. Rawlinson, Sir H. C., 
England and Russia in the East (TSVs) p. 10; Sykes, Sir 
Percy, op. cit., vol." Xl, p. 501.
(2) Gardane, Le Cte. Alfred de, Mission du General Gardane en 
Perse, sous le Premier Empire. PocumenFs his tori ques"T7.. 
(Paris, 1665), pp. l£-25, 82-94, 107-5&,“ 805-06;
Driault, E., La Politique Orientale de Napole'on, Sebastian! 
et Gardane (Paris, 1904), pp. 170-3, SlO-22. See also, 
Fontanier, V., Voyage dans l'Inde et dans le Golfe Persique 
par l'Egypte et la Mer Rouge (5 vols., Paris. 1844-6). 
vol. II, pp. 6, 199, 3:19.
(3) Gardane, op. cit., pp. 252-4; Driault, op. cit., pp. 336-9; 
Low, op. cit"., vol. I, p. 318.
(4) Cited Sykes, op. cit., vol. II, p.307.
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( 1 )
was negotiated by him on 12 March, 1809, which gave way, in
(2)
1614, to a so-called Definitive Treaty. This treaty, how­
ever, produced few of the benefits which the British Government 
had hoped to gain from it.
The Napoleonic menace to India, probably more dreaded than
(3)
real, passed, but the Russian pressure southward, begun in
the later part of the 18th century, intensified. Russia^
long strides over the Caucasus, to the sea of Aral, 1844-8, into
the valley of the Sir Darya, 1849-64, to Khiva, 1873, and
Khokand, 1876, and after the fall of Geok Teppe, the Turcomans1
most formidable fortress, into Merv, February 1884, brought her
(4)
almost to Indian Central Asian frontiers. These territor­
ies were consolidated by the construction of railroads. Her 
slow but unceasing assimilation of territory in northern Persia 
and her acquisition of markets and influence over even larger 
areas, including the capital itself, confirmed British merchants 
and statesmen in their fear that Russian designs included the 
subjection of Persia, not only for the sake of commerce, but
(1) Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XIII, Persia No. V; British and 
Foreign State Papers (hereafter Brit, and For. St. Papers) 
I, 258; Summary in Hertslet, Sir E., Treaties, etc. con­
cluded between Great Britain and Persia and between Persia 
and other Powers ... in force 1 April, 1891 (1891) , p. 4
(2) Aitchison, op. cit., Persia No. VII; Brit, and For. St. 
Papers, I, 261. ’See also Sykes, op. cit., vol. 11, 
pp. 307 ff.
(3) Brit, and For. St. Papers, I, 151-170.
(4) Sykes, op. cit., vol. II, p. 354 ff.
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also to guarantee access to India by the Persian Gulf or by 
Central Asia,
These fears were not allayed by Russian efforts to obtain
a coaling station in the Gulf at the end of the 19th century,
by the establishment of Russian consulates at Bushire, Basra
(1)
and Baghdad where few, if any, Russian subjects lived, and 
by the steady infiltration over the mountains of Kurdistan to­
ward Baghdad, Not less disturbing were the activities of 
Russian financiers with political backing, in the Banque 
d!Escompte et des Prets de Perse, in seeking concessions in
Persian and in Turkey, such as Count Kapnist1s project for a
(2)
Mediterranean-Kuwait Railroad, or in blocking concessions to
other powers, as by the Russo-Persian Railway Agreement of
(3)
12 November, 1890. All of these were regarded, with some
justification, as manifestations of the Russian dream of a vast 
Oriental Empire, including India and warm water ports, as re­
vealed in the will of Peter the Great, which, even if spurious,
1 enshrines with admirable fidelity the leading principles that
(4)
have guided the Asiatic policy of his country ever since.1
(1) Wilson, Sir A. T., Persian Gulf, p. 259; Frazer, Lovat,
India under Curzon and Afterr"p. 91.
(2) The Times, 17 December, 1898.
(3) Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XIII, Persia App. No. XXIII.
(4) Curzon, op. cit., vol. II, p. 601. Sykes, op. cit..
vol. II, p. 245, gives an English version of the will, 
but gives no indication that it is a forgery.
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Persia!s attempts to counterbalance with conquests in the
(1)
south-east what she had lost to Russia elsewhere, brought
her into opposition with Great Britain. The presence of 
Persia in Herat and Afghanistan, in British opinion, meant in
reality, the eventual, painless installation of Russia there. 
In the efforts of Great Britain to thwart Persia, which in-
with Persia herself, 1856-7, successful military and naval ac­
tions were launched from the Gulf, demonstrating the possibil­
ity of controlling Persia from her south-west flank.
Consolidation of British Influence in the Persian Gulf.
The advance of Russia, and at the end of the 19th century, 
the appearance of Germany as a serious claimant for a place in 
Turkish Arabia and in the Persian Gulf, coincided with 1 a
(1) The Treaties of Turkomanchai, 22 February, 1822, not only 
gave Russia rich Persian territories, including Erivan and 
Nakhchivan, special commercial advantages, and extra­
territorial rights over Russians in Persia, but also re­
vealed to Europe that Persia was not the strong, independ­
ent power that she was believed to be. See Sykes, op. cit., 
vol. II, pp. 311, 318 ff. For texts of the Treaties, see 
Hertslet, o “ .....
XV, 669.
(2) Brit, and For. St. Papers, XXIII, 864-5; XXV, 1247. 1249
IS53; X lV, T£T1T. ---
(3) Lieut.-Gen. Sir Janies Outram1 s Persian Campaign in 1857
(4) Low, op. cit., vol. II, p. 98; Asiatic Jour., vol. XXVI, 
N.S., Pt. IT; Brit, and For. St. Papers, XLVII, 282 ff.; 
Douglas, Sir G., and Ramsey, Sir G., Panmure Papers (2 vols., 
1908), vol. II, p. 470. For Treaty of Paris, 4 March,
1857, by which Persia recognized the independence of 
Afghanistan; Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XIII, Persia 
No. XVIII; also Brit, and For. St. Papers, XLVII, 42.
(2)
eluded numerous missions, an Afghan war, 1838-42 and a war
(4)
vol. XIII, a App. n o . Vilj Brit, ana POr. St. Papers
(1860)
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deliberate but necessary consolidation of our (British) influ­
ence’ in the ’quarters where trouble threatened or where rival-
(1)
ry was feared,’ that is, In the Gulf and in the Tigris and
Euphrates valleys..
In the Persian Gulf, veiled protectorates were established
over the Arab chiefs. The Shaikh of Bahrain agreed on 22
December, 1880, to abstain from entering into negotiations or
treaties with any other government than Great Britain. Nor
were diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling stations to be
(2)
established without its consent. In 1892, an even more
comprehensive agreement was signed by the Shaikh of Bahrain and
by the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast. It was agreed that none
of them would enter into treaties except with Great Britain,
nor admit agents of any other power, nor alienate any territory
(3)
save by permission of the British Government.
Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait, who possessed the finest natural
harbour in the Persian Gulf, and who had repeatedly asked for
British protection, was brought into treaty relations 23 January,
(4)
1399, at the direction of Lord Curzon, on the same conditions
(1) Accts. and Papers, 1908 (Cd. 3882) CXXV, 457; Extract from 
a Despatch from the Government of India to S/S for india in 
Council, dated September 21st.. 1899, referring to British 
policy in Persia. Paras. 42-69 of this dispatch are given 
more fully in British Documents on Origin of the World War, 
1898-1914, Gooch and Temperley (11 vols., 1967- ). (Here­
after Brit. Docs.)
(2) Aitchison, Op. cit., vol. XI, Persian Gulf No. XII.
(3) Trucial Coast Agreement, 6 March, 1892: ibid., Persian
Gulf No. XXX; Bahrain Agreement, 13 March, 1892; ibid., 
Persian Gulf No. XIII. -----
(4) Pari. Debates, H. of L., 5th S., vol. 7 (1911), p. 587.
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(1)
as the other shaikhs of the Gulf, His earlier requests had
been refused, as he was under the nominal sovereignty of the
(2)
Ottoman Empire, and, strictly speaking, was an usurper. The 
prospect of Kuwait, however, as a Russian port or as the German 
terminus of the Baghdad Railway overcame any scruples which may 
have been felt. One of the first administrative acts of Lord 
Curzon was to direct Col. Meade, Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf, to enter into treaty relations with Shaikh 
Mubarak.
Khaza’al, Shaikh of Mohammerah, owing allegiance to Persia,
and possessing immense power on both the Persian and Turkish
sides of the lower Shatt al-*Arab, over which he exercised de
facto control, was also brought, on Lord Curzon1 s suggestion,
(3)
into excellent understanding with the British Government.
(1) Aitchison, op. cit., Persian Gulf No. XXXVI.
(2) It is impossible here to go fully into the arguments for
and against the position of Kuwait as a part of the Ottoman
Empire. Lord Curzon, in 1892, had recognized that Kuwait 
owed allegiance to Turkey. He wrote: 1 Northward from
Port of Ujair, Ottoman dominion is established (on the Arab 
coast of the Gulf) without dispute as far as Fao.1 Op. cit., 
vol. II, p. 462. Kuwait was included in the territory
thus described. Sir A. T. Wilson, (Persian Gulf, p. 251)
wrote, 1928, that until 1896, it was !regarded at home as 
under the exclusive influence of Turkey.1 It would appear 
that while Ottoman sovereignty had never been contested 
until 1899, its claim had rested lightly on the Shaikh.
In the agreements between Great Britain and Turkey, 1913- 
14, never ratified, Kuwait was recognised as an autonomous 
qadha in which the British had a privileged position.
(3) Further agreements not to give pearl or sponge fishing con­
cessions except by permission of the British Government, 
were signed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, 29 July, 1911, and 
later in the same year by the Shaikh of Bahrain and the 
shaikhs of the Trucial Coast, Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XI. 
Persian Gulf No. XXXIX. Agreements not to allow other
post offices than those of India were signed by the Shaikh of
(Continued over)
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The ambitions of France, the menace of Russia and later, the
rivalry of Germany, together with the necessity of British control,
of the Persian Gulf and its extensions, had not been unobserved
by British statesmen, writers and publicists of the 19th century.
Outstanding among these were: David Urquhart, 1805-77, one time
minister to Turkey, strongly anti-Russian and pro-Turkish in his
(1)
sympathies, a prolific writer and speaker; Viscount Stratford
de Redcliffe, 1786-1880, the most aggressive British Ambassador
of the 19th century to the Sublime Porte, who disliked the Turks
(2)
but hated the Russians; Sir H. C. Rawlinson, 1810-95, a strong 
advocate of the 1 Forward1 policy for India. He spent many years
in service of the Crown in the East, including a term as British
(3)
Resident at Baghdad.
It was Lord Curzon, however, who, having taken India and the
(continued) Kuwait, 28, February, 1904, ibid., No. XXXVIII; by 
the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1911, not to grant oil concessions 
without permission of the British Government; by the Shaikh 
of Kuwait, 27 October, 1913, ibid., No. XLI; by the Shaikh 
of Bahrain, 14 May, 1914, ibid., No. XVI; by the shaikhs of 
the Trucial Coast In February and May, 1922, ibid., Nos.XXXIV, 
XXXV. The Shaikh of Qatar entered into an agreement on 3 
November, 1916, to observe all previous treaties with the 
shaikhs of the Persian Gulf, ibid., No. XXXIII.
(1) Among his voluminous writings were: Turkey and its Resources,
(1833), England, France, Russia and Turkey, (~i833), Spirit of 
the East (1838), and The Lebanon~(~2 ~vols., 1860) • His only 
biography is Inadequate: David Urquhart, by Robinson, G.,
(1920).
(2) Life of the Rt. Hon. Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de 
Redcliffe, ~by Poole, S. L ., f2~voIs ., 1888) £s "the‘standard 
biography; the Life, by Smith, E., (1933) is a newer inter­
pretation.
(3) England and Russia in the East (1875) is his best known 
work.
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Middle East as his special spheres of interest, did more, both 
as a private citizen and as a public servant, than any other
(i)
individual of his day to focus attention on rival ambitions
in the Middle East, particularly those of Russia, and to
strengthen India1 s defences against what he believed to be a
danger of the greatest magnitude. From his school days at Eton,
(2)
he had mistrusted Russia and his subsequent travels in Central
Asia, India and the Far East, 1887 to 1894, confirmed him in his
(3)
views. He was convinced that Russian threats to Great 
Britain from South Persia and Turkish Arabia, could not, commer­
cially, politically or strategically be tolerated. !Are we 
prepared1 he asked,
to surrender control of the Persian Gulf and divide that of 
the Indian Ooean? Are we prepared to make the construction 
of the Euphrates Valley Railroad or some kindred scheme an 
impossibility for England and an ultimate certainty for 
Russia? Is Baghdad to become a new Russian capital in the 
south? Lastly, are we content to see a naval station 
within a few days sail of Kurrachi and to contemplate a 
hostile squadron battering Bombay?(4)
(1) See tribute paid to him by Lovat Frazer, one time editor of 
the * Times of India1, in Pro. C. Aslan Soo., 8 January, 1908, 
pp.7 ff., and In India uncfer Curzon and After (1911), p. 9.
(2) Frazer, Lovat, op. Qlt., P* 8* Also Leslie, Shane, Studies 
in Sublime Failures (1932), p. 204.
(3) Curzon, G. N., Russia in Central Asia (1899), Also 
Quarterly Review, January, 1887.
(4) Curzon, op. cit., p. 378. Contrast his view, of the 
Euphrates Valley Railroad here, with that expressed in Persis 
and the Persian Question, vol. I, pp. 635 ff. It would 
seem that he, In common with many of his fellow countrymen, 
while unable to approve of Great Britain building the rail­
way, were concerned that no other nation should be permitted 
to do so.
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In his official role as Under Secretary of State for India,
1891-92, and later as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
under Lord Salisbury, 1892-8, and more especially as Viceroy of
India, 1899-1905, he put his convictions into practice. The
Indian Frontiers were strengthened, the North West Frontier
(1)
province was instituted and a frontier policy evolved.
The question of the defence of India against European rivals
was reviewed at the instance of Lord Curzon and set forth at
(2)
length is the now famous dispatch of 21 September, 1899. This 
dispatch reminded the Seoretary of State for India of the British 
and Anglo-Indian commercial supremacy, amounting in many in­
stances to almost a monopoly, in the Persian Gulf ports, of how 
the carrying trade was almost exclusively in British or Anglo- 
Indian bottoms, and of how many Indians had settled in Persian 
Gulf ports. It emphasized in detail that the de facto political 
position reflected a more positive British predominance than the 
de jure position might indicate. The Viceroy in Council de­
clared;
Upon the question of allowing any European Power and 
more especially Russia, to overrun Central and Southern 
Persia and so to reach the Gulf or to acquire naval facili­
ties in the latter even without such territorial connections, 
we do not conceive that any doubt whatever can be enter­
tained; and we imagine that it is accepted as a cardinal
(l)His views on frontier policy may be examined at length in
his Budget speeches of 27 March, 1901, of 26 March, 1902, and 
30 March, 1904; also in his speech at the Durbar at Peshawar, 
26 April, 1902. Excerpts from all these may be found in
Lord Curzon in India, (1906), pp. 415 ff., 418 ff., 428 ff., 
422 "ffrespectively.
(2) Accts and Papers, 1908, (Cd.3882) CXXV, 457; with additional 
material in Brit. Docsvol.IV, No. 319, pp. 356-^63.
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axiom of British policy that no such development would be 
acquiesced in by H.M.Government. (1)
To curb Russian rivalry, three possible policies were put
forward. Of these the most favoured was that of partitioning
(2)
Persia into spheres of influence along specific boundaries,
as was eventually done by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.
It was pointed out, however, at the time, that if the agreement
were made as suggested, it
would not for one moment retard, but might on the contrary 
accelerate her (Russia) advance to the same objective through 
Mesopotamia by way of Baghdad. This is an issue which we 
should regard with scarcely inferior repugnance. (3)
The efforts made during Lord Curzon1 s Viceregency to secure 
by treaty further control of the Independent Arab Chiefs, and 
to establish a friendly understanding with the Shaikhs of 
Mohammerah and of Kuwait, were capped by vigorous action to pro­
tect the Shaikh of Kuwait from the attempts to reassert Turkish 
authority over his territory. Twice in 1901, a British cruiser 
was sent to his aid. The threats of Ibn Rashid against Kuwait, 
in the same year, were countered by the dispatch of three 
British cruisers to the harbour, and of British troops to Port 
Jahara, 18 miles Inland. A later attempt by the nephews of
(3.) Ibid., p. 8.
(2) Ibid., * Sir M. Durand has drawn a line across Persia from 
Khanikin on the Turkish frontier on the West, through 
Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd and Kerman to Selstan and 
the Afghan Frontier on the East, as indicating approximately 
the existing line of partition between the British spheres 
of influence both political and commercial in Persia.1
(3) Ibid., p. 10.
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( 1 )
Shaikh Mubarak to unseat him was dispersed by H.M.S. Lapwing.
To renew Arab confidence in Great Britain's power, already
somewhat shaken by German propaganda, Lord Curzon, accompanied
by eight ships of war, paid, in November and December, 1903,
(2)
the first viceregal visit in history to the Gulf. Speaking
to the assembled chiefs at a Durbar at Sharja, 21 November, he 
revealed his attitude to the question of Great Britain's place 
in India and the Middle East, a point of view which was to come 
to the fore again when Lord Curzon, in the months immediately 
following the Armistice, dominated the Middle East policy of 
Great Britain. He said, in part, to the shaikhs:
We were here before any other power, in modern times, 
had shown its face in these waters. We found strife and 
we have created order. It was our commerce as well as 
your security that was threatened and called for protection. 
At every port along these coasts, the subjects of the King 
of England still reside and trade. The great Empire of 
India, which it is our duty to defend, lies almost at your 
gates. We saved you from extinction at the hands of your 
neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all 
nations and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have 
not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed 
your independence but have preserved it. We are not now 
going to throw away this century of costly and triumphant 
enterprise; we shall not wipe out the most unselfish page 
in history. The Peace of these waters must still be 
maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; 
and the influence of the British Government must remain 
supreme.
His speech was in keeping with the statement made by Lord
(1) Times History of the War 22 vols., (1914-1921), vol. Ill, 
ch. LII. Also, Frazer, op. cit., p. 10.
(2) Curzon’s meeting at Kuwait with 'the late Mr. Reynolds, Mr. 
d’Arcy’s oil engineer, who was on his way to England, led
to his (Mr. Reynolds) return to examine the Maidan-i-Naptura 
area and the discovery of the Anglo-Persian oilfields.'
Dane, Sir Louis, The Times, 6 April, 1935.
(3) Lord Curzon in India, p. 502.
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Lansdowne, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Lords, 
5 May, 1903. Had any previous doubt existed as to British 
official policy for the Persian Gulf, none should have occurred 
thereafter. He said, in parts
It seems to me that our policy(with regard to the 
Persian Gulf) should be directed in the first place to 
protect and promote British trade in those waters. In 
the next place I do not think ... that ... those efforts 
should be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate 
trade of other powers. In the third place - I say it 
without hesitation - we should regard the establishment of 
a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf 
by any other power as a very grave menace to British inter­
ests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means 
at our disposal. (1)
BRITISH INTERESTS IN TURKISH ARABIA.
In the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, provinces of the
Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was less able to adopt the vigor-
(2)
ous policy pursued in the Persian Gulf. For the most part, 
she continued to rely, for the maintenance of her interests, on
(1) Pari. Debates, H. of L.# 4th Sj k v , vol. 121, (1903), 
pprT34T-S. '
(2) Cf. proposals to occupy Basra in 1911, and in January, 1914, 
O.H., vol. I, p. 73. Turkish authorities were aware of 
Great Britain1s desire to increase her influence. Cf. 
Speech of a Member of the Committee of Union and Progress, 
Baghdad, 18 April, 1911: 1 Listen, dear compatriots - For
a number of years England has been endeavouring to increase 
her political influence in the Persian Gulf. This influ­
ence is being felt in Basra ... We must be ready to re­
sist any political aggression on our territories. We must 
awaken our Government to take immediate steps to protect 
Basra.1 Also speech of the Wali of Baghdad, 30 August, 
1911, cited infra, p. 73, and Al-Misbah, (Baghdad),
14 March, 1913, which warned readers that Great Britain in­
tended to do in Turkish * Iraq what sha had done in India, 
that the Lynch Company, supported by England, were 
1 harbingers of a vast colony here*, and advised readers 
*to arm themselves to fight the pioneers of the colonizing 
army • *
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her traditional prestige at the Sublime Porte and on the ex­
tension of her special position in Turkish Arabia, dating from 
the establishment of the first English factory at Basra in
1643, after the first venture of the East India Company there
(1)
in 1635.
Much of the British influence in the valleys had been the
result of the political organization deliberately set up in
recognition of their strategical importance. The Baghdad
Residency, supplanting that of Basra, in 1810, as the chief
(2)
political centre of Great Britain in Turkish Arabia, ac­
quired considerable political influence with local Turkish 
authorities, who had not been averse to making use of British
(3)
assistance against Persian or Arab disturbers of the peace.
(1) For an able resume of the early development of British 
trading interests in * Iraq, see Longrigg, S., Four 
Centuries of Modern 11raq (1925), pp. 107, 175, 158, 254-5 
passim.
(2) A Consulate had been established at Basra, 1764, and an 
Agency at Baghdad, 1755, which, because of commercial and 
political developments, but mainly because of the Napoleonic 
scare, had been raised to a Residency in 1798. Supra, p.24.
(3) In 1763, the Pasha of Baghdad asked for help against the 
Ka*ab, who were attacking towns and shipping around Basra. 
Six ships were eventually sent from Bombay, in 1766.
Later, in 1774, when ships had been furnished to the Pasha, 
he requested the British to use them as they thought fit 
for Turkish interests. In 1778, the British aided the 
Turks to regain Basra from the Persians, while in 1798,
the Resident at Bushire was called in to adjust claims 
between the Sultan of Oman and the Pasha of Baghdad. Wken
there was a possibility, between 1835 and 1839, that 
Muhammad Ali’s Egyptian army might advance from the head of 
the Gulf and attack Baghdad, it is reported that the Turkish 
Government asked for British intervention. Hogarth, D, G., 
Penetration of Arabia, pp. 84-7, 104, passim.
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( 1 )
The development of canal and river navigation between
1820 and 1840 gave the Mesopotamian valleys a new importance to
the British Government and to the Indian Presidencies when, in
the 19th century, they sought speedier communications between
(2)
India and England. The scheme to establish communications
with India by means of a line of mail steamers running regularly 
on the Euphrates River, found its chief early protagonist in 
Captain F. R. Chesney, R.A., who had been commissioned in 1830
(3)
by the British Ambassador at Constantinople, to investigate
(4)
both the Egyptian and the Euphrates valley routes.
H. M. Government was inclined to look with more favour on 
the Mesopotamian route than on the one through Egypt and the 
Red Sea. The former would not only give Great Britain a 
strategical position from which to check Russia’s thrust to the 
south, but would also provide a route to India removed as far
(1) During the early part of the 19th century, navigation by 
canal and river multiplied in every direction between 
England and Europe. It was even suggested that river 
communications with India might be established by way of 
the Rhine, Danube, Orontes, Euphrates and Indus.
(2) Pari. Debates, 3rd S., vol. 26, (1834), p. 142; Pari.
Papers, i83l-2 (735-11) X, Pt. II, App. 25, 675 ff.; 1834
('478) XIV, 369 ff.; 1837 (540) XLIII, 223; 1837-8 (356)
XLI, 365.
(3) Pari. Papers, 1834 (478) App. 16, 50.
(4) Pari. Papers, 1834 (478) XIV, App. 16; Reports on the
Navigation of the Red Sea and River Euphrates, Submitted to 
Government, by Capt. Che's ney, fr.R.S. of the Royal Artillery. 
Ohesney jiaa at first, because of marshes, difficulties of 
navigation and unfriendliness of the Arabs, taken an un­
favourable view of the Euphrates route (Ibid., p. 51), but 
later he modified his views.
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as possible from the domination of Muhammad *All's Egyptian 
Empire. Prance was believed to be behind Muhammad !Ali, and, 
as Lord Palmerston declared, 1 The Mistress of India cannot per­
mit Prance to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to
(1)
her Indian dominions.* Parliament was induced, therefore,
in August, 1834, to vote £20,000 for the construction of tv/o 
river steamers and for a thorough survey of the Euphrates 
Valley route.
Pew of the results so confidently promised by Chesney were
accomplished, although he actually succeeded, under great
(2)
difficulties, in launching two small river steamers on the
Euphrates, in reaching Basra and in obtaining much additional
(3)
information.
The impracticability of the Euphrates River route had been 
amply proven by 1837, but not until 1842, when the political 
situation had improved, was the expedition formally disbanded. 
The Near and Middle East had then become comparatively quies­
cent. The Turco-Egyptian problem had been settled, to Lord
(4)
Palmerston1s satisfaction, by the Protocol of London, 1841.
(1) Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, E., The Life of Henry John Temple, 
Viscount Palmerston (3 vols., lSVo-4), vol. II, p. 293.
(2) Pari. Papers, 1837 (540) XLIII, 235 ff.; Chesney, P. R., 
Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition (1868), pp. 172 ff.; 
Poole, S. L., (Ed.) Life of General R. Chesney, (1885)
pp. 293 ff.
(3) The important surveys by Chesney and his successors
(supraTp. 17-18) paved the way for the Lynch navigation line, 
and linked the attempt of 1834-42 to open a through route 
between India and England with the later projects of 1856-7.
(4) Brit, and For. St. Papers, XXIV, 703 ff.
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The participation of the Five Powers in the Protocol indicated 
that the safety of eastern routes had become a major issue in 
European diplomacy. By the Protocol, Russian claims to inter­
fere in Turkey were, for the time being, removed. France was 
rendered powerless to dominate, by means of her protege 
Muhammad »Ali, either highway to India, through Egypt or by 
Turkish Arabia. The latter route was, therefore, neglected
in favour of that across Egypt, already partially developed and
(1)
in general use.
Further instances of interferences by Russia in Persia
and in Turkey, each of which had a distinct bearing, in British
opinion, on the security of India, and coinciding with a wave
of railroad expansion in England and Europe, renewed British
(2)
interest in another project, originally proposed in 1850, to 
utilize the Mesopotamian route to India: the Euphrates Valley
Railroad.
(3)
Although favoured by the Government of India, the pro­
ject had been given little encouragement by Lord Palmerston, 
who, as in 1834, continued to be apprehensive of European com­
plications. The Association for the Promotion of the Euphrates 
Valley Railroad, formed in 1856, having as its Chairman, W. P. 
Andrew, impressed the Government, however, with the political
(1) Hoskins, op. cit., ch. IX, X, for growth of Egyptian route.
(2) By R. M. Stephenson. See article in Calcutta Review, 
vol. XXV, pp. 145 ff.
(3) Letter, Government of India to R. M. Stephenson, 30 January, 
1856, cited in Calcutta Review, vol. XXV, p. 175.
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arguments for the scheme: the possibility of checking French
influence, again in the ascendancy in Egypt and Syria, of provi­
ding a diversion to the projected Suez Canal and of forestalling
(1)Russian designs on the Persian Gulf. The fact that a French
company was striving to obtain a concession for a similar rail­
way, with some prospect of success, no doubt further influenced 
Lord Palmerston to alter his early unsympathetic attitude. He 
assured a deputation of those concerned in the Euphrates Valley 
project of the interest of the Government. The chief obstacle
to full official support, it would seem, lay in the amount of
(2)
financial guarantee expected by the company.
Additional surveys were made, the firman secured from the
(3)
Sultan, 1857, and the original capital of £1,000,000 was
(1) Andrew, W. P., A Letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Poli­
tical Advantages of the Euphrates Valley Railway, and the 
Necessity of the Financial Support of H,.If. Government (1857) 
The Times, 25 June, 1857. According to Andrew, Our Scien­
tific Frontier (1880), pp. 98-9, Russia might take any of 
four routes to the Persian Gulf: by the line of Kars to the
Euphrates valley and Mesopotamia; from Erivan by way of 
Lake Van to Mosul and Baghdad; from Tabriz to Shuster; 
from Tehran by Ispahan to Shuster and thence to the Persian 
Gulf. All of these lines would be intersected by the line 
of the Euphrates which 1 takes all Russian lines of advance 
in the flank, and, running in an oblique direction from the 
head of the gulf north of Antioch to the Persian Gulf,passes 
along the diagonal of a great quadrilateral, which has its 
two western corners on the Mediterranean, its two eastern on 
the Caspian and Persian Seas#1
(2() The Times, 23 June, 1857, also Pari. Debates, 3rd S., vol.
147 (1887), pp. 1226, 1652, 1662.
(3) The Times, 10 January, 22 January, 1857.
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( 1 )
offered to the public over-subscribed five times, suddenly,
14 August, 1857, the support of the Government was withdrawn by
(2)
Lord Palmerston. The whole project fell through.
A further ob jection to the Mesopotamian route was found in
the fact that much of it could not be protected by the British
fleet. Nor was its strategical value, either to convey troops
to India or to counter Russia, a subject of agreement even
(3)
among military experts. It was even contended, as it was
of the Suez Canal, that the construction of the new highway
(4)
would facilitate aggression rather than discourage it.
It would seem, also, that the British Government held that 
If the railroad became a necessity, it could, because of its 
standing prestige and influence at the Sublime Porte, take up 
the project whenever it desired, a doubtful supposition in view 
of Great Britain* s changing position in Turkey, as yet unrealized
(1) Pari. Debates, 3rd. S., vol. 147, (1857), p. 1658.
The Times','1 ~Vf February, 1857.
(2) Pari. Debates, 3rd S., vol. 147, (1857), pp. 1676-7. Vari­
ous reasons for Palmerston*s volte-face have been given. 
Pressure may have been put on him by Napoleon III, then 
visiting in England. Palmerston may have deemed it wiser 
to give up the railway than accept the Suez Canal, in order 
to preserve the nominal alliance with France. It has also 
been suggested that the sacrifice of the railway was in 
exchange for French consent to use the overland (Egyptian) 
route for the dispatch of troops to India at a critical 
stage in the mutiny. See: The Times for 8, 10, 11 August,
1857; 4 May, 1858; also, Quarterly Review, CXX, pp. 354-
397; Jour. R.C. Asian Soc., July, 1954.
(3) Jour. E. India Ass*n., vol. X, p. 250; Curzon, Persia, 
v o T f ;  pp. "’633-5.--- ------
(4) Viscount Palmerston: Pari. Debates, 3rd S., vol. 146.
(1857), pp. 1044, 1385^9T:
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(1)
by the British Government,
Of even greater importance was Great Britain* s belief that 
by manipulating the political situation in Europe, she could 
safeguard the routes to India, She had not yet fully realized 
that political control, direct or indirect, would have to be 
assumed over territories through which lay actual and potential 
highways to her indispensable Eastern possessions.
Protection of the Indians engaged in trade at Basra and 
Baghdad and of the Indian Muslims on pilgrimage to the four 
Holy Cities of Turkish Arabia, concern for the sanitary condi­
tions at Basra and the Holy Cities, the distribution of the 
Oudh bequest, the administration of the India Postal System,
established in 1868 at Basra and Baghdad, the Irrigation
(2)
schemes projected by Sir William Willcocks in 1911, and
executed by British companies; and, above all, the encourage­
ment and protection of commerce and river navigation continued 
to be the methods by which British influence and position was
maintained and extended. It centred largely about the Resi-
(3)
dency at Baghdad with Its guard of Indian troops, and the 
armed sloop attached to It, yet so strong was British prestige
(1) Hoskins, op. cit., Prom about 1875, Great Britain*s position 
in Turkey steadily declined except for momentary revivals
in 1877 and in the years immediately following the Young 
Turks* assumption of power.
(2) Willcocks, Sir William, The Irrigation of Mesopotamia,
(1917, Revised Ed.).
(3) f0ur maintenance of troops as far north as Baghdad ... 
could not have been actuated by hope of commercial gain. It
must have been due to our strategic position in those 
regions.? Lord Lamington, former Governor of Bombay, 
,1903-7, Pro. C. Asian Soc., January, 1908, p. 17.
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among the tribes that on a number of occasions British repre­
sentatives were approached by Arabs who desired Great Britain
(1)
to establish a protectorate over them.
Great Britain1 s early interest in communications with
India, however, had not been without some valuable results.
The expeditions sent out from 1834 onwards and the presence of
(2)
armed steamers on the Tigris paved the way for the initiation
(3)
of a British mercantile line on the Tigris and for a further 
expansion of British commerce, which,advancing far beyond the 
days when Basra had first been a centre for part of the Gulf 
trade, contributed not a little to the predominant position 
and influence which Great Britain exercised in Turkish Arabia.
In 1911 and 1912, imports through Basra and Baghdad averaged 
for each of the two years, £3,100,000, of which the great pro­
portion were British end Indian goods destined for re-export to 
Persia by way of Kermanshah. Exports by sea for the same years
(1) In 1899, 1902, 1912; Events in Turkish 11raq, September, 
1911, October 1911, February, 1912.
(2) In 1840 and 1841, four armed steamers of the East India 
Company, the Assyria, Nitocris, Nimrod, and Euphrates, de­
signed to e s t ahl ish further Brit is h influence, made per iodic 
trips from Basra to Baghdad with goods, mail and passengers. 
Surveys were also made on both the Tigris and Euphrates 
(Supra, ip J.7-16& • All but the Nitocris were withdrawn in 
1842. Pari. Papers, 1840 (323) Pt. II, 299-300.
(3) This mercantile service was maintained from 1836 on the 
Tigris.ostensibly under the firman (following the Arabic
) originally granted in 1834 to the British 
Government for the operation of two steamers for commercial 
purposes on the Euphrates in connection with the Euphrates 
Expedition of that year. (Hertslet, Commercial Treaties 
(1875-91) vol. XIII, pp. 838-839). Just how this firman 
could be applied to the Tigris is not easily understood. 
Neither the subsequent firmans of 1842 (Ibid., p. 839) nor 
the Vizerial Letter of 1861 r(Ibid., p. 845) defined clearly 
the rights and privileges which the company exercised and 
claimed.
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( 1 )
averaged £3,247*500.
The transportation of practically all of these commodities
was in British or Anglo-Indian bottoms, while the handling of
the largest proportion of the entire river transport had come
into the hands of the firm of Lynch Brothers, who from 1860 had
assumed the local management of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam
Navigation Company. It had enjoyed a virtual monopoly until
the advent of Midhat Pasha’s river service. In spite of con-
(2)
stant interference from the Turkish authorities, the company 
carried on a comparatively efficient service, although at high 
rates. It also maintained, with a Government subsidy, a line 
of steamers on the Karim River, after it had been opened by the 
Shah of Persia in 1888.
So strategically placed were the river valleys, so firmly 
was external trade regarded as a British monopoly, so paramount 
was British influence that British statesmen had come to regard 
them as commercial and political as well as geographical exten­
sions of the Persian Gulf, in whose politics, as Lord Curzon 
declared in the House of Lords, were ’involved the security,
(3)
integrity and safety of India itself.’
Lord Curzon had stated in 1892, alluding to the commercial 
importance of Baghdad, ’Baghdad ,in fine, falls under the
(1) Report on the Conditions of Trade in Mesopotamia. (Baghdad, 
1920) p. 13.
(2) Other than purely political reports, the difficulties of 
the company with Turkish officials occupied more dispatches 
from the Resident at Baghdad to the Foreign Office than 
any other subject.
(3) Pari. Debates, H. of L., 5th &, vol. 7, (1911), p. 587.
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category of the Gulf Ports, and must be included in the zone of
(1)
indisputable British supremacy.1 He amplified this state­
ment in the House of Lords, in 1911, saying:
It would be a mistake to suppose that our political 
interests are confined to the Gulf. They are not confined 
to the Gulf; they are not confined to the region between 
Busra and Baghdad; they extend right away up to Baghdad. (®)
Any change in the status quo in Turkish Arabia became,
therefore, as objectionable as any alteration in that of the
Persian Gulf itself. The interest of H. M. Government in the
early trans-Mesopotamian schemes of communication had been
stimulated by the realization of this fact. Lord Salisbury,
in 1878, had made the attitude of H. M. Government quite clear
upon the subject, when he said: ’Whatever happens, whatever
Ministry may be in power, the people of this country will never
allow Russian influence to be supreme In the valleys of the
(3)
Euphrates and Tigris.’ This attitude was again reflected
in the dispatch of 21 September, 1899, from the Viceroy of
(4)
India in Council, when it was declared that Russian movement 
towards Baghdad would be as distasteful as Russian penetration 
into South Persia.
Germany’s ’Drang Nach Osten.*
If Russia was Great Britain’s chief rival in Asia during
(1) Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. II, p. 578.
(2) Pari. Debates, H. of L., 5th &, vol. 7, (1911), p. 586.
(3) Cited, Hoskins, op. cit., p. 446.
(4) Supra, pp. 28, 32-3.
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the 19th century, Germany became her rival of the 20th century*
The entry of Germany into Turkey and the Persian Gulf, although
ostensibly based on commercial ventures and on concessions
from the Porte to build a railroad through Anatolia to the
(2)
Persian Gulf, came to be regarded as a greater threat than
(1) Details cannot be given here of the activities of the firm 
of Wonckhaus in the Persian Gulf, of the negotiations for 
the railroad concessions, of the political significance 
attached to the railway project both in Germany and else­
where, and of the increase of German prestige and influ­
ence in Turkey generally, Of the mass of literature 
existing on this whole subject, the following may be con­
sulted: The Times History of the World War, vol* III,
ch, LII; Report on the Condition and Prospects of British 
Trade in Mesopotamia, George Lloyd, 1908, 1Confidential)* 
Rohrbach, P., iDle Bagdadbahn, (Berlin, 1903); Helfferich, 
K*, Die deutscHe TKTrKenpoXitik (Berlin, 1921); Schaefer,
C. A. i Die Sntwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolltlk (Weimar, 1916); 
Muller, K. H«, Die tedeutung der BagdadbahiT~(Hamburg, 1916); 
Cheradame, Andre, la Question d*Orient: la Macedoine, le
chemin de fer de Bagdad (Paris7 1.903) ; also, The Baghdad 
kallway, Pro , C. Asian""Soc. 1911; Lewin, Evans, The G erman
Road to the East (New York, 1~§17); Earle, Edward M., Turkey,
Tbe Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway (New York, 1923)•
See also: Lynch, H.F. bT, The Bagdad Railway, Fortnightly
Review, March, 1911; Quarterly Review, October, iGlV', 
pp. 491-528, (by Sir Alwyn barker, Foreign Office)•
(2) For texts of the concessions: Actes de la concession du 
chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Konia (Constantinople, l&9oj; 
also, Report of the Anatolian Railway Company (1896),
pp. 4, 9. preliminary concession, 1&99: Young, G., Corps
de droit Ottoman, vol, III, pp. 342-51; cf. Report of the 
Anatolian Railway Company, 1902, p. 8; provisional con- 
vention, 1902: Lecoq, R* t Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure
(Paris, 1907), appendix; definitive convention, 5 March, 
1903: Pari. Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5635), CIII, I. This also
containsT the additional convention of 1908, as well as the 
StatUes of the Imperial Bagdad Railroad Company, Specifica­
tions, the Loan Contract, First Series, 1903; Loan Con­
tract, Second and Third Series, 1908; third and fourth 
additional conventions, 21 March, 1911: troisleme conven­
tion additionslie et quatribme convention""additlonelie a 
la convention du 5 Mars, 1905. relative au chemin de fer 
de Bagdad. (Constantinople, l&ll).
-47-
Russia to the status quo in those areas which Great Britain had 
come to look upon as her own special spheres# Lord Lansdowne!s 
official statement of policy was directed as much at Germany 
as at Russia, although Germany chose to regard it as applicable 
only to Russia#
Germany^ early interest in Turkey had not been regarded 
with alarm. The British Ambassador at Berlin had been in­
structed to interest Germany in Asia Minor in order to counter- 
(1)
act Russia. The decision of Abdul Hamid, in 1899, to grant
the concession for a railroad to the Persian Gulf had been wel­
comed in England as a check to both Russian and French ambi-
(2)
tions.
The phenomenal expansion of Germnay^ industries and of 
her overseas commerce, the penetration of markets hitherto re­
garded as Britain1 s own, the sudden growth of Germany1 s mercan­
tile marine, her Navy bills of 1899 and 1900, the colonial de­
mands and aspirations of German diplomatists, the noisy anti- 
British demonstrations at the time of the Boer War, changed the 
picture. The English public, stimulated by the press, had 
come to believe that not only (Jreat Britain1 s markets but also
(1) See Wilson, Sir A. T., Persian Gulf, p. 2. note.
(2) Lord Salisbury is reported to have said in 1900: 1 We are 
in no way unfavourably impressed by the grant of the con­
cessions in question. On the contrary we welcome them 
for in this way Germany comes into line with our interests 
in the Persian Gulf.1 Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen 
Kabinette, 1871-1914, (Here aft er G .P7) (Berlin, 1922)
vd. XVll, No. 5212, p. 373. Also: Lord Lansdowne to
F. Lascelles, 18 March 1902, Brit. Docs., vol. II, No.204, 
pp. 177-8; Pari. Debates, 4th S., vol. 101, (1902), pp. 129, 
597, 628, 66§1 vol. 120, (1903), p. 1371.
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her political prestige in the East and in Africa were being
seriously challenged.
The possibility of curbing Germany in Turkish Arabia by
means of British participation in the Baghdad Railway had, at
first, seemed likely. In 1905, however, the suggestion of the
(1)
Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur B&lfour, 7 and 8 April, that
H. M. Government should approve of the investment of British
capital in the Railway at the invitation of the German financ-
(2)
iers, providing such participation were on the basis of
equality with any other power, raised a storm of disapproval in
(3)
the House and in the press.
The protest was due, in part to annoyance that German
enterprise had undertaken, with every prospect of success, what
British commercial and governmental authorities through lack of
vision and mistaken policy had repeatedly rejected, and, in
part, to resentment that a rival power should threaten those
regions which Great Britain had looked upon as peculiarly her
(4)
own. Protests of shipping companies serving India, of the
owners of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company,
(1) Pari. Debates, 4th S., vol. 120, (1903), pp. 1207-08,
T 3 5 5 =ra.-------
(2) von Gwinner, A., The Baghdad Railway and the Question of 
British Co-operation, Nineteenth Century, June, 1909.
(3) The Times, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24 April. Daily Mail,
9, 18, 22 April. The Daily Telegraph, 8, 9 April.
Pall Mall Gazette, 9, 11, 22, 24 April. Spectator, 4, 11, 
18, 25 April. Manchester Guardian, 15 April, 1903.
(4) Yate, Col. A. C., Pro. C. Asian Soc., 22 May, 1911, p. 19; 
Johnson, Sir H. H., Common Sense in Foreign Policy (London, 
1913), pp. v-vii. Cf\ also, Lord Curzon7 Pari. Debates,
H. of L., 5th S., vol. 7, (1911), pp. 583-7, 589.
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and of the British-owned railways in Asia Minor may have also
(1)
added to the opposition.
In the face of this opposition, which may have extended to
(2)
his own Cabinet, Mr. Balfour was forced to declare to the 
House of Commons, 23 April, 1903, that H. M. Government would
(3)
give no support to any British financial share in the railroad.
What the British Government had failed to secure by finan­
cial participation, it attempted to secure through diplomatic 
negotiations. The rapprochement between England and France,
already in the air, soon became a reality. Following the
(5)
visit of King Edward to France in May, active negotiations
(6)
for the understanding were taken in hand. The three
(1) The Times, 18, 19, 24 April, 1903.
(2) Earle, op. cit., p. 185.
(3) Pari. Debates, 4th S.,vol. 121, (1903), pp. 271-2.( Lord 
Lansdowhe 'seems to have believed that ’the scuttle of 
British financiers’ at the newspaper opposition made it 
impossible for the Government to give assurances of its 
support. Brit. Docs., vol. II, Minute on No. 224, p. 196.
Cf. Earle,"op, cltTT P* 186.
(4) For early indications of the r appro chement, see Documents 
Diplomatiques Franqais (Hereafter Docs. Fr.) (Paris, 1922--), 
2e Series, vol. II, No. 524 (12 December, 1902) p. 653;
vol. Ill, No. 138 (14 March, 1903), p. 186; vol. Ill,
No. 192 (23 April, 1903), p. 258. Also, Tardieu, A.,
La France et les Alliances (Paris, 1908), pp. 51-72.
(5) Memo. on Present State of British Relations with France and 
Germany by Mr. Byre Crowe, January, 1§07, Brit. Docs., 
vol. Ill, App. A, p. 398.
(6) Brit. Docs., vol. II, Nos. 356-416, pp. 292-373. Docs.
Fr., 2e Series, vol. Ill, Nos. 362, 363, 381, 384, 3&TJ 392, 
3T9; vol. IV, Secs. II, Ilia, VId, Vllb.
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( 1 )
agreements, signed on 8 April, 1904, settled the outstand­
ing points of friction, initiated the Entente Cordiale and
paved the way to the defensive alliance between the two coun- 
(2)
tries.
Thus the period of 'splendid isolation' came to an end.
There was inaugurated that pre-1914 era of diplomacy among the
powers which aimed, on the one hand, at securing on the basis
(3)
of compensations a recognition of their respective spheres of 
interest in Asia and in Africa, thus avoiding points of con­
flict, and, on the other hand, at providing for collective 
security in the event that rival ambitions, either commercial 
or territorial, could not be reconciled.
Tentative negotiations towards an Anglo-Russian rapproche­
ment had been interrupted by the Russo-Japanese war. Russia's 
defeat and her domestic difficulties in 1905 made her more
amenable to the settlement of her Middle East differences with
(3)
Great Britain, after negotiations lasting from September,
(1) Texts of the three agreements: Accts. and Papers, 1904
(Cd. 1952), CX, 323-4, 340-1; 1905 (Cd.2383)^ CIII, 241; 
1905 (Cmd. 2384), CIII, 265; 1905 (Cmd. 2385)^ CIII, 285. 
Secret articles of Egyptian Declaration: ibid., 1911
(Cd. 5969), CIII, 353 f f., Also in Brit .Docs ., vol. II, 
pp. 374-98, with earlier drafts in parallel columns.
(2) On discussions from 1906, on the Anglo-French defensive 
alliance, see Brit. Docs., vol. III. Nos. 210-21. pp. 170- 
203.
(3) A 'give-and-take arrangement' as Lord Lansdowne expressed 
it, 2 July, 1903, Brit. Docs., vol. II, No. 356, p. 293.
(4) Lansdowne to P. Cambon, 26 October, 1903; Ibid., vol. II, 
No. 250, pp. 217-18. Also: ibid., vol. r\T7~Nos. 181-8,
pp. 183-94, especially, Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, 17 November, 
1903, No. 181a, p. 183.
(5) For the effect of the Baghdad Railroad in hastening the 
Convention of 1907, see Driault, E., La Question d'Orient 
depuis ses Origines jusqu'a la Paix de Sbvres (Paris. 1921) 
PfTS7'3'ff'. -----
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( 1 )
1906, to 51 August, 1907, when the Anglo-Russian Convention 
(2)
was signed.
By the Convention, Persia, without her consent, was parti­
tioned into spheres of influence, as foreshadowed by the sugges­
ts)
tion of the Government of India in 1899# No reference was 
made, however, to the Persian Gulf or to Turkish Arabia al­
though Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
had pressed urgently for the inclusion of a clause recognizing
(4)
the status quo in the Persian Gulf, To remedy the omission,
Sir Edward, in a dispatch to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 27 August, 1907, noted, on behalf 
of H. M. Government, that the Russian Government had explicitly 
stated that they did not deny the special interests of Great 
Britain in the Persian Gulf. He also stated, in order to make 
it clear that no change of policy in the Persian Gulf area was 
contemplated: *H. M. Government think it advisable to draw
attention to previous declarations of British policy and to 
affirm generally previous statements as to British interests in
(1) Brit. Docs., vol. IV, No.339, p. 388; Nos. 341-517, 
pp. 389-576. For an indication that an Anglo-Russian 
understanding was imminent, see: Pari. Debates, 4th S, 
vol. 157, (1906), p. 1416, Sir E. Grey1 s" statement, 24 May, 
1906.
(2) For text: Treaty Series, No. 34, (1907) in Accts. and
Papers, 1908 (Cd. 3753), CXXV, 489; Also, ibid., 1908 
(Cd. 3750), CXXV, 477; Brit, and For. St. Papers, C.276-7.
(3) Accts. and Papers, 1908 (Cd. 3882), CXXV, 465. But cf.: 
Hardinge to Grey, 23 December, 1905, Brit. Docs., vol. IV, 
No. 322, 276-7.
Brit. Docs., vol. IV, No. 417, p. 465; No. 421, p. 470;
No. 425, p. 473; Minutes on No. 428, pp. 476-7; Enclosure 
to No. 429, pp. 480-1; No. 430, pp. 481-2; No. 434, p. 484
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( 1 )
the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them. 1
The convention was not so much an attempt at territorial 
expansion as an attempt to recognize the status quo, to check 
further Russian advances and to free England to deal with 
Germany’s ’Drang nach Osten’. It was received in England with 
great disapproval. One group alleged that the convention 
needlessly sacrificed British interests. The misgivings of 
the group which declared that the partition would alienate 
friendly Persian opinion were justified. The ill-feeling 
aroused in Persia was utilized to the fullest extent by the 
Germans in 1914-15.
Nevertheless, the convention served its purpose, particu­
larly in relieving pressure on India and on the Persian Gulf
(2)
at a time when it was most needed.
Early attempts at an Anglo-German understanding had
(1) Accts. and Papers, 1908 (Cd. 3750),CXXV, 477, Dispatch
No. I, Sir Edward' Grey to Sir A. Nicolson, 27 August, 1907. 
For previous declarations of policy, see Hertslet, Map of 
Europe by Treaty (4 vols., 1875-91), vol. IV, pp. 2615-17, 
2624-7; Lord Lansdowne, Pari. Debates, 4th S., vol. 121, 
(1903}, pp. 1347-8; Lord Salisbury, July, 1878, Hoskins, 
op. cit., p. 446.
(2) Sir E. Grey to Committee of Imperial Defence, 26 May, 1911; 
Brit. Docs., vol. VI, App. V, pp. 788-9. Also, MacCaulay, 
Capt. D. I,, Pro. C. Aslan Soc., 10 October, 1909. The 
convention was probably not sincerely observed by either 
Russia or England. See, Pari. Debates, H. of L., 5th S., 
vol. 7, (1911), p. 605; vol. 10, pp. 678, 694, 697; Cox 
to Grey, 28 September, 1913; Minute by H. G. Chick, 
Commercial Adviser to the Persian Gulf Residency; Govern­
ment of India to Marquess of Crewe (Confidential),
22 January, 1914, cited in Behind the Veil in Persia 
(Amsterdam, 1917), pp. 148-67.
-53-
( 1 )
failed. Following, however, the Anglo-Russian Convention,
Great Britain turned to negotiations with Germany and with 
Turkey on the question of the Baghdad Railroad which had con­
tinued to grow in international importance. To Turkey, con­
sent to the increase in customs was held out in return for con­
cessions which would both safeguard and consolidate England!s 
acquired position in Turkish Arabia. To Germany, Great 
Britain was willing to make concessions in order to secure her
original demands as stated by Lord Haldane to Emperor William H
(2)
at Windsor in November, 1907: the right to construct and
control the section of the Baghdad Railroad from Baghdad to the
(3)
Persian Gulf, thereby securing ’the gate to India.1 In
1909, she was prepared to grant Germany a free hand in Turkey 
north of Baghdad in return for the recognition of similar
(1) For these early negotiations, see: Brit. Docs., vol. I,
No. 122 (21 August, 1898), pp. lOO-Oll vol. II, No. 77 
(18 March, 1901), pp. 60-1 and documents ff.; vol. Ill,
No. 1 (18 May, 1904), p. 1; G.P., vol. XIV, ch. XCI;
vol. XVII, ch. CIX. For an official review of Anglo- 
German relations, see Brit. Docs., vol. Ill, App. A. pp. 397 
ff. ‘
(2) Haldane, R. B., Viscount, Before the War (1920), p. 48; 
Autobiography (1929), p. 2%0] also, Brit. Docs., vol. VI, 
Nos. 597 60, 62, 63, 65, pp. 91-9. From the German side:
G.P., vol. XXIV, pp. 17-22; Baron von Schoen, Memoirs of 
an Ambassador (1922), pp. 59-63.
(3) This arrangement, proposed to Dr. A. von Gwinner, 13 
December, 1903, was accepted by him as far as the financial 
interests were concerned. Nothing came of it, however: 
Brit. Docs., vol. II, No. 224, p. 195. It was put for­
ward officially as the basis of British policy, 25 April, 
1907, Grey to Bertie: ibid., vol. VI, No. 249, p. 355.
Also, Grey to Cambon and to Benckdorf, 4 June, 1907; ibid., 
No. 250, p. 355. For the renewal of the proposals: Grey
to Goschen, 28 October, 1909, ibid., No. 277, p. 379; 
Marling to Grey, ibid., No. 282, pp. 384-5; and Memo, by 
Sir H. Babington Smith, ibid., App. VII, pp. 793-4; Enclos­
ure to No. 309, p. 410.
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( 1 )
privileges for Great Britain in southern Mesopotamia,
A settlement along these lines was not out of keeping with
the attitude of the powers, including Austria and Italy, during
(2)
the period 1907 to 1914, in which there ’was an approach to
a general agreement among the European nations with reference
(3)
to their interests', i.e. the creation of special economic
and political spheres of influence. Russia and England had
already partitioned Persia in 1907. By the Potsdam Agreement,
19 August, 1911, Germany and Russia recognized each other’s
(4)
special interests in Asia Minor and in Persia. France and
Germany brought their commercial Interests in the Near and
(1) Brit. Docs., vol. VI, No. 277, p. 379; No. 287, p. 388. 
Also, theconfidential letter from the Russian Ambassador, 
Constantinople, to Iswolsky, 25 November, 1909, von Siebert, 
op. clt., No. 576, p. 510: ’The projected treaty is
equivalent to partition of Turkey into a British and a 
German sphere of interest: England granting Germany free­
dom of action in Turkey, in Europe and Asia Minor, and 
claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories
in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty 
with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian 
Gulf.’ Also, Russian Ambassador, London, to Iswolsky, 
ibid., No. 570, p. 507.
(2) For an able account of these pre-war aspirations: Howard,
H. N., Partition of Turkey (Norman, 1931), pp. 50-60.
(3) Official Report on Events in Turkish 'Iraq, July, 1913.
(4) Text: Die Krlegschuldfrage, March, 1924, p. 63. The 
Potsdam" Agreement undoubtedly had its origin in fear of an 
Anglo-German understanding. In such an event, as the 
Russian Ambassador at Constantinople wrote to Iswolsky,
25 November, 1909: 'France and Russia would stand alone,
which has to be prevented ... Hence there remains only 
direct though parallel negotiations between ... Germany and 
Russia and Germany and France.' von Siebert, op. cit.,
No. 576, p. 510. Also, ibid., No. 582, p. 515; No. 619, 
p. 543. For negotiations, see G.P., vol. XXVII, Nos. 10218- 
25, pp. 950-62; Un Livre Noir (R. Marchand, ed., 2 vols., 
Paris, 1923), vol. II, pp. 501-76.
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( 1 )
Middle East into agreement between 1910 and 1914. Prom
(2)
Great Britain, Prance had gained in 1912, it is reported a 
pledge of disinterestedness in Syria in exchange for a similar 
disinterestedness on her part in southern Mesopotamia.
Negotiations with Turkey had begun in 1909, but not until 
1915 was agreement possible, Great Britain having been forced 
to give way on many of her original proposals. In the end, 
however, Great Britain was able to secure the recognition of 
her special position in the Persian Gulf and of the validity 
of her existing treaties with Kuwait. The terminus of the 
Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, beyond which the railway 
was not to extend without the consent of Great Britain. Two 
British Directors were to be appointed to the Board of the 
Baghdad Railway. Turkey also guaranteed that equal charges, 
dues and treatment should be accorded to all nations on the 
railway. The development and future control of the port of 
Basra were to be partially entrusted to British hands. Ex­
clusive rights of navigation were secured to a new company 
formed by Lord Inchcape and to the existing Lynch line, whose
privileges were extended. Turkey recognized the right of
(3)
Great Britain to buoy, light and police the Persian Gulf.
(1) Earle, op. clt., p. 248; also Docs. Fr., 3e Series, 
vol. Ill, No. 239, p. 317.
(2) See statement by M. Pichon at Secret Meeting of the Pour 
Powers, Paris, 20 March, 1919: Baker, R. S., Woodrow
Wilson and World Settlement (3 vols., 1922-3), vol. Ill, 
p. 3.
(3) Quarterly Review, October, 1917, pp. 517-21; Pari.
Debates, H. of C., 5th S., vol. 53, (1913), pp. 392-5;
von Siebert, op. cit., ch. XX; Helfferich, Karl, Die 
Vorgeschlcte d£s Wfelt&rleges. {Berlin, 1921) pp. Ttt ff.;
The Times, 17 and 31, May, 1913.
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During this period of negotiations, both the Foreign
(1)
Office and British representatives in Turkish Arabia were 
concerned with increasing Great Britain’s influence and prest­
ige, not only to counteract the importance of the Baghdad Rail­
way, but also to provide a greater claim to Mesopotamia as her 
sphere of influence in the event of the break-up of Turkey.
The Resident of Baghdad had telegraphed, 23 June, 1913, to the 
Government of India and to H* M. Ambassador at Constantinople:
In view of the possible break-up of Turkey and in the 
meantime the development of preparatory foreign spheres of 
interest, it seemed incumbent on the British Government to 
preserve every kind of priority which they already possessed 
in Mesopotamia, their natural sphere in the Ottoman domin­
ions. Hence any abolition of British Post Offices in 
Turkey should not extend to those at Baghdad and Basra.
The Residency guard and the R.I.M.S. Comet are appurten­
ances to be jealously guarded, for the present.
A month later, the Acting Resident in Baghdad presented a
(3)
full plan for extending Great Britain's position. He advo­
cated an extension of the Irrigation system under British 
auspices, as one of the most important means to that end, say­
ing: 'To gain control of this system and create an imperlum
imperiof is important, Control of water will give control of 
revenue assessment, perhaps control of collection.' As to
(1) Minute by Sir E. Grey, 12 March, 1910: Brit. Docs.,
vol. VI, No. 325, p. 433.
(2) Cited: Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq, June, 1913.
(3) He had already urged that increased efforts should be made 
to add Mosul, not then belonging to any sphere of influ­
ence, to Great Britain's sphere. He had suggested that 
the Church Missionary Society might be aided financially 
and that Sir Edward Grey should approach the Jewish Colon­
ization Society to subvent schools where English would be 
taught. Nestorians should also be encouraged. Ibid., 
February, 1913.
57
railways, they would be auxiliary to irrigation and to the
(1)
agriculture which it would encourage, while steam navigation,
he believed, would have to give way both to irrigation and to
the railways* The importance of oil, in his opinion, had not
(2)
been proven.
Germany was not unwilling that Great Britain should 
possess these special interests in Turkish Arabia, although 
she was not willing to recognize the full British claims* The 
process of reconciling the differences between the two powers 
might not have taken so long, however, had it not been for the 
necessity of considering the wishes of Prance and of Russia, 
and of finding compensations for them in order to avoid that 
obsession of the early 20th century: a general European war*
Not until 15 June, 1914, was a treaty initialled, subject to 
ratification, following the conclusion of separate Turco- 
German negotiations.
(3)
By the terms of the agreement, Germany abandoned all 
hope of a port in her own name on the Persian Gulf. She se­
cured, however, cessation of obstruction to the Baghdad Rail­
way, the recognition of her own special spheres in Anatolia, 
North Syria and northern Mesopotamia, in exchange for recogni­
tion of Great Britain's dominant position in southern
(1)rGive the Tigris and Euphrates escapes into the deserts, 
and Babylon will again rival Egypt and the railways will
be one of the best paying concerns in the world*f Willcocks, 
Sir W., Near East, 6 June, 1915.
(2) Reports on Events in Turkish 'Iraq, July, 1913.
(3) Political Science Quarterly, March, 1923, pp. 29 ff.
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Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf. The terminus of the 
Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, any further construction to 
be made only after a complete agreement had been previously 
reached by the Ottoman, German and British Governments. Two 
British members were to be added to the Board of Directors of 
the Railway. There was to be no discrimination, direct or 
indirect, in transit facilities or freight rates in the trans­
portation of goods. Both Powers were to observe strictly the 
terms of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July, 1913, in which 
the agreements between Lord Inchcape and the Baghdad Railway 
Company regarding the important navigation rights and the port 
and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates were recog­
nized, together with the agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin 
Railway and the Baghdad Railway regarding important extensions 
to the former line. As an essential preliminary to the nego­
tiations regarding the Turkish oilfields, the German Government 
was forced, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia 
as well as central and southern Persia as the exclusive fields 
of operation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and, in addition, 
to agree to the construction of a railway from Kut al-'Amara to 
Mandali in order to facilitate the shipment of petroleum.
Both Germany and Great Britain undertook to observe their re­
spective interests in the irrigation of the Cilician plain and 
lower Mesopotamian valley.
Thus, on the eve of the world war, Great Britain*s long 
tenure as the dominant European power in Turkish Arabia and the 
Persian Gulf was about to enter a new phase. Another chapter
59
had "been added to those in which Englishmen, first as traders 
and -then as representatives of the British Crown, sought to 
establish commercial and political supremacy for their country 
in tkiose regions. Three centuries of British efforts to ex­
tend and to protect trade had culminated, through the new con­
cessions contained in the Turko-German Agreement, in fresh 
opportunities for British capital, talent and products in the 
development of irrigation, of navigation, of the ports of Basra 
and Baghdad and in the anticipated increase in prosperity of 
Turkish Arabia. A share of the potential riches of the petrol' 
eum fields of Kirkuk had also been won for British exploita­
tion.
The long series of British political activities: the sup­
pression of pirates, the establishment of suzerainty over Arab 
chiefs of the Gulf, the surveys and investigations for river 
and railway communication projects, and the initiation of dip­
lomatic and military measures, all of which had been success­
fully directed towards protecting trade and forestalling other 
powers from reaching the Gulf and thus menacing India, had 
broken the force of the latest and most dangerous of the 
attempts to disturb the status quo in Persian Gulf regions.
Even more important: Great Britain’s claim to special
consideration and position in south west Asia had achieved 
recognition both by the Powers and by Turkey itself. She had, 
in effect, with their consent, completed the peaceful annexa­
tion of the Persian Gulf as an Indian Lake and the establish­
ment of her special position in the Mesopotamian wilayets of
60-
the Ottoman Empire.
The agreements, however, had not been all pure gain for 
Great Britain. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to have its 
outlet to the Gulf. Germany, although greatly restricted, 
was to be admitted into the hitherto jealously guarded Garden 
of Eden. Nor was there any guarantee as to how long the new 
relations could be expected to last. In the face of previous 
successes in hitherto British markets already won by German 
commercial rivals and of the bellicose attitude and unfriendly
t
actions of Germans, within the few months following the
initialling of the Anglo-German Agreement, it is not too much
to conjecture that the agreement might have been, in reality,
only an uneasy truce.
It may be reasonably doubted whether these breaches In
Great Britain’s traditional policy would ever have taken place,
whether the negotiations themselves would ever have been
necessary, or whether Great Britain would have been forced to
(1) (2 
suffer nearly 100,000 casualties or to sacrifice £200,000,000,
in a war in Turkish Arabia had she taken the early opportuni­
ties repeatedly offered her of building the trans-Mesopotamian
(1) British casualties in the Mesopotamia Campaign:
-a- -b-
Killed or died of wounds or disease .. 27,621 31,758
Missing or taken prisoner ... 13,494 15,350
Wounded ... ... 51,586 51,150
Total .. 92,501 98,258
a-Q.H., vol. IV, p. 331. b-Robertson, Sir William,
Soldiers and Statesmen; (2 vols., 1926) vol. II, p. 82.
(2) Farl. Debates, H. of C., 5th S., vol. 151. (1922), p. 1546.
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Railroad. Conjectures are often futile, but the concatenation 
of events would seem to bear out the supposition that had she 
built the railroad, the Wilayets of Baghdad and Basra would, 
in the fullness of time, have taken the status of Egypt before 
the war, owing nominal allegiance to the Sultan but under the 
protection of Great Britain*
Had there not been the visions of economic and political 
expansion in Mesopotamia to draw Germany onward, Germany might 
never have sought or acquired her predominating influence at 
Constantinople. Without that influence, Turkey would never 
have entered the war on the side of Germany. Arab National­
ism would not have arisen for at least another generation with­
out the stimulus of the Allied war-time promises of Arab inde­
pendence, in return for their co-operation against the Turks. 
Without that stimulus and without the war which brought the 
Sharifians into a position to give leadership and direction to 
the Arab movement, the creation of the ’Iraq Kingdom might 
have been delayed to the dim future*
Whatever the new relations between Turkey, Germany and 
Great Britain in the Persian Gulf area might have been as a 
result of their agreements, it was clear, immediately on the 
outbreak of the war in Europe, that the whole situation had 
been thrown once again into the melting pot. All for which 
Great Britain had striven, consciously or unconsciously, for 
nearly three hundred years, was now in danger of being swept 
away. The whole history of the part played by Great Britain 
in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia made it inevitable, once
-62-
resort to arms had begun, that she should make some effort, not 
only to maintain that which she had won, but also to secure, 
once and for all, by the establishment of political control, 
the Mesopotamian portion of the land route to India.
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CHAPTER III.
THE CONQUEST OF SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA.
In the four years, 1914 to 1918, British arms completed 
what three centuries of British commerce and diplomacy had be­
gun. The military operations which resulted in the occupation 
of Basra, then of Baghdad in 1917, and finally of the whole of
Turkish Arabia as far north as Mosul, have been ably recounted
(i)
elsewhere. It is germane here only to indicate how the 
motives which lay behind the forward movements and the adminis­
tration of the occupied territories arose partly from immediate 
circumstances and partly from the long established Middle East 
policy of Great Britain.
Baghdad as an objective of the Expeditionary Force had not 
been unconsidered by military and political officials even be­
fore Basra was taken. Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf and Chief Political Officer to the Expeditionary 
Force, had telegraphed privately to the Viceroy on 23 November, 
that the General Officer Commanding had been considering the 
question of the advance to Baghdad, and that he (Cox) did not
(1) History of the Great War based on Official Documents:
(a) Moberly, Brig.-Gen. , F. J., op. cit., (O.H.). (b) Corbett; 
Sir Julian, Naval Operations, voIT II,”(1922); VI, (1923).
(c) Macpherson, Medical e^'rvices, General History, vol. IV, 
(1924). Survey oF“India, Records of ~ the, voT7~XX. The War 
Record (T§257* Candler, Edmund, The long Road to Baghdad 
T2 vol s., 1919). Personal accounts by Sir Arno Id Wilson,
Lt.-Col. J. E. Tennant, C. V. Townshend and others are 
listed in the bibliography.
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( 1 )
see how »we can well avoid taking over Baghdad.1 Political
officers on the spot, in Simla and in Whitehall, both at the
Foreign Office and the India Office, at various times continued
(2)
to give expression to similar views, but neither H. M. Govern­
ment nor the Government of India were ready, at the time, to
(3)
support such a far reaching objective. Indeed the attitude 
of the latter towards the expedition until the middle of 1915
had been that of niggardly, even unwilling compliance with the
(4)
policy laid down by H. M. Government.
The sudden reversal of this attitude by the Government of
India came after the appointment of General Sir John Nixon to
the command in Mesopotamia, 9 April, 1915, when it assumed, with
(5)
his support, the initiative for the advance to Baghdad. Occur­
ring almost at the same moment that the India Office, with a new 
concern for oil supplies, opposed any advance beyond the hinter­
land of Basra, a deliberate and concerted policy was rendered 
impossible. The criticism of the Mesopotamia Commission of 
1917: * The scope of the objective of the expedition was never
sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successive
(6)
move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan* was never 
more pertinent than in the days before the first advance towards 
Baghdad.
(1) O.H., vol. I, p. 134.
(2) Meso. Comm. Report, Cd. 8610, p. 97.
(3) Ibid., p. 20; Asquith, H. A., Memories and Reflections,
(2 vols., 1928) vol. II, p. 69.
(4) Cd. 8610, pp. 97, 105, 106, 123-31.
(5) Ibid., pp. 16, 97, 125.
(0) Ibid., p. Ill, O.K., vol. Ill, preface.
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The degree to whioh the reversal of the attitude of the 
Government of India and the sanction of H , M . Government to the 
advance on Baghdad were influenced "by the realization that 
India's permanent interests would he best served by the inclusion 
of Baghdad under the direct control of India cannot be fully 
known until the evidence in state archives is available. It 
would seem, however, that considerations of the moment played a 
greater part in the authorization of the advance, than did 
deliberate considerations of past and future policy.
Early successes around Basra had elated the military com­
mand in India, increasing their desire for further victories in 
order to demonstrate their importance, unduly cast in the shade,
in their own opinion, by the larger and more striking operations
(1)
in Europe. The advance to Baghdad would not only give these
opportunities, but would, as the Viceroy pointed out to the
Secretary of State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,
create an immense impression in the Middle East, especially 
in Persia, Afghanistan, and on our frontier, and would 
counteract the unfortunate impression in the Middle East 
created by want of success in the Dardanelles. It would 
al30 isolate German parties in Persia, (2) probably pro­
duce a pacifying effect in that country and frustrate the 
German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while 
the impression throughout Arabia would be striking. In 
India, the effect would be undoubtedly good. (3)
(1) Cd. 8610, p. 131.
(2) For German activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India in 
August and September, 1915, see O.H., vol. I, pp. 309 ff.
(3) Telegram (Private) Lord Hardinge to Chamberlain, 6 October, 
1915, cited O.H., vol. II, p. 11; also, Letter, Viceroy to 
Chamberlain, 15, October, 1915, cited ibid., p. 21.
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The Chief of General Staff, India, on 5 October, emphasized,
in addition, that the possession of Baghdad would
deprive the Turks of a well equipped place of concentration; 
place us in a good position to defeat them in detail as they 
moved down the rivers from Asia Minor or Syria; deprive 
the Turks of steamers, material and resources, and increase 
our prestige, d)
The whole question of the advance rested on the possibility
of sending reinforcements. These, the Government of India
(2)
insisted, should be provided by H. M. Government. Whitehall
maintained, however, that as the expedition was India*s *show',
(3)
the Government of India should find the forces not only for 
taking Baghdad but for retaining it. General Nixon had re­
peatedly shown himself confident that he had troops enough to
(4)
capture the City. Ke stipulated, however, that an additional
division, at least, should arrive within the first weeks of the
(5)
capture of Baghdad in order to hold it.
(1) Appreciation, Sir Percy Lake, 5 October, 1915, cited ibid., 
pp. 9-10.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Interdepartmental Comm. Report, 16 October, 1915, cited 
Ibid., p. 17.
(4) Telegrams: Nixon to Government of India and India Office,
6 October, 1915, cited O.H., vol. II, p. 12; Nixon to 
Chamberlain, 8 October, 1915, cited ibid., p. 15; Viceroy 
to Chamberlain, 6 October, 1915, cited~ibid., p.11.
Telegram (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, 5 October, 1915, 
cited O.H., vol. II, p. 9.
(5) Telegram, Nixon to Chamberlain, 8 October, 1915, cited 0 .H., 
vol. II, p. 15. Also, Interdepartmental Comm. Report,
16 October, cited ibid., p. 17.
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In the arguments put forward "by the Government of India,
(1)
H. M. Government fully concurred. Indeed so convinced was
the War Cabinet by 1 Nixon1 s attitude and by opportunities within
our grasp for a great success such as we have not yet achieved
in any quarter, and the political (and even military) advantages
which would follow from it throughout the East,1 not easily
(2)
overrated, that it authorized General Nixon to ’march on
Baghdad if he is satisfied that the force he has available is
sufficient for operations’ and promised reinforcements from
(3)
Prance•
The disasters which followed, ending in the surrender, 29
April, of 13,309 British officers and other ranks at Kut al-
'Amara, after a siege of five months, now form part of history.
The Commission appointed by Parliament in 1916 to make enquiry
(4)
into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia, placed’the
weightiest share of responsibility for the first attempt on
(5)
Baghdad1 on Sir John Nixon, whose 'confident optimism was the
(6)
main cause of the decision to advance.* It must not be
(1) Letter (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, 7 October, cited 
ibid., p. 8; Telegram S/S for India to Viceroy, 6 October 
cited ibid., p. 11; Interdepartmental Comm. Report, 16 
October, cited ibid., p. 17.
(2) Telegram, S/S for India to Viceroy, 6 October, cited ibid.
p. 11.
(3) Telegram, S/S for India to Viceroy, 23 October, cited ibid.,
p. 28.
(4) Meso. Comm. Report, Cd. 8610.
(5) Ibid., p. 111.
(6) Ibid., p. 111.
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overlooked, however, that both he and those who advocated the 
advance at the time were not unnaturally influenced by immediate 
ends which outweighed military conditions, to meet which little 
or no adequate preparation had been made.
In the period after the unsuccessful attempts to relieve Kut 
and its surrender, when the Force lay inert, concerned mainly
(1)
with renewing its strength and reorganizing its vital services,
the ultimate desirability of extending British influence to
Baghdad was not entirely forgotten. Not until 3 February, 1917,
however, when the Russians were expected to converge on Mosul and
perhaps Baghdad, that Sir William Robertson, it being deemed
desirable for political reasons that British forces should occupy
Baghdad first, inquired as to General Maude1s views regarding
(2)
another advance, with Baghdad as the objective.
Sir William Robertson’s enquiry and the definite instructions
(3)
of 28 February, 1917, to capture Baghdad were not influenced 
merely by dislike of seeing Russian forces, either as allies or 
otherwise, in Turkish Arabia. Circumstances arising from more
deeply rooted aspirations as we11 as the same general consider-
had
at ions which/prompted the first advance of 1915 were also at
(4)
work.
(1) 0*H., vol. Ill, pp. 7, 20-3, 30-6, 62-70.
(2) Ibid., pp. 125, 126 and 204 ff.
(3) Ibid., p. 205.
(4) The Government of India again pressed for the capture of
Baghdad on the grounds that it would relieve the increasing 
tension on the North West Frontier, 0 .H., vol. Ill, 
p. 207.
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The pre-war aspirations of the powers for economic and
(1)
political expansion in Asia had taken on a concrete form as
important war objectives of the Allies on the basis of the so-
called Secret Agreements. These, as far as they affected the
Ottoman Empire, were as follows: i. Constantinople Agreement,
18 March, 1915, by Russia, Prance and Great Britain concerning
(2)
Constantinople, the Straits and Persia. ii. Paot of .London,
26 April, 1915, between Great Britain, Russia and Italy regard-
(3)
ing compensation to Italy for joining the Allies against Germany
iii. Husain-McMahon Correspondence, August, 1914-January,1916,
concerning Arab independence in return for Arab co-operation
(4)
against the Turks. iv. Agreements of the spring of 1916, be­
tween Great Britain, France and Russia, (a) Sykes-Picot Agreement
(1) Supra, p,48ff.
(2) Texts de Martens, C., Recueil des Traltes, 3e Series (Leipzig 
1922 ), T. X, p. 347. See* also, Temperley, H.W. V., (History 
of the Peace Conference of Parl3 (Hereafter H.P.C.P.)(& vols., 
1920-4), vol. VI, pp. 2-10; Manchester Guardian, 22 February, 
1918.
(3) Accts. and Papers, Misc. Papers, 1920, No. 7 (Cmd. 671),
£il, 261. Text: de Martens, op. cit., vol. X, p. 329;
H.P.C.P., vol. V, pp. 384 ff.; also, vol. VI, pp. 10-13.
(4) The complete text of the correspondence has never been 
officially revealed, but summaries of substantial portions 
have been published: MacMunn, Sir G., and Falls, C., 
Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine (Official History 
of the World War, hereafter cited as O.H., E. and Pal.)
(2 vols.,1928-30) vol. I, pp. 213 ff; Le Temps (Paris) 19 
September, 1919, Letter of 25 October, 1915, not included; 
Cocks, Seymour, The Secret Treaties (1918); Note on the 
Arab Question, submitted by Amir Faisal to H. M. Government 
and cited Fortnightly Review, vol. 136 (1929) pp. 735-6; 
Al-Manar (Arabic journal, Cairo) 5 January, 1924. The 
present writer1s summaries have been taken directly from 
the original Arabic text of the letters.
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16 May, 1916, between Great Britain and France, concerning the 
division of Syria and Mesopotamia between themselves and the
(i)
Arabs. (b) Russia1 s assent to an agreement which assigned
(2)
her northern Kurdistan and portions of Eastern Anatolia, 
v. The Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, 17 April, 1917, be­
tween Great Britain, France and Italy, concerning Italy*s share
(3)
of Asia Minor.
The Ottoman Empire, from which Germany was to be excluded, 
was, by the Agreements, divided among the Allies in accordance 
with their longstanding ambitions. In addition, large sections 
of the Empire were assigned to potential allies as compensation 
for their participation in the war against the Central Powers. 
Thus, Italy demanded and received recognition, by the Pact of 
London, 26 April, 1915, of her claimsto an equitable section
(1) Text: de Martens, op. cit.,vol. X, p.350: L fAsle Francaise,
XVII, (August-November, 19l9), pp. 243 ff.; Samne, G., La^Syrle 
(Paris, 1920), p. 638 ff.; Loder, J. de V., The Truth about
Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria (1923), pp. 161-4. The 
Foreign Office * version^ in Leslie, Shane, Mark Sykes; His 
Life and Letters (1923), pp. 250-8, is nothing more than an 
explanation of the circumstances under which the Agreement 
was made.
(2) See Memorandum of 6 March, 1917 (first printed In Izvesta,
12 November, 1917); Manchester Guardian, 19 January, 1018; 
de Martens, op. cit., vo1., X , p .353; H.P.C.P., vol. VI,
p. 16. For negotiations in which Russia participated, see 
documents in Die Europaischen M&chte und die Turkel Wahrend 
des Yifeltkrleges; Die Auftellung der aslatisohen Turkel 
lAdamoff, E.J Ed., Dresden, 1932) (Hereafter Die' Auftellung 
der asiatischen Tiirkei), especially Nos. 56, 60, 74-8, 99,
T6 3 ; T 6 4 .-----------------
(3) Reputed text: Manchester Guardian, 9 January, 1920; Current
History (New York), vol. 3£l'"f March, 1920), pp. 499 ff.; see 
also H.P.C.P., vol. VI, pp. 18 ff. u
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of Asia Minor. In return for his revolt against the Turks, 
Husain, Sharif of Mecca, received promises, through the so-called 
Husain-McMahon Correspondence, of British aid for the establish­
ment of Arab independence in a large portion of the Arab-speaking
(1)
provinces of Turkey.
In the Correspondence, however, Sir Henry McMahon made res­
ervations safeguarding the interests of Great Britain and those
(2)
of her ally, Prance, Previous Agreements which Great Britain
(3)
had with the Arab chiefs were to be unaltered. Basra was to be
(4)
placed under British control while Baghdad, concerning which 
it was declared that a stable government was demanded by the very
(5)
special British interests in the region, was to be the subject
(6)
of future negotiations. It was also stipulated that the pros­
pective Arab state should receive only British aid and assistance.,
(1) Letters, Sir H. McMahon, Cairo, to Husain, Sharif of Mecca,
24 October, 25 October, 14 December, 1915; also, 30 August 
1915. See also, Young, Major Sir H. W., The Independent Arab 
(1933), pp. 276-7.
(2) Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 24 October, 14 Dec­
ember, 1915, also, 25 January, 1916. The reservation of 
territory along the eastern Mediterranean in the interests of 
Prance were not recognised by the Sharif, who agreed, however, 
to postpone the decision until the end of the war. Sharif 
Husain to Sir H. McMahon, 1 January, 1915. The claim of an 
existing secfcet treaty giving all of Arab-Asia to Sharif 
Husain has never been proven. Infra p.217 .
(3) Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 24 October, Section 
1; Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, 5 November, 1915.
(4) Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 25 October, 1915.
(5) Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 14 December, 1915.
(6) Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, 5 November, 1915;
Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 25 January, 1916.
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( 1 )
and should employ, exclusively, British advisers. The Sharif 
had, at first, protested at the conditions concerning * Iraq,which,
he declared, by history and religion, formed an integral part of
(2)
Arab territory. It was agreed, however, to leave the final
decision to the future, the British to pay an indemnity for any
(3)
part of !Iraq which they occupied, even temporarily.
(4)
The Sykes-Picot Agreement was to regulate future Anglo- 
French territorial relations in the eastern Mediterranean and to 
govern future British policy in points of conflict arising from 
the interpretation of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence and the 
Agreement. It confirmed the arrangements made by the Anglo-Arab 
correspondence by assigning Basra and Baghdad to British control, 
and by designating a strip of territory lying between Baghdad and 
the zone of territory around Mosul, assigned to French influence, 
as a zone to be given to the Arabs, subject to British influence.
(1) Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 25 October, 1915, 
Section 4.
(2) Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, 5 November, 1915.
(3) Ibid., Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 25 January, 191b.
(4) The statement that T. E. Lawrence, fhad much to do with the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement1 Main, op. cit., p. 58, is scarcely 
accurate. The first intimation received by Sir Henry McMahon 
or anyone else in Cairo, of the agreement seems to have been 
when Sir Mark Sykes, 'in conversation, producing a map, re­
marked "What do you think of my treaty?"' Hart, H. B. Liddell, 
T. E. Lawrence (1934), p. 70. See also Leslie, op. cit. ,
pp. 244, 245, 249, 287, 288.
See Sketch Map.
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The necessity of capturing Baghdad as a preliminary to the 
application of these secret agreements thus became one of the 
primary political arguments in favour of the renewed advance to­
wards Baghdad. Its capture would also restore British prestige, 
seriously shaken by the surrender of Kut and by the attempt,
(i)
suggested by General Townshend himself, 23 April, and sanot-
(2 )
ioned by the War Cabinet, to purchase the freedom of the be­
sieged army for a sum of £2,000,000. The capture would, in
addition, encourage the people of the Allied Powers and dishearten
(3)
the Central Powers.
The occupation of Baghdad would present a better opportunity
to organize Arab co-operation, a step which H. M. Government had
repeatedly stressed from the inception of the campaign and to
facilitate which the War Cabinet was to sanction the Proclamation
of 19 March, 1917, issued under the name of General Maude, follow-
(4)
ing the capture of Baghdad, 11 March, 1917.
Among the reasons originally urged for the dispatch of the 
Expedition, it will be remembered, was the hope that it would
(1) O.H., vol. II, p. 450.
(2) Ibid., p. 452.
(3) The tremendous store set by Germany and Turkey on Baghdad and 
the plans which they elaborated for its recapture have been 
well described by Djemal (Jamal) Pasha in Memories of a 
Turkish Statesman (n.d.)f During the war, he, himself, re- 
garded Tales tine and Syria as more important centres, although 
he had once, when Pasha of Baghdad, described 'Iraq as 'an 
iron gate against the great power to the south, that Is,
India.' Speech on the Inauguration of Jamal Bey as Pasha of 
Baghdad, 30 August, 1911.
(4) For text, see Appendix I.
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secure the assistance of the Arabs against the Turks and prevent
(1)
them from joining in a Jihad, With these ends in view,pro-m
clamations had been addressed to the Shaikhs of the Gulf and 
to the Arabs of Turkish Arabia by H. M. Political Officers, 
both before and after the occupation of Basra, It was empha-
(3)
sized that ’this War has nothing to do with religion.’ The
Shaikhs were urged not to ’allow the foolish people to be led
away by foolish talk of "Jehad”•’ They were assured that ’the
Holy Towns of Arabia, and also the Holy Places in 'Iraq, and
the port of Jeddah’ would not be attacked by either the British
army or navy ’ so long as there is no interference with pilgrims
and visitors from India to those towns and Holy Places, ’ It
was reiterated that ’the military operations of the British
Forces’ were directed 'solely against the Turkish Government
(4)
and its troops.' The Arabs were again assured that the
(5)
British Government bore ’no emnity or Ill-will against the populace';
(1) Supra, pp. 4, 8-10,
(2) Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc... Relating to 
... Mesopotamia, October 51st, 1914 to August 51st, 1919, 
(Baghdad, 1919) (Hereafter, Proclamations, 1914-1919.) 
Notices and Proclamations, Nos. 1-5, 7, 8. An interesting 
parallel to the Proclamations of 1914 may be seen in the 
instructions to Captain Seton, Political Officer to the 
expeditions against pirates of the Persian Gulf, 1809. See 
Low, op. cit., vol. I, p. 325.
(3) Ibid., Notice No. 1, 31st October, 1914; Proclamation No.2,
1st November, 1914; Proclamation No. 3, 1st November, 1914.
(4) Ibid. , Notice No, 7, 14th February, 1915.
(5) Ibid. , Proclamation No. 5, 22nd November, 1914.
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that it had 'no desire to treat them as enemies so long as they
themselves remain friendly and neutral and refrain from taking
(1)
up arms against her (British) troops.1 On the contrary,
the British Government hoped 'to prove good friends and protec­
tors' and they were assured that, under the British flag, they
would 'enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard
(2)
to your religious and your secular affairs.* They were warned,
however, that while it was 'the wish of the British Government 
to free the Arabs from the oppression of the Turks and bring 
them advancement and increase of prosperity and trade', yet, 'in 
the case of those departing from the path of friendship and 
neutrality and taking up arms in co-operation with the enemy, 
their properties lying within the sphere of British control will
(3)
be considered sequestrated to the British Government.' This
warning had already been conveyed to them in an emphatic notice,
(4)
on the outbreak of war, and dated 5 November, 1914.
Neither the assurances nor the warnings conveyed in these 
proclamations nor the personal efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his 
assistant Political Officers were sufficient to win over the 
Arabs as a whole to the British side. The problem of gaining 
Arab co-operation in responsible posts in the Administration or
(1) Ibid., JMotice No. 7, 14th February, 1915; cf. also, Notice
No. 4, 5th wovember, 1914.
(2) Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, 22 November, 1914.
(3) Ibid., Notice No. 7, 14th February, 1914.
(4) Ibid., Notice No. 4, 5th November, 1914.
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In fighting the Turk hung largely on the ability of Great Britain 
to give the Arabs tangible evidence that the Turks would never 
return to the country. Confiscation of property would be the 
least of the reprisals which the Turks would inflict if they 
ever returned, as the Arabs well knew; a knowledge confirmed by 
Turkish treatment of the Arabs of Kut al-'Amara after its sur­
render.
Such assurance could not be given, however, not only for
fear of giving umbrage to the allies of Great Britain, but also
because the question of the advance on Baghdad was still In the
air, and the future status of the country was still in doubt in
(1)
official quarters. Not even those, who, familiar with the
intimate relationship which Turkish Arabia bore to India, or 
responsible for the administrative policy of the country, could 
make reassuring public announcements, although they confidently 
expected Mesopotamia to be 'an Indian appendage1 as Sir Valentine
Chirol wrote in 1915, while accompanying the Viceroy of India on
(2 )
an official visit to Basra. The Viceroy himself, on the
occasion of the visit had made a speech, Interpreted by many as
(3)
foreshadowing annexation to India.
(1) Asquith, Herbert, wrote in his diary, 25 March, 1915: 'Grey
and I both think that in the real interests of our own
future the best thing would be if at the end of the War we 
could say that we had taken and gained nothing.... Mesopotamia 
for instance.' Asquith, H. A., op. cit., vol. II, p. 69.
(2) Behind the Veil, pp. 91-2, (facsimile, p. 119).
(3) Proclamations, 1914-1919. Speech No. 6, 6 February, 1915. 
p. 3.
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Private assurances as given by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Politi­
cal Officer, on behalf of H. M. Government, to various individuals, 
such as the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Shaikh of Mohammerah, had 
limited credence. To the former, in a letter dated 3 November, 
1914, two days before the landing at Pao, Sir Percy Cox had de­
clared that if the British succeeded at Basra, ’we will not
return Basra to the Turkish Government and will not surrender it
(1)
back to them at all.’
Lacking definite and public assurances, the great majority 
of the Arabs, both townsmen and tribesmen, while feathering their 
nests at every opportunity, refused to commit themselves. They 
preferred to let time and circumstances decide the question on 
whom their permanent allegiance should be bestowed.
(1) Aitchison, op. cit., vol. XI, Persian Gulf No. XLII.
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CHAPTER IV.
INITIATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.
While the extension of the campaign to Baghdad and the
future of the country were being discussed in official circles,
the practical problem of the administration of the occupied
areas was forced upon those in command of the Expeditionary
Force .. Even had there been no obligation under international
(1)
usage, as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and of 1907, the 
needs of the Force and the necessity of replacing the vacuum 
left by the departure of the Turks, rendered the initiation of 
some form of administration imperative.
The requirements of the troops were wide and varied.
Houses had to be requisitioned for billets and messes, the 
occupants removed. Land for camps and ammunition dumps had to 
be found. Labour and transport in ever increasing quantities 
had to be supplied. Local produce and provisions had to be 
obtained and constantly inspected for quality. Precautionary 
measures for the health of both men and animals had to be taken; 
sanitary regulations had to be enforced; a better water supply 
provided. Peace and order in the bazaars and about the camps 
had to be maintained; thefts from troops and stores by loose- 
fingered Arabs checked. Liquor shops, dance halls and brothels
(1) Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Annexed to Hague Convention, 29 July, 1899, affirmed in a 
similar Convention of the Hague, 18 October, 1907. Texts: 
Brit, and For. St. Papers, vol. XCI (1898-9) 988; vol. C 
(1906-07) 338.
I 57*
had to be controlled.
The use of river and of sea transport had also to be regu­
lated in the interests of army supplies. Freedom of movement 
of both persons and goods had to be so controlled that neither 
information nor supplies should reach the enemy.
These needs of the Forces, although met largely by the 
direct intervention of the military authorities, necessitated 
an intricate mass of detailed orders, proclamations and notices 
issued under the authority of the General Officer Commanding 
and enforced for the most part by military police and military 
courts. These regulations supervised the direct relations
between the inhabitants and the army, ranging from the control
(1) (2) 
of rents and foodstuffs, the restriction of movements and 
(3)
rivercraft, to orders that carriage drivers and boatmen
'shall in all cases give preference to British Officers,
(4)
European ladies and Government servants.1
They governed indirect relations, from the control of the
(5)
carrying of arms among the inhabitants, the sale of liquors 
(6)
and drugs to minute sanitary regulations prescribing floor
(1) Compilation of Proclamations and Notifications Affecting 
^Tvll Inhabitants of Mesopotamia In Basrah (Baghdad, 1919) 
Notification No. 2 (hereafter Procs. Basrah)
(2) Ibid, Notif. No. 5; Proclamations and Notifications,
'Amarah' (Baghdad, 1919), No. 1, Sec. 14^ (Hereafter 
Procs. 'Amarah).
(3) Procs. Basrah, Notif. No. 6, Regulation Nos. 12, 13; Procs.
'Amarah, Proc. No. 1, Secs. 2, 3, and 9.
(4) Procs. Basrah, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 11.
(5) Procs. Basrah, Reg. No. 12; Procs. 'Amarah, Proc. No. 1,
Sec. 4.
^  £gPcif* Basrah, Reg. No. 12, Sec. 9; Procs. 'Amarah. Proc. 
No. l, Sec. 7; Notice No. 5. --------------
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space per animal in stables or rewards for bringing in dogs
(1)
for destruction.
In all these relations between the civil population and
the military authorities, the fact was never lost sight of that
it was a military occupation and that a war had to be won.
Prom the first to the last, the needs of the inhabitants were
subordinated to those of the occupying Forces, Food, in certain
cases, was admitted to market for sale only when the require-
(2)
merits of the military authorities had been met. Access to
(3)
piped water was forbidden. Families were evicted from
their houses and land requisitioned, sometimes without payment
(4)
of rent. Restrictions on persons and goods were carried
to unnecessary lengths, even after the danger from spies had
(5)
vanished.
Delicate handling by the Political Officers was necessary 
in order to enforce the orders and regulations, harsh and 
exacting as many of them were, and at the same time, to keep 
the populace friendly, an avowed aim of the Expedition, which, 
from its Inception, placed the British authorities in a peculiar 
position.
(1) Basrah, Notice No. 1, No. 10: Procs. 1Amarah,
Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.
(2) Procs. 1Amarah, Proc. No. 1, Sec. 14.
(5) Ibid, Notice No. 3.
(4) Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit, pp. 144, 242; Review of the
Civil Administration of Mesopotamia (1920), Cmd. No. 1061, 
p. 24. (Hereafter Review C. Admin., 1914-1920)
(5) No rent was paid from the time of the Occupation, on the 
four or five miles of river frontage occupied by the British 
at ’Amara. Monthly Reports, Political Officers. December,
1918; »Amara, p. 2.
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The entire situation was a contradiction in terms. The
Expeditionary Force was invading enemy territory, with the
population of which the British Government were not at war,
(1)
according to the proclamations issued after Fao. Indeed,
the British Government had declared that it had come to co­
operate with the Arabs for their liberation from Turkish op-
(2)
pressors. In spite of these declarations, however, the
restrictions placed on the inhabitants differed little, if any, 
from the treatment accorded to an enemy population. The situ­
ation was no doubt complicated by the refusal of many of the 
Arabs to be considered friendly and by the necessity of combat­
ing by rigorous measures the low standards of sanitation, hous­
ing and morality prevailing in Mesopotamia.
The fact that the military regime was accepted as long as 
it was, without protest, may be attributed to a variety of
factors. Prompt payment for all supplies, cash rent for
(3)
billets and land, although not invariably nor always in
strict proportion to prevailing rates, non-interference with
such religious or local customs as did not hamper military or
administrative policy, and the marked Increase in general econ-
omic prosperity, did much to mitigate its rigours. While the
attitude of the Army as a whole was distinctly hostile to the
native population, not without good reason, yet there was a
 . .   _______
(1) Proclamations.1914-1919, Notice No. 4, 5 November, 1914; 
Proc. No. 5, 22 November, 1914, Also supra pp. 74-5.
(2) Ibid. Notice No. 7, 14 February, 1915. Also supra p. 75.
(3) Supra, p. 80, note 5.
-82-
genuine and general desire on the part of all responsible 
officers to be just and fair in all their dealings with the 
native population. The untiring efforts of Sir Percy Cox 
and his assistants in establishing personal relations at the 
same time that subsidies and remissions of taxations were dis­
tributed among the shaikhs and local dignitaries, won many of 
the notables to benevolent neutrality. The high integrity 
and efficiency of the new administration, once it has got into 
its stride, as contrasted with the former Turkish administra­
tion, did even more to create a general feeling of confidence 
and belief that the coming of Great Britain was for good rather 
than for evil.
Why the Turks Failed to Give Good Government to ♦Iraq.
It has been the habit among many writers on pre-war and 
war-time ’Iraq to disparage its administration by the Turks. 
Much of this attitude may be due to the not unnatural desire to 
paint the Turkish picture black in order that the scene, after 
Great Britain had reconstituted the administration, might ap­
pear brighter in contrast. Undoubtedly these views are some­
what exaggerated, yet there can be no question that the Turkish 
system, both In conception and in application, was lamentably 
deficient.
The principal reason for the failure of the Ottomans to 
give good government in ’Iraq or elsewhere In their dominions, 
lay In their fundamental political concepts. From the founda­
tion of the Empire, Ottoman subjects, their lives and property
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were regarded as existing only for the benefit and glory of 
the rulers. Thus, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, from 
the Sultan downward, every member of the official hierarchy 
looked on each person lower than himself in the scale as pro­
viding the where-with-all for his own profit and advancement 
until the accumulated burden finally rested on the great mass 
of peasantry and common people, who, having no means of resist­
ance, might be maltreated and starved with impunity. A wider 
concept of government as well as other reforms seemed imminent 
after the Revolution of 1908, but the Young Turk movement pro­
duced little but confusion and disappointed hopes.
The Ottomans, moreover, in all their political activities 
could not forget that they had come to power by conquest, a 
fact which bore particularly upon the non-Ottoman sections, 
such as ’Iraq and Syria and upon the non-Moslem sections of the 
Empire. They looked with ingrained aversion on all occupations 
except those of soldiering and governing. The potential 
wealth of the country was thus left undeveloped, additional 
sources of revenue were untouched, and, in the face of extrava­
gant and ill-advised expenditure, the country was forced to 
seek for financial relief from abroad.
Another reason for the failure of the Turks to give good
government lay in the hiatus between statute book and practise,
between a principle and its application. Every reforming
movement had seen new laws and regulations, often copied bodily
(i)
from European models, added to the statute books. Rarely,
(1) A general resume of Turkish laws, regulations, etc., may 
be found in Young, George, Corps de droit ottoman. Recueil
(Continued over)
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however, was the will or the ability present to enforce the 
measures. Every innovation had to face opposition not only 
from a poorly-paid, badly educated, often indolent officialdom, 
but also from traditional usage, from religious custom and 
prejudice, and, not infrequently, from vested interests of the 
European Powers.
Although the civil bureaucracy might blindly struggle to 
apply the regulations as imposed by the central authorities, 
the impartial application of such measures varied in direct 
proportion to the energy and honesty of the pashas of the 
wilayets, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the distance 
of the wilayets from the central supervising authority at 
Constantinople.
In all these respects, Turkish Arabia suffered badly.
Its remoteness from Constantinople, its lack of amenities, and 
its unfavourable climate made officials reluctant to take office 
there. The wilayets were thus staffed, for the most part, by 
incompetent officials, or by those in political exile from Con­
stantinople. Proper supervision was almost impossible.
(1) (Continued): des codes, lols, reglements, ordonnances, et
actes les plus Import ants du droit int^rleur. et d~f Etudes 
sur le droit coutumler de PEmpire Ottoman, Y vols"^  (Oxford, 
1905-06). Also Biliotti,^ A., and Sedad, Ahmed, Legisla­
tion Ottomane depuis le re'tabl is semen t de la constitution,
24 Diemazl ul-ahlr, 1326, TlO juillet.; 1908, lor Novembre, 
1909). Recueil des lols. dbcrets, reglements, conventions, 
actes internationaux, etc., de 1♦Empire Ottoman, (Paris,
1912). English translations of various Turkish laws made 
by the Judicial Department, during the British occupation 
are listed in the bibliography under Official Publications, 
♦Iraq Government, Judicial.
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Salaries of most of the government officials from Walis 
to gendarmes were small and irregularly paid. Opportunities 
for peculation and corruption seem to have been rarely over-
CD
looked. Substantial sums, exceeding the annual salaries
were often paid for offices, from which holders rarely retired
without having privately reimbursed themselves. Judges1
salaries in the Baghdad Wilayet ranged from £.T.7-| to £.T. 35
(2)
per month, but occupants of these positions had been fre­
quently known to advance from extreme poverty to wealth within 
the space of a few years.
Whatever its faults and they were many, the Turkish regime 
had been the only Government known to Turkish Arabia. Its 
vagaries had become familiar. Its defects and shortcomings 
the populace both knew and made use of for their own ends.
Its disappearance with the complete withdrawal of the Turks as 
far north as Kut al-Amara by September 1915, the flight of all 
but minor Arab officials, the destruction or removal of records 
both by fleeing Turks and by interested inhabitants and the
(1) Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, p. 7, cites 1 an authentic story 
of a Turkish Mutasarrlf in Syria, popular with his. 
superiors if not with the people he governed, who boasted 
that his budget showed no expenditure at all. It con­
sisted entirely of receipts. All the officials, from the 
Mutasarrlf himself downwards, drew no pay, but lived on 
questionable perquisites, while repairs, maintenance, 
public works, etc. were simply neglected.1
(2) Report on the Admin, of Civil Justice, from the Occupation 
of Baghdad to 31st December, 1917, in Admin. Report of the 
Baghdad Wilayet, 1917, (Calcutta, 1918), p. 182. (Here­
after Admin. Report, Baghdad, 1917 ).
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( 1 )
looting and pillaging of government buildings and equipment 
made it imperative that an administration should be re-estab­
lished, As soon as the first confusion had settled into routine 
and the population of the occupied territories had become some­
what accustomed to British troops and their unfamiliar demands 
and regulations, the setting-up of the Civil Administration was 
taken in hand,
(2)
For the purposes of Civil Administration and control of 
the tribes, the General Officer Commanding had attached to his 
staff a Chief Political Officer (Sir Percy Cox) who appointed 
officers, wherever they could be diverted from their military 
units, as Assistant Political Officers to take charge of the occu­
pied territories, divided for political purposes along Indian 
lines. At the time Kut al-'Amerawas taken, they had been estab­
lished at Basra, ^uma, Nadiriya, Suq ash-Shuyukh, 1 Amara, Qpl! at 
Salih, and fAli Gharbi. To the Chief Political Officer, they 
were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the settle­
ment of disputes both of townsmen and tribesmen, the administration 
and collection of Revenue and the creation of friendly relations 
with the tribes. To the military authorities, they were respons­
ible for the collection of labour and local supplies, for estimates 
for compensation of damages caused by military operations and
(1) Within 48 hours of the departure of the Turks, not a single 
government building outside Basra had doors or windows left. 
Wilson, Sir A. T. op. cit., p. 13.
(2) The administration until November 1920 was actually Military 
Government, whether called Civil or Military Administration.
It was imposed by the military authorities under the necess­
ities of war. The laws of war alone determined the legality 
of its acts.
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( 1 )
for the local protection of lines of communication. In
the towns Military Governors were appointed, with full control
under the senior Military Officer.
Prom the outset, the primary question had to be decided
whether the existing Turkish system, either as a whole or in
part, should be adapted and utilized, or whether new systems
based on Indian methods should be set up. Although the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and of 1907, of which Great Britain was a
signatory, stated that the occupant of a country !... shall
take all the measure in his power to restore and ensure, as
far as possible public order and safety while respecting, un-
(2)
less absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’, 
the choice between the two alternatives was not difficult.
Both the magnitude of the task and the military situation de­
manded immediate returns and a maximum of efficiency with a
minimum of effort from those delegated to the initiation of the
civil aspect of administration. None of the responsible
officials of the Turkish regime remained. Pew of the British 
officers of the Army of Occupation possessed any specialized 
knowledge of the previous administration. Such little admin­
istrative experience as existed had been gained in Indian 
systems which, from the British point of view, were vastly
(1) Admin. Report, Basra Sanjak, 1916-1917 (Calcutta, 1917),
pp. 1-2.
(2) Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Sec. Ill, Art. 43: Brit, and Por. St. Papers, vol. XCL 
(1898-9) 999; vol. CT (19o6-67T'35Cf.
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preferable to the complicated, inefficient and clumsy Turkish 
methods. In addition, the confident expectation within inner 
circles that the Government of India would assume, in the 
future, permanent control of Basra and its hinterland at least, 
stimulated the adoption of the Indian administrative methods 
which would aid in the assimilation of the occupied territor­
ies. Hence, in deference to political motives and practical 
considerations as well as expediency, it was natural that the 
political and military authorities should apply Indian methods 
and practises wherever possible.
Within a week of the occupation of Basra, a Civil Police
service modelled on Indian lines, replaced the Military Police,
under the supervision of Mr. E. G. Gregson of the Indian Police
Service, who had had wide experience on the North West Frontier
and in the Persian Gulf. Employment of the ex-Turkish police,
even had they been available, was not desirable. Constables
were therefore imported from India and Aden. A similar force
v/as organized at 'Amara, and a little later at Nasiriya and at
(1)
Suq ash-Shuyukh, but not with great success. Local police,
or Shabana, for use in the outlying villages and districts, 
were recruited from the Arabs themselves.
Foundations were thus laid on which later officials from 
India, Including Colonel H. C. Prescott, I.A., late Inspector- 
General of ’Iraq Police, were to construct the present ’Iraq
(1) Administration Report, Suq ash-Shuyukh, in Reports of
Political Officers In Occupied Territories of ’Iraq, 1916- 
1§I7, (MarcH~5TTi Submitted 15 y Sir P. Z. Cox under 
No. 8850, Baghdad, 18 November, 1917, (Hereafter P.O. Reports, 
1916-1917).
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Police system, in which the Shabana provided the nucleus of
the native element.
The introduction of Indian currency followed naturally on
the coming of the Expeditionary Force, whose needs were paid
for in rupees. A proclamation forbade the use of depreciated
(1)
Turkish paper money, and the inadequate supply of small 
Turkish coins were driven from the bazaars. Turkish gold liras, 
however, continued to circulate, but their important exports 
were regulated.
Establishment of a Judicial System.
For the administration of civil and criminal jutsice, a
(2)
special code, known as the fIraq Occupied Territories Code,
(3)
was created largely from laws in force in India. The Code,
promulgated 1 August, 1915, from whioh time the legal system of
(4)
the Occupied Territories may be said to date, established 
courts for the enforcement of civil rights by legal action, 
hitherto in abeyance, and criminal courts to supplement the 
military courts. These courts, functioning under the authority
(1) Proclamations, notices, etc. relating to the Civil Admin. 
... issued between 22 December, 1^16 and July 1, 1^18  ^
(Baghdad, 1918) Proc. No. 1, 22 December, 1916.
(2) 1 Iraq Occupied Territories Code, 1915 (Bombay, 1915)•
Also six supplements to 31 December, 1918. (Hereafter 
11.0.T. Code.)
(3) A preliminary schedule of 34 Indian Acts to be applied in
the Occupied Territories was annexed to the Code.
(4) Arrangements to reconstitute the courts had begun shortly
after the appointment of the Senior Judicial Officer,
7 April, 1915.
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of the General Officer Commanding, were supervised by Lieut, 
Colonel S. G. Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, and by Captain 
C. P. Mackenzie, Junior Judicial Officer, both of whom were 
members of the Indian Political Department.
Among the reasons put forward for the substitution of the 
Anglo-Indian Judicial system for that of the Turkish system, 
have been the impossibility of reproducing within a limited 
time the hierarchy of courts culminating in the Court of Cassa­
tion at Constantinople, the inability to find judges and offic­
ials familiar with the Turkish system, as well as other reasons
(i)
already given above. It was also held that the Foreign
(2)
Jurisdiction Act, of 1890, could not be applied and that any
laws made or administered must take the form of orders issued
by the Army Commander who could, by notification, depute his
powers to Civil Judicial Officers and regularise the exercise
(3)
of the orders so made in the form of a code such as the one 
actually promulgated.
(1) Supra pp. 86-7. The additional reason for the abandonment 
of the Turkish system given by Sir A. T. Wilson (op. cit. 
p. 67) that Turkish law *had never functioned properly in 
Mesopotamia,1 seems hardly sufficient, especially in view 
of the comparatively successful application of Turkish law 
to Baghdad in 1917 and the re-application of the system to 
Basra itself in 1919. Moreover, it hardly met the require 
ments of the Hague Convention as stated in Section III, 
Article 43, to respect 1 unless absolutely prevented the 
laws in force in the country.1
(2) 53-54 Victoria cap. 37.
(3) Administration Report, Judicial Department, 1915, (Calcutta. 
TS16)' p. 1.---(TTerea’fper'"JuSl’cial Report",' '1915)7
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Under the Code, the Senior Judicial Officer exercised the
civil and criminal powers normally exercised in India by the
District and the Sessions Judge, respectively. The Junior
Judicial Officer possessed the powers of an Assistant Judge and
a District Magistrate. The Assistant Judicial Office!*, who,
after 7 September, 1915, was Khan Sahib Agha Mirza Muhammad,
had powers of a Subordinate and of a Magistrate of the First
(1)
Class. In addition, the Junior and the Assistant Judicial
Officers were invested, as In India, with powers of Small Cause
(2)
Court Judges.
Powers were given under the Code to enforce any Indian
(3)
Law, which might be amended to meet local conditions, a pro-
(4)
vision which was freely used, as was also the power to make 
rules of procedure for the better execution of any matter aris-
(5)
ing in the course of any civil or criminal case.
Although provision was made for the application, subject
(6) (7)
to stated exceptions, of Turkish Civil Law, the exceptions
(8)
included in practise the bulk of suits coming before the courts.
(1) *1.0.T. Code, Sections 8 and 14.
(2) Order by the General Officer Commanding, 1 August, 1915,
in *1.0.1. Code, p. 25.
(3) *I.O.T.Code, Sections, 6, 4, and 55.
(4) Judicial Report, 1915, p. 1.
(5) *I.0.T. Code, Section 51.
(6) Ibid., Sections 49, 50.
(7) Ibid., Sections 6, 32, 50.
(8) Judicial Report, 1915, p. 1.
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Thus, for all intents and purposes, Turkish Civil Law dis­
appeared. Turkish Criminal Law, the Law of Evidence and the
(1)
Laws of Civil Procedure were expressly excluded from operation.
The 1 Iraq Code in its provisions and in the manner of its 
application seems to have made little distinction between India 
and ’Iraq. Indeed, Section 8 explicitly stated 1 the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and other enactments for administration, of 
criminal justice in British India shall have effect as if the 
Occupied Territories were a district in the Presidency of 
Bombay.’ This section, taken with the code as a whole, tends 
to confirm the impression that valid as were some of the 
reasons advanced at the time for the introduction of the new 
legal system, the most cogent reason was the underlying desire 
to pave the way for the painless absorption of lower Mesopotamia 
to India.
The belief, apparently held at this time, that the Indian
system introduced by the Code was no more foreign to Turkish
(2)
Arabia than the Turkish system which it replaced, and that 
therefore the change was acceptable, seems scarcely in accord­
ance with the facts. As Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, head of the 
Judicial system in Mesopotamia, 1917-1921, has pointed out,
The present organization of these Courts and the Codes 
(of the Turks) have been in force for more than a generation, 
and indeed some of the Codes date back to a much earlier 
date. The people are accustomed to them, and are accus­
tomed to regulate their transactions by them. This is 
especially true of the Baghdad mercantile community ... 
Lawyers and Government officials have been trained in the
(1) 1I.O.T. Code, Section 48.
(2) Wilson, Sir A. T., op. cit.f p. 68.
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( 1 )
procedure of the Courts and use of the Codes,
The same statement could hardly he made concerning the
Indian Laws, none of which were available either in Arabic or
in Turkish when introduced. Even the Code was not translated
into Arabic for some time following its introduction. Only
four of the several score of Indian Laws had been translated
into Arabic at the end of 1917, a fact which called forth a
protest from the retiring Senior Judicial Officer, Colonel
(2)
S. G. Knox. With the introduction of the Code, Arabic be­
came the official language in the Courts, a measure popular to 
the people. Its use, however, was not entirely new. A cir­
cular from the Turkish Ministry of Interior in April, 1913, had 
directed that the use of Arabic should be allowed in the Courts 
of Justice and in public offices. In spite of the failure to 
carry out this concession literally, the use of Turkish was 
more of an affront to Arab sentiment than a handicap to litiga­
tion. Turkish was, and in many centres still is, the polite 
language, much as French was at the Courts of Prussia and 
Russia in the 18th Century.
Although criminal cases could be tried in these newly 
established civil courts, the bulk of such cases were not sent 
to them. Serious cases, mainly robbery under arms, continued 
to be tried by military courts, under a highly summary
(1) Report on the Admin, of Justice, Baghdad, 1917, in Admin. 
-R^poW,"BTgMadY' T5177 p7'       ;
(2) Review of the Reports of the Administration of Basrah 
Wilayet from April to December.1917 (Calcutta, 1918) (Here­
after Admin. Rep., Basrah, 1917): Report on the Admin, of
Justice, 1917, p. 1q8»
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( 1 )
procedure. In Basra, ’Ashar, ’Amara and Nasiriya, the
Military or Deputy Military Governors decided disputes of all 
kinds, while in the districts the same powers were exercised 
by Political Officers. Until after the fall of Baghdad no 
civil courts existed outside of Basra town.
Justice in Tribal Areas.
It was soon evident that the ’Iraq Code could not be 
applied in its entirety to the tribal areas, comprising practic­
ally all of the Occupied Territories outside the town. It was 
also clear that special powers were needed by the Political 
Officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their dis­
tricts. To meet the situation, the Tribal Criminal and Civil
(2)
Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. Doobs, on 
the lines of the Indian Frontier Crimes Regulation and was 
promulgated in February, 1916. It gave authority the 
Political Officers to invoke a tribal majlis or other
(1) Admin. Rep., Basra, 1917: Rep. Military Governo* of Basra,
I9l7,~ p. m
(2) Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, G.B.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., 
K.C.I.E., (1871-1934) may be rightfully called cne of the 
makers of modern ’Iraq. He saw wide and distinguished 
service in India, Persia and Afghanistan. As fevenue and 
Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan, 1909, 1911 and 1917, 
he came into direct contact with the ’Sandeman System’ •
He was under orders as Resident to Turkish Arabia when war 
broke out in 1914, but it was as Revenue Commissioner that 
he supervised the organization of administration, 1915-16, 
while Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, enlarged 
political relations with the Arabs. Versatile in talents, 
but essentially an administrator, he brought to the diffi­
cult period, 1923-9, when he served as High Cominissioner 
to ’Iraq, a great capacity for realistic thinking, a highly 
developed sense of duty, and a deep loyalty to tie Empire 
which dominated all his relations with the Arabs.
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arbitrating body to deal, in accordance with tribal custom, 
with all cases in which any of the parties concerned was a
(i)
tribesman.
In all arbitration procedure, the Political Officer had 
the final word, although the Chief Political Officer might re­
view the case. The Political Officer had to confirm the find­
ings of the majlis, and he might set aside or add to the sent-~nftr
ences imposed. He was also invested with magisterial power
to try cases which did not lend themselves to the application of
(3)
tribal arbitration.
The Regulation in its application proved congenial to the
tribes, for it enabled them to settle disputes in ways long
familiar to themselves. It also aided in tribal settlement
and pacification by giving effect to tribal opinion obtained by
arbitration, and it raised the importance of the shaikhs by
giving them a recognized place in the political and legal system.
The Political Officers, on their side, found that considerable
(4)
work was taken off their shoulders.
Over one point of tribal justice the views of the tribes­
men and of the Political Officers often clashed. In cases of 
murder arising out of a blood feud, the tribesmen were
(1) Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation, G.O.C. 
F r T c T a m ^  III,"Sec. 7.
(2) Ibid., Ch. Ill, Sections 10, 11, 13.
(3) Ibid., Ch. IV and V.
(4) Reports of Admin, for 1918 of Divisions and Districts e€
"Dio gFie&s of -bile 0 c cup i e d T e r r i t o r i e s of M e s opo t ami a. 
rCaic^utla, n.d.): Qurna Report, p. 3o£. (Hereafter Admin.
Report, 1918.)
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(1)
accustomed to regard fasl or payments of money and usually, 
of women, as sufficient to settle the score and to end the feud. 
Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only 
harsh but unnecessary. In many cases where a woman violated 
or had been even accused of violating the desert code of moral­
ity. the death of the offender was demanded by the code in the
(2)
name of honour (namus). Capital punishment for such murders,
which were frequent and usually premeditated and brutal, cut
across tribal justice. The Political Officers, on their side,
found such customs abhorrent and contrary to their ideas of
(3)
justice. Their natural tendency was to over-ride the de­
cisions of the tribal majlis and to impose imprisonment or death 
penalties. The problem was partially solved by the gradual 
recognition of the tribal point of view by the British authori­
ties , but the modification of tribal custom has taken longer.
At the present, it still constitutes one of the major problems 
in the administration of the tribal areas of 11raq.
(1) For valuable first-hand observations on fasl: Monthly
Reports of Political Officers of the Occupied Territories, 
November. 1919. (Hereafter Monthly Rep1 ts): Nasiriya,
pp. 94-5.
(2) See Thomas, Bertram, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia,
1931, pp. 86-7.
(3) Admin. Report, 1918: Hilla Division, pp. 126, 133;
Monthly Repjts. December, 1919; Qurna Division, p. 59; 
ibid., August^ 1919; Qurna Division, p. 74.
-97
The Revenue Department*
No single task of greater magnitude faced the British ad­
ministrators of the Occupied Territories than that of organiz­
ing the Revenue Department. The collection and administration 
of revenue, in accordance with the Turkish system but freed 
from abuse and corruption were not the only problems. Assoc­
iated problems of land tenure, of revenue assessment, of 
Auqaf administration, in all their strangeness and complexity, 
had to be studied and solved. Responsibility for other activ­
ities, such as Excise and Customs, control of Hostile Trading 
Concerns, of the Public Debt, and of Education had to be assumed. 
To render the task more difficult, papers and records, where 
they had not been destroyed, were out of date, and, with the
exception of land-registration, in confusion, requiring weeks
(1)
of careful sorting. Responsible officials had fled, and
although Important aid was rendered by residents of Basra and 
!Amara and later by the discovery of old registers, the essen­
tial information concerning the complicated and often inconsis­
tent system had to be gleaned by investigation and experience.
British Military authorities had at first no time to deal
(1) Cf. the excellent unsigned article (by C. C. Garbett, I.C.S.) 
Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia in 
Quarterly Review, vol. 230, pp. 405 ff. The claim made 
there, p. 411) however, that demand-statements for the 
annual tax on date trees as prepared by the Turks, were 
found intact and collection of this as well as other revenue 
were begun within a few days of the occupation of Basra, 
is not borne out by the records of the period, as Revenue 
Admin. Report, January -March, 1915 (confidential) nor hy 
personal testimony of the officials on the spot at the 
time •
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(1)
with Revenue or Fiscal matters except Customs, With the
arrival, however, of Mr, Dobbs in January, 1915, as Revenue
Commissioner, the work was taken in hand. The taxes demanded
by the Turks had to be ascertained, the proportion paid before
the arrival of the Expeditionary Force had to be discovered,
(2)
and a collecting agency improvised. Methods of assessment
had to be learned. In the first months, the process of learn­
ing was by trial and error, tempered by the desire to win the
confidence and goodwill of the Arabs and to impress them with 
the difference between the Turkish and the British methods of 
government. In some sections, as about 'Amara, the revenue 
was farmed out to great landowners on terms which kept them
loyal to the British. In other sections it was remitted in
(3) (4)
part, and in still others, entirely, as at Qurna in 1915.
In some districts the tax on date trees alone was collected,
(5)
and this in small proportions to former Turkish demands. In
other districts where the landowners were ohviously paying on 
too few trees, the number was raised, with the alternative that 
owners might demand a recount. No such demands occurred. 
Considering the difficulties, it is not surprising that only 
Rs. 20,000 (approximately £ 1,350) in land revenue was collected
(1) Entrusted to a Private Trading firm, Messrs. Gray,
Mackenzie and Co., Revenue Admin. Report, 1915.
(2) Ibid., p. 1.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) P.O. Reports, 1916-1917: Hammar Lake Area, 1916-1917,
p. 57.
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in the five months of the first fiscal year (ending 31 March,
(1)
1915) following the British occupation.
Pull development of the Revenue Department was to come
(2)
after Baghdad Wilayet had been taken over, Nevertheless,
by October 1916, when Mr. Dobbs was invalided to India, a work­
ing administrative machinery had been set up, not only for 
Revenue, but also for other branches of administration which 
had been taken under the wing of the Revenue Department. A 
certain amount of confidence in the British regime had been 
gained. Data and information on revenue, land tenure and 
other subjects had been embodied for future guidance in a ser­
ies of notes which for clarity of judgment and succinctness 
have probably never been surpassed in the history of * Iraq Ad­
ministration.
Administration of Tribal Areas.
To the establishment of a government for the tribal areas, 
both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs gave particular attention.
The greatest need of the moment was for peace and order in 
tribal areas and for the restriction of aid and assistance to 
the Turks from the Arabs, in order that the Expeditionary Force 
might devote itself to its main objective of defeating the 
Turks.
(1) Revenue Admin. Report, 1915.
(2) The Turkish system and the British methods in the various 
aspects of the Revenue Department will be described in 
greater detail in a later section dealing with the develop­
ment of the Administration from 1917 onwards. Supra, pp. 1293
Both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs believed that these con­
ditions might be attained by utilizing the natural leaders of 
the tribes: the shaikhs. The alternative of direct govern­
ment, either by a British or Arab staff, was calculated to be 
contrary to immediate ends if not impossible, due to the lack 
of a suitable staff and to the semi-barbaric character of the 
tribes. Their efforts were, therefore, directed towards 
building up forms of administration and of justice, which, 
while conforming as far as possible to Western standards, were 
based on tribal organization, on recognition of tribal habits 
and customs and on support of the shaikhs as instruments of 
government.
The policy adopted was, in reality, an adaptation of the
system so successfully developed and applied in Baluchistan by
Sir Robert Sandeman, of whom it has been said 1 Every great
colonial administrator has, wittingly or unwittingly, taken him
(1)
as their example or followed in his footsteps.1
When Sir Robert Sandeman first began to develop his system 
in Baluchistan, about 1875, he had found ’the tribal organiza­
tion in a state of rapid decay and the power and influence of
(2)
the tribal leaders much diminished.’ In ’Iraq, at the out­
break of the war, the tribes, especially those on the lower 
Euphrates, were in much the same state, as a result of Ottoman 
attempts alternately, to crush or settle the tribes, and to
(1) Bruce, Col. C. E., J. R. C. Asian Soc. January, 1932, p. 60. 
For details of Sir Robert Sandeman and his system, see the 
article cited, Thornton, T. H., Sir R. Sandeman; his Life 
(1895); Hittu Ram, Sandeman in Baluchistan, (Calcutta,
1916); The Times, 26 February, 1^35; and J. R. C. Asian 
Soc. April, 1935.
(2) J. R. C. Aslan Soc. January, 1932, p. 51.
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break or conciliate their leaders. The Turkish Government had 
at all times regarded the tribal Arabs as savages, who, from 
sheer maliciousness, opposed the Government, while, in reality, 
they were primitive communities still leading an existence so 
untouched by the benefits of civilised government that they 
could comprehend no other form of life than that postulated by 
their own codes and customs. The Government policy, until the 
appointment of Midhat Pasha as Wali of Baghdad, in 1869, aimed 
at the forcible conversion of the tribesmen from outlaws to 
obedient citizens without providing the means to live as such, 
or without arousing even a spark of the respect by which tribal 
obedience might be secured,
(i)
Midhat Pasha approached the tribal problem from the 
standpoint of the land. His method was to sell mlri or state 
lands for small periodical payments, giving mirl tapu sanads 
(state-land title-deed certificates), which, while not con­
ferring actual ownership, gave security of tenure. These tapu 
sanads were to be open to holders of doubtful titles, to 
villagers who cleaned a canal or planted a garden, and to all 
shaikhs of tribes for their tribal area. He intended thereby 
to reclaim wide tracts for the plough, to increase revenue, and 
to subdue tribal ’Iraq by giving the tribesmen new interests 
and relations in agricultural life. The shaikhs, to whom the
(1) For the career of this noted Turkish official, whose re­
forming influence extended throughout the Ottoman Empire, 
and to whom the Turkish Constitution of 1878 owed much, 
see the interesting but uncritical Life of Midhat Pasha 
(1903), by his son, ‘All Haydar MidhaFI
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grants were to be made, would be won to the government In self- 
interest, and would therefore lose their terror as rallying- 
points of anti-government forceg. As chiefs of agricultural 
communities, they would be accessible because rooted to the 
land, taxable because crops could not be hidden, vulnerable be­
cause of government control of water, and dependent on the 
government as guarantor of their acquired rights to collect the 
landlord*s share of crops%
This agrarian policy, although the only one which could 
permanently solve the tribal problem, never achieved more than 
partial success, either during Midhat Pasha*s regime, 1869-72, 
or during those of his successors, previous to 1908, who, while
nominally committed to land settlement, followed their own
(1)
devices in dealing with the tribes.
The machinery for registering the land was inadequate and 
tended to become corrupt. The majority of the tribal leaders 
feared the new policy and shunned the new status as a machina­
tion of government to rob them of freedom and to impose con­
scription. Urban speculators, friendly with tapu officers,
W )
forestalled other would-be tribal purchasers.
(1J After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks reaffirmed 
the policy of settling such tribes as were still nomad, 
such as the firman appointing Jamal Bey (better known as 
Djemal Pasha) as Wali of Baghdad, August, 1911: * The
Wali is to formulate a scheme with the least possible 
delay for the settlement of the nomad tribes on the 
land.*
(2) Revenue Circulars, Nos. 1-22, (Baghdad, 1920), No. 15, 
p. 25.
-103
The attempt to settle the tribes had one definite result,
however, It split the shaikhs, as in the case of the Sa’duns
the
of/Muntaflq, into groups, one hostile to the innovations, the 
other, willing tools of the Government, bought by gifts of land. 
Between the two groups the government vacillated. It was 
easier at times to acquiesce in the domination of the country­
side by powerful, reactionary shaikhs and in the consequent 
nullification of their land policy rather than to maintain their 
own partisans. Nevertheless, whatever plan for winning over 
the shaikhs had existed, it was soon abandoned by the young 
Turks. The latter, desiring to stamp out all other power than 
their own, sought to establish direct relations between the 
Government and tribesmen. Great shaikhs were struck down where- 
ever possible, as was Sa!dun Pasha, in June, 1911, when he was 
treacherously captured and imprisoned in Aleppo, where he died 
suddenly. The authorities went deliberately 1 out of their way 
to break the power of the individual shaikhs by multiplying 
their number everywhere to a bewildering degree. Anarchy reign­
ed and nothing could be done to prevent it, owing to the lack
(1)
of a strong hand in each tribe.1
The struggle between the Government and the tribes in the 
lower Euphrates valley had been further complicated by the 
disruption of the prevailing feudal system, through the unskil­
ful application to the Muntafiq country of Midhat Pasha1s other­
wise sound policy of securing control of the tribes through
(1) Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh, in P. 0, Reports, 
1916-1917.
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( 1 )
land-settlement. The whole of the arable land, although
occupied and cultivated for many years by the tribes, and there­
fore claimed as their own by prescriptive right, was parcelled
out between the Turkish crown and the Safduns, tapu title deeds
(2)
being issued to the new landlords.
The Sa!dun family by long usage, had exercised a form of
overlordship over the Muntafiq, receiving tribute from them and
holding apparently none of the territory as their private pro­
fs)
perty. Prom being mere overlords of tribal landowners, they
themselves beoame landlords. The degradation in status of the 
tribesmen to tenants, much as the Irish cultivators had been 
reduced to tenants on their tribal lands by the English adven­
turers of the 16th and 17th centuries, together with the neces­
sity of paying both rent to the landlords and revenue to the 
Government in the form of shares of their crops, stirred tribal
feeling to revolt, in which they were joined by the party of
(4)
Sa*duns hostile to the Government. An era of bitter strife
ensued between the tribesmen and their landlords, many of whom 
lived in the towns, occasionally by choice but more often by 
necessity, and between the tribesmen and the Government which 
attempted to collect both revenue and rent. In some areas, 
accessible to gun boats and troops, the tribesmen had begun to
(1) Nasir Pasha, the great Sa’dun and founder of Nasiriya is 
credited with introducing the tapu system into the Muntafiq, 
whereby the Safduns became great landlords. Note on the
Saf dun Problem (Confidential) by the Revenue' (jormnissioner, 
Igl&V ' Adminr*Report of the Muntafiq Division, 1919 (Baghdad, 
1920), pp. I-£.
(2) Note on the Sa!dun Problem; Admin. Rep., Muntafiq, 1919, p.2.
(3) Ibid., Also Revenue Rep.,1919, p. 24.
(4) Rev* Circular No. 15, p. 25; Admin. Rep., Muntafiq, 1919, p.2.
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(1)
pay these dues regularly until the weakening of the Government
hold, due to the Revolution of 1908 and later to the Italian
and Balkan wars. The tribes soon relapsed into their former
state of truculence, expelling their landlords and paying scant
(2)
attention to the Government.
In some districts revenue had not been paid by the tribes
(3)
for years, as in the Hammar Lake area, and in the Suq ash- 
Shuyukh region which had been free of any government control for
(4)
fifteen years or more. In still others the Turkish writ
(5)
did not run outside the towns.
Thus, by the time that British Administrators appeared on 
the tribal areas, the only attempt to settle the tribes had 
failed for want of will and of means to execute it. Disputes 
over land and water, had embittered relations between tribesmen 
and landlords on the one hand, and between tribesmen and the
(1) Review of Civil Admin, of the Occupied Territories of
al-tiraq, 1914-1916, (Baghdad, 1918) p. 44. (Hereafter
Review C. Admin, 1 Iraq, 1914-1918) .
(2) The disturbances eventually led the Turkish Government In
1911, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, which attributed 
the Muntafiq troubles to the fact that the arable lands of 
the tribes are in the hands of a few powerful Shaikhs who 
appress their fellow tribesmen and keep them at variance 
... The proper remedy is a thorough partition of the lands.1 
Cited: Note on Sa!dun Problem.
(3) P.O.Reports, 1916-1917; Admin. Rep.. Hammar Lake Area, 
p. 56.
(4) Ibid., Admin. Rep. Suq esh-Shuyukh, p. 39.
(5) Arab of Mesopotamia (Basra, 1917). Hereafter this semi­
official publication by Miss G. L. Bell; Bell, Arab of 
Me so •
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Government, on the other* The authority of the shaikhs, where 
it had not been entirely destroyed by the Government, was an­
tagonistic to it. Government had, for the most part, broken 
down. ’Iraq, in the words of one competent observer, which 
though written with reference to the situation in 1900, may be 
applied with equal force to that in 1914, was
a country of tribesmen fast losing the old loyalties, less 
and less able to revert to the old livelihood, attracting 
local rather than tribal relations, more dependent on order 
and control, ... yet still tribal in material equipment, in 
speech, in ignorance, still easily inflamed to ruin their 
own interests, still resentful of government and all its 
works. (1)
The full application of the policy of rebuilding the tribal
organization under competent shaikhs, advised, controlled and
supervised by British Political Officers, which was the essence
of Sandeman’s policy, had to wait until the force of Turkish
(2)
arms had been broken. In the meantime, however, every means
of strengthening the power of the shaikhs was undertaken, on the 
basis that ’both the attitude and action of a tribe depend al-
(3)
most entirely on its most influential chiefs.’
A single leading shaikh was recognised in every tribe, as 
in the Suq ash-Shuyukh district where H. R. P. Dickson, Assist­
ant Political Officer, reported that he had ’managed during
(1) Longrigg, S. H., Pour Centuries of Modern ’Iraq, (Oxford, 
1925), p. 309.
(2) For instance, Nasiriya was occupied July, 1915, but not until 
1918 was administrative progress possible among the tribes,
r because of their anti-British feeling. Admin. Rep.. Muntafiq, 
1919, p. 2; Revenue Rep., 1919, p. 24.
(3) Provisional Note on the Tribes within and fringing 
Mesopotamtan Boundaries, North, of Latitude 53° 20’ (Baghdad) 
For Official use only," General Staff, "M.E.F. (Baghdad, 1920), 
p.l. (Hereafter Note on Tribes for General Staff). Although 
written in 1920 of tribes of Baghdad Vfilayet, it is gener­
ally applicable to practically all tribes from 1914.
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1916-17, more or less to get the power into the hands of one
(1)
Shaikh in the case of each of the 22 Suq tribes .'
Each shaikh so selected was made responsible for peace and 
order in his tribe, for the apprehension of wrongdoers, for the 
protection of lines of communication and of British Government 
property, for the cutting off of supplies and aid to the Turks, 
and the collection of such revenue as was levied.
In return, each shaikh was given the support of British 
officials, prestige and, if necessary, arms. Possession of his 
lands was confirmed, and his tribal boundaries were defined as 
closely as possible. His natural importance in the tribal 
majlis was enhanced by the measures of the Tribal Disputes Regu­
lations. Added to these was the policy of 'large doles, sub-
(2)
sidies and no taxation’, which one Political Officer, at
Nasiriya, held to be 'chiefly responsible for the remarkable
state of law and order which now exists', since 'the Shaikh ...
(3)
will obey any order than risk losing it (his subsidy).'
As advantageous for immediate military ends as was the 
policy of restoring the cohesion of the tribes and the patri­
archal rule of their shaikhs, and as well suited as it was to 
many aspects of tribal life, it was nevertheless fraught with 
difficulties for the future.
The tribal organization had so far deteriorated, especially
(1) P.O. Reports, 1916-1917: Admin. Rep.. Suq esh-Shuyukh, 
p. 4b.
(2) Admin. Report., Muntafiq, 1921 (Confidential, Baghdad, 1922) 
p. 16.
(3) Reports Admin., 1918: Nasiriyah Division, p. 351.
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among the rice-growing and date-producing tribes, that it could
only be restored by supporting the shaikhs with force, and, as
Sir Henry Dobbs said in 1916: ’Once a shaikh has to rely on
Government for support, he has lost the sympathy of his tribes-
(1)
men.1 Endowed with power as they were and motivated by
self-interest no less than the meanest tribesman, the shaikhs 
found it difficult to restrain themselves from even petty 
tyrannies, which, by 1920, had assumed such proportions in tribal 
eyes as to form a cause of the insurrection of that year#
Prom the standpoint of government, the efforts to restore 
tribal organization meant the re-imposition of feudalism, con­
trary to the principle of the evolution of political institu­
tions. Purely bureaucratic government, with its lack of flexi­
bility and sympathetic contacts, was manifestly unsuited to 
tribes at the time, a fact which Mr. Dobbs realized and made 
every effort to combat. Nevertheless, the introduction of the 
Sandeman system, depending for its successful operation on 
maintenance of the tribal status quo gave little opportunity for 
the operation of civilizing processes, for the growth of less 
primitive social codes and of more progressive forms of govern­
ment. The system in ’Iraq tended to become a method of Control 
rather than a system of government in its broadest sense.
(1) Cited, Admin.. Report, Suq al-Shuyukh District, in Admin. 
Rep., Muntafiq, l9£l, p. 56.
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CHAPTER V,
BRITISH POLICY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD.
One© Baghdad was In British hands, it was apparent that the
Commander-in-chief in India and the Imperial General Staff held
divergent views from H. M. Government as to future policy in
Turkish Arabia. The General Staff wished to assume 1 an active
defensive1 in order that men, equipment and shipping might be re-
(1)
leased for the needs of the Western Front. H. M. Government on 
the other hand, pressed not only for a continuance of the offensive 
but also for the extension of British Political influence through­
out Baghdad Wilayet. The Foreign Office, in particular, deemed
(2)
the moment opportune to exploit Great Britain1 s Arab policy and
to foster a general Arab movement to embarrass the Turks. Not to
continue to encourage a movement which had proved of distinct
(3) (4)
military advantage in the past was considered unsound.
(!) OJi., vol. IV, pp. 19 ff.
(2) This policy, in a formula proposed by Sir Mark Sykes, was: 
*Towards all Arabs...whether independent allies as Ibn Sa’ud 
or the Sherif, inhabitants of protectorates, spheres of in­
fluence, vassal states, we should show ourselves as pro-Arabs, 
and that wherever we are on Arab soil we are going to back the 
Arab language and Arab race, and that we shall support or 
protect Arabs against external oppression by force as much as 
we are able and from alien exploitation.1 Cited Hart, H. B. 
Liddell, op. oit., p. 105 n.
(3) Hardly a reference to Egypt, as suggested in O.H., vol. IV,, 
p. 6, but more probably to Arab operations in the Hijaz.
(4) Summary of telegram, Chief of Imperial General Staff to General 
Officer Commanding, Baghdad, 16 May, 1917. General Maude was 
instructed to send an outline, after consultation with Sir 
Percy Cox, of action which might be taken to enlist the sympathy 
of Arab tribes and to extend the scope of the Arab movement.
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H. M. Government hoped, thereby, to hasten the defeat of 
the Turks, and to acquire additional compensatory advantages in 
Mesopotamia, as well as in Palestine, to offset the possible 
stalemate in Europe. They were also anxious to achieve along 
the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the correspondence
(i)
between the Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, an unchall-
(2)
engable position in the Middle East.
With the political aspect of the policy urged by H. M. Gov­
ernment, General Maude found it difficult to be in full accord.
As a soldier, he considered that the destruction of Turkish arms 
was his primary duty from which his energies should not be di­
verted, particularly since he believed that an early advance
would have a substantial moral effect in Mesopotamia and in
(3)
adjacent countries. The collapse of the Russians, who had
been expected to co-operate along the Persian front, in a gen­
eral offensive against the Turks, placed increased responsibili­
ties on his forces, necessitating their reorganisation. Moreover,
(4)
an attempt by the Turks to retake Baghdad seemed almost certain.
(1) Notably: Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, 24 October; 
25 October, 14 December, 1915; 25 January, 1916. Sharif 
Husain to Sir H. McMahon, 5 November, 1915; 1 January, 1916.
(2) O.H., vol. IV, p. 42. 'In Mesopotamia one of our main guiding 
factors was our anxiety for the security of India. »
(3) Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Commander- 
in Chief, India, July 1917, cited, O.H., vol. IV, p. 27.
(4) See, O.H., vol. IV, pp. 5, 7, 12, 38-41. For Enver Pasha's 
abortive Yilderim or 'Lightning' expedition to retake 
Baghdad: O.H., vol. IV. pp. 8-9, 13 ff., also Husain Husni 
Amin Bey, Yilderim, published by the Turkish General Staff, 
translated by Captain C. 0. de R. Channer, I.A.; also 
Liman von Sanders, Gen. O.V.C., Funf Jahre Turkei (Berlin, 
1922), pp. 219-33.
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He was reluctant, therefore, to assume new responsibilities and 
to detach from his force officers and men more than absolutely 
essential for political and administrative work, or for consoli­
dating the political advantages already gained by British arms.
He took his position, in spite of the fact that for every man 
which it was believed the Turks could send to Mesopotamia, the 
British had already in the field two combatants and nearly four 
non-combatants, and that for every Turkish gun the British had
three, in addition to a vast preponderance of ammunition and
(1)
stores.
General Maude, moreover, could not bring himself to believe
(2)
that encouragement of the Arab movement was desirable. He had
protested against the proclamation issued in his name after the
(3)
fall of Baghdad, in the attempt to win Arab opinion, as unnec­
essary and ill-timed. It would, he believed, create confusion 
in the minds of the Arabs as to the future intentions of Great
(1) General Maude estimated on 5 August, 1917, that Turkish
re-inf or cements for Mesopotamia by the end of September would 
be approximately 67,000 rifles, with 308 guns, (O.H., vol. IV, 
p. 34). These added to troops already in Mesopotamia, esti­
mated on 5 August as 29,500 and on 15 August, as 2,280 sabres 
and 31,280 rifles, (ibid. p. 38; cf., estimates given in 
Order of Battle of same date in Yilderim).would total between 
96,500 and 100,560 effective troops, of which about 81,500 
might be expected to face General Maude. Sir William Robertson, 
Chief of the General Imperial Staff, estimated Maude's ration 
strength at 340,000, of which 200,000 were fighting troops,
(O.H., vol. IV, p. 44). General Maude, however, estimated, 
on 29 September, his effective forces at 166,450 men, (ibid, 
p. 45).
(2) His views were stated in a telegram to the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, 1 June, 1917.
(3) Proclamations, 1914-1919, Proc. No. 9, 19 March, 1917, p. 6.
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Britain, and would unduly arouse their hopes and ambitions at
a time when the authority of the British Army must remain suprene
and unquestioned in the Occupied Territories,
General Maude was also doubtful, for a number of reasons,
as to the military benefits to be derived from the application
(1)
of the proposals of H, M. Government towards the Arabs, although
the Chief Political Officer, Sir Percy Cox, thought that Arab
assistance in definite instances, as by the rAmarat section of
the Anaiza tribe, numbering about 5,000 rifles, under Pahad Beg
(2)
ibn Hadhdhal, might achieve a wide and important effect apart
(3)
from its precise military value.
In these opinions, General Maude was in full agreement with
the views of the Government of India and with those of most of
(4)
his fellow officers in Mesopotamia,
Although one of the objectives of the expedition had been 
to win over the Arabs from their fellow-Muslims, the Turks, the
(1) Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of 
Imperial General Staff, 1 June, 1917, cited, O.H,, vol. IV, 
p* 9.
(2) The *Amarat section ranged over the eastern half of the 
Syrian desert, from Karbala as far north as Dair az-Zur, and 
also shared with the Dulaim pastures between the Euphrates 
and the wells of Muhaiwir and al-Mat. Arab Tribes of Baghdad 
Wilayet July, 1916 (Baghdad, 1918); A Handbook of Mesopotamia, 
(Prepared on behalf of the Admiralty and the War Office, by 
Naval Staff, Intelligence Department, 1918, 2nd ed. 5 vols.) 
Vol. I, p. 103 (hereafter Handbook of Meso.); Note on 
Nomadic Arab Tribes (Baghdad, 1919).
(3) Telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, to Chief of 
Imperial General Staff, 24 June, 1917. Summarized in O.H., 
vol. IV, p. 20.
(4) O.H., vol. IV, p.10.
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Government of India had made little effort other than with Ibn 
Sa'ud, to induce the Arabs to take up arms against the Turks.
Saiyid Talib Pasha, the vigorous and ambitious leader of Arab Nation-
(1)
alism, was exiled to India. Favourably disposed Shaikhs were
given little active work except that of keeping supplies from the 
Turks, duties which made little appeal either to their pockets or 
to their dignity. In later 1915 and early 1916, Karbala and 
Najaf had risen against the Turks, the Arab forces with Khalil 
Pasha were openly rebellious, and the tribes were ripe for a ris-
l2)
Ing. These opportunities had been allowed to pass, although
Arab attacks on Turkish communications might have enabled the 
British forces to have dislodged the Turks before Kut.
Even the Arab rising in the Hijaz had been deprecated. It
had been, in the Viceroy's words, 'a displeasing surprise' and 
'its collapse would be far less prejudicial to us in India and 
also in Afghanistan than would military intervention in support
(3)
of the revolt. They feared that it would be regarded by 'very
many Mohammedans in and on the borders of India as having been
inspired by us and consequently as a Christian interference with
(4)
religion.
The attitude of the Government of India may have been par­
tially due to fear of the effect of an Arab revolt on Indian Muslims
(1) For details of his career, see infra, pp. 288 ff. , 4Q4ff., passim.
(2) Lawrence, T. E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (1935), p. 60.
(3) Hart, op. clt., p. 107.
(4) O.H., vol. Ill, pp. 26-7. But cf. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, J. C.
Asian Soc., vol. X (1923), p. 63.
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still loyal to the religious authority of the Ottoman Khalifa.
It seems more probable that it was due to the inherent disbelief 
of Anglo-Indian officials in native ability, to the desire to 
avoid using allies who might complicate the eventual settlement 
of the political status of Mesopotamia, and to the antagonism to 
an Arab policy which did not originate in India.
For generations past the Government of India had assumed 
sole charge of Great Britain's relations with the Arabs. On 31 
March, however, the High Commissioner took charge of all Arab
a)
affairs, save those of the south and east coasts of Arabia.
In this action, in Foreign Office support of the Sharif of Mecca 
rather than the proteg^ of the Government of India, Ibn Sa'ud, 
and in the incitement of Arabs against their spiritual and tem­
poral overlords - a dangerous precedent, according to Indian 
authorities - lay the fundamental differences of opinion which 
gave rise to the two so-called 'schools' of thought on Arab 
politics. The Anglo-Indian or Eastern Arabia or Sa'udi school 
viewed Arab politics from the standpoint of the immediate needs 
of India. It regarded the Wahhabi Amir of the Najd as the proper 
Arab leader, and it aimed at the penetration of Arabia from the 
Persian Gulf and Aden, at the indirect control of Arabs in their 
own spheres, and at the absorption, by the Government of India, 
of Turkish Arabia, that it might, as a western Burma, protect and 
extend Imperial interests.
The Anglo-Egyptian or Western Arabia or Hashimi school, no 
less concerned for the welfare of India, adopted the line of
(!) 0«H., E. and Pal., vol. I, p. 216.
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action which, if successful, would place friendly Arabs in 
Damascus, barring a possible French expansion towards India, and 
in Western Arabia and in Turkish Arabia, facilitating the pro­
tection of both the Suez Canal and the land routes to India, 
Having selected the Sharif of Mecca and his family as the fittest 
tools available, it aimed at Arab independence in strictly Arab 
lands and at only sufficient influence over the other Arab-speak­
ing portions of the Ottoman Empire as might guarantee their
(1)
friendly relations with Great Britain,
In Mesopotamia, the views of the Anglo-Indian school natur­
ally prevailed. Moreover, the military authorities, trained in 
the conduct of war only by orthodox methods, had little desire 
for irregular allies, who, in their opinion, had proven both 
unreliable and unsuitable for conditions of modem warfare.
Their own experiences were taken as justification for these views
The tribes in Mesopotamia had shifted from side to side, accord-
(2)
ing to whichever at the moment seemed to be winning. They
turned at the first opportunity, forgetting all obligations, 
against ally or enemy, in order that they might plunder and loot:
(1) See Hogarth, D. G., Quarterly Review, vol. 234 (1920) 
pp. 411 ff.
(2) ’This is not treachery but the natural outcome of weakness 
and the struggle to exist.1 Extract from Note on Tribes 
for General Staff, p. 2. Admin. Rep., Muntafiq, 1921, p. 56, 
cites the example of ’the carefully attested warrior, who, 
in an authentic tribal battle, changed sides on no less 
than five occasions eventually to be with the victors’.
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( 1 )
their 1 clearest and strongest positive Influence.* The Turks 
had relinquished hope of using them after the battle of Shu*alba, 
where the 10,000 tribal allies had not fired a single shot.
Ibn Sa*ud, from whom the Government of India had expected 
much, had failed to render effective aid against the Turks, 
although, when his enemies had been removed or weakened, he be­
came the paramount figure of Arabia. He had entered into 
treaty relations with Great Britain, 26 December, 1915, after 
negotiations extending over fourteen months. He was also in 
receipt of a subsidy which, in proportion to his effective par­
ticipation against the common enemy, the Turks, was far greater
(2)
than that paid to Sharif Husain, although he constantly
(3)
complained of its smallness. Hi3 failure to render aid in
(1) Note on Tribes for General Staff, p. 2. Arab uncertainty 
and their proneness to consider loot as the chief aim of 
their existenoe more than once threatened to suspend the 
operations on the other side of the desert; Lawrence, op. 
clt., pp. 128-9t. 348, 368 ff, 470, 523, passim; HarET
op. cit., pp. 296-7.
(2) It has been estimated that the operations of the Hijaz Force 
accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops, at the cost of £100 
per man. Ibn Sa*ud, in receipt of £60,000 annually from 
the British Treasury alone, as well as of other sums from 
the Government of India, occupied the attention of not a 
single Turkish soldier. Not did his pro-Turk rival, Ibn 
Rashid, have anything *to fear from Ibn Sa*ud.* (Cmd. 1061, 
p. 25. See also O.H. E. and Pal, vol. II, p. 598) . It 
has been estimated that in the British Army*s operations 
against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost 
from £1,500 to £2,000 per head. See Toynbee, A. J. The 
Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement (1927), p. 283;
Pari. Debates, H. of L., 5th S., vol. 49 (1922),pp. 241-3;
Ibid., H. of C. 5th S., vol. 159 (1922), p. 490.
(3) Memorandum No. 24, 9 August, 1917, from * Iraq Section, Arab 
Bureau to Arab Bureau, Cairo. For Ibn Sa*ud!s own valuation 
of his services to Great Britain, see Amin Rihani, Ibn Sa*oud 
of Arabia,his people and his land (1928), p. 61.
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1915 may have been one reason why the British authorities at
Cairo turned to negotiations with the Sharif of Mecca.
The military authorities could see little practical value
in the Arabs as fighting forces* General Maude, for instance,
held that the tribes must be carefully organized, under officers
with suitable knowledge and with military experience. They could
be employed only as part of a general campaign under a sihgle
direction. Otherwise they would have little bearing on general
operations. They could harry and demoralize a retreating enemy,
but they would be entirely ineffective, although tiresome, against
(1)
unbroken troops.
With such views prevailing in India and in Mesopotamia, it
is not surprising that T. E. Lawrence, on his visit to 'Iraq in
1916, with a three-fold mission, one of which was to foster, if
possible, an Arab rising similar to that brewing in Western
(2)
Arabia, should be treated with scorn, that subsequent events
(3)
in Hijaz should be belittled and that the policy of organizing 
Arab assistance should be rejected.
(1) Summary of telegram, General Officer Commanding, Baghdad to 
Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1 June, 1917, O.H., vol. IV, 
p. 10. Cf. the views of T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 104, 
339-40. “For the opinion of a Turkish Army commander on the 
military value of Arabs, see Djemal Pasha, op. cit., p. 153. 
For that of the head of the German Military Mission to Turkey, 
see Liman von Sanders, op. cit., p. 242.
(2) Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 59-60; Hart, op. cit., p. 101.
(3) 'Nothing that had been achieved in the direction of Arab 
co-operation on the Palestine front, up to this date (1917), 
gave those on the spot (Mesopotamia) any reason to advocate 
any change in policy.' Wilson, Sir A. T., Mesopotamia, 1917-
1920, p. 4.
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The historical fact remains that while many of the same
obstacles to tribal co-operation existed in Western Arabia, the
effort was there made, with important results in the successful
defeat of the common enemy, the Turk and his allies. The
peculiar genius of T. E. Lawrence; the inspiring leadership and
fervent belief in Arab Nationalism of the Amir Faisal ibn Husain
the military experience of Ja’far Pasha al-’Askari; the patient
(1)
direction of Lt.- Colonel P. C. Joyce and the organizing 
ability of Colonel A. G. Dawnay and of Major Hubert Young con­
tributed not a little to the success of the Arab movement in the 
West. So also did the support of those officials in Whitehall 
and in Egypt, including Sir Gilbert Clayton, Commander D. G. 
Hogarth, Sir Reginald Wingate, Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis, who 
while aware of the limitations of Arab character and temperament,
believed in the military as well as the political value of Arab
(2)
co-operation against the Turks. This belief was not wholly
unjustified; the Arabs did not rise in force against the Allied 
Powers, as had been predicted. The Sharifian activities in 
Western Arabia from 1916 onwards against isolated Turkish Posts 
and communications taxed the strength of the Turks and contrib­
uted almost as much to the defeat of the Central Powers as did 
the role which they played in the main' operations in Palestine
(1) Adviser, Ministry of Defence, ’Iraq Government, 1921-28.
(2) Hogarth, Comdr., D. G., J. C. Asian Soc., vol. X (1923) 
p. 63.
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( 1 )
and Syria under the command of General Allenby.
The failure to make the same effort in ’Iraq was not due
to any lack of men of undoubted ability to lead and to work v/ith
the Arabs, although none would have claimed the special gifts
of the late T. E. Lawrence. Outstanding men were Major H. R. P.
(2)
Dickson, who, combining generous sympathy with unwearying
patience, possessed an unrivalled psychological understanding
of the tribal Arab; Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Leachman who, by his
indomitable spirit, controlled vast areas of tribal country
(2)
almost single-handed under most trying conditions; Major
(1) Allenby, Field-Marshal Lord, J. R. C. Asian Soc., vol. XXII, 
(1935), p. 333; and The Times, 20 May, 1935; O.H. , E. and 
Pal., vol. 1, pp. v, 221, 3^2; vol. II, pp. 401-03, 408-09; 
Lloyd, Lord, The Dally Telegraph, 20 May, 1935; Lloyd 
George, D., frhe Times, 20 May, 1930; Hart, op. cit., pp. 
374-6, 437 ff., and The Times, 20 May, 1935; Liman von 
Sanders, op. cit., pp. 185-'7, 260-61, 290-91, 345; Djemal 
Pasha, op. cit., pp. 168, 170, 191, 233.
(2) Now Lieut.-Col. Dickson, Political Officer, Kuwait.
(3) For excellent summaries of his character and career, see 
Hogarth, Geog. Jour., vol. 56 (1920), pp. 325-36; also 
Near East, 26 August, 1920, and J. C. Aslan Soc., vol. VIII 
(1921), pp. 70 ff. A highly coloured picture of Colonel 
Leachman’s career has been given by G. N. N. Bray, in 
Shifting Sands (1934), a book that is both inaccurate and 
unhistorical. His thesis, maintained also in his more 
recent biography of Leachman, and by Main, E., op. cit., 
that Leachman actually contributed more to the success of 
Great Britain’s Arab policy than any other individual is 
hardly tenable. Although a man of great gifts and a superb 
keeper of tribal peace, his work was less creative in 
character and less permanent in value than that accomplished 
in western Arabia. The thesis also confuses the Arab 
policy of H. M. Government and that pursued by the Anglo- 
Indian authorities in ’Iraq.
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( 1 )
Hubert Young, who later served under Lawrence In western Arabia;
(2)
Bertram Thomas later to distinguish himself as an explorer;
H. St. John B. Fhilby, whose knowledge of Arabia and of Arabs
(3)
is now probably unequalled; and later, Major A, H. Ditchburn,
(4)
much of whose work in the Muntafiq has endured to this day.
The energies and talents of these men, as well as of others, 
instead of being utilised in organising Arab co-operation as a 
means of winning the war as in western Arabia, were diverted to 
checking tribal quarrels, to preventing food and supplies reach­
ing the Turks, to collecting revenue and laying the foundations 
of administration. Such activities, although no mean accom­
plishment In themselves, and no 3mall contribution to the event­
ual establishment of the Kingdom of 'Iraq, were in no way fully 
Indicative of the capacity of the British Officers nor of what 
might have been accomplished had the authorities ordered other­
wise.
For whatever reasons deemed sufficient at the time, the
(1) How Governor of Northern Rhodesia. He played a prominent 
part in the creation of the Kingdom of 'Iraq, and was Great 
Britain's first Minister to 'Iraq after the cessation of 
the Mandate. See his Independent Arab.
(2) See his Arabia Felix: Across the Empty Quarter of Arabia 
(1932). Also, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia for a vivid 
and well-balanced account of his experiences in Mesopotamia 
and Muscat.
(3) See his Heart of Arabia (1922); Arabia of the Wahhabis 
(1928) and The Empty Quarter (1933*n
(4) Administrative Inspector, 'Iraq, from 1922 until his receni 
appointment as Land Settlement Officer, 'Iraq.
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failure of the military authorities to make full military use
of the Arabs of Mesopotamia, notwithstanding the^forts of Sir
Percy Cox and his associates to win Arab support in other di­
ll)
rections had far-reaching effects, not*only during the period 
of hostilities but also long after the end of the war.
The British authorities in Mesopotamia lost thereby the
war-time services of capable Arab leaders. Arabs of !Iraq by»
the score, once in Turkish service, were gathered from the 
internment camps in India and Egypt, to serve as leaders and 
officers, not in the land of their birth, but in the Hijaz. In 
contact there with the sources of the Arab Movement, they were 
to imbibe and to pass on to ‘Iraq, in the days after the Armis­
tice, an intensity of Arab Nationalism hitherto unknown in 
* Iraq. On the western side of Arabia, they had come into 
contact with English officers, who, no less sincere in their 
allegiance to British interests than those on the eastern side 
of Arabia, were, nevertheless, sympathetic to this awakening 
Arab Nationalism, It is not surprising therefore, that these 
1 Iraqis felt the difference between the official mind in Meso­
potamia and that on the Mediterranean side of the desert, nor 
that, appreciating the difference, they were all the more
(1) To the untimely death of Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear at
Artawi, in January, 1915, has been ascribed the failure of 
Ibn Sa’ud to take an active part in the war and the failure 
to develop in Mesopotamia an Arab Movement comparable to 
that in the Hijaz. See Philby, The Heart of Arabia, vol.I, 
p. xxi; Wilson, Sir A. T, Mesopotamia, 1914-1917, p. 161; 
also, Coke, Richard, The Arabfs Place in the Sun, p. 221.
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impatient with the attitude of the Civil Administration which 
prevailed at Baghdad after Sir Percy Cox had been sent to 
Teheran in early 1918. Such impatience was none the less be­
cause they had little or no experience or knowledge of the 
difficulties of the military or administrative problems of 
Turkish Arabia, of which the British had gained an intimate, 
first-hand knowledge.
The military authorities in Mesopotamia also lost the 
opportunity to learn what British officers in Western Arabia 
had already learned; that the Arabs might be more than 
treacherous, self-seeking, half-civilised peoples. The end of 
the war, consequently, found few British officials in authority 
in fIraq who had any sympathy for Arab Nationalism or who had 
more than hearsay knowledge either of its strength or of the 
extent of the movement on the other side of the desert. To 
the majority of the British officials in Mesopotamia, engrossed 
in creating an Anglo-Indian regime for the country, and belong­
ing, for the most part, to the ’Indian School’ of Arab politics, 
and, therefore, antagonistic to everything savouring of the 
rival ’Sharifian School’, Arab Nationalism was something to be 
controlled at all costs and destroyed wherever possible.
Notwithstanding General Maude’s reluctance to accept pol­
itical responsibilities for his force, the creation and mainten­
ance of British influence in the Baghdad Wilayet became the 
chief mission of the expedition, according to instructions
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(1)
issued by the Imperial General Staff, following considerable 
interchange of views among the authorities concerned. General 
Maude1 s force, after Eaghdad Yi/llayet had been cleared of Turks, 
was to assume the defensive, but it was to be ready to seize 
the earliest opportunity to resume the offensive. Tribal co­
operation against the Turks was to be encouraged as far as poss­
ible, but administrative expansion was to be limited to bare 
essentials. These activities were to be placed under the 
guidance of Sir Percy Cox as Civil Commissioner, subject to the 
supervision of the General Officer Commanding, but with the 
right to correspond directly with the India Office. Sir Percy
(1) Cf. Orders issued to Sir William R. Marshall on his assump­
tion of the command of British Forces in Mesopotamia. 
(Telegram, Chief of Imperial General Staff to General Officer 
Commanding, Baghdad, 22 November, 1917) of which the per­
tinent sections are given here:
On your assumption of the command in Mesopotamia I think 
it advisable to recapitulate the instructions issued to 
your predecessor.
1. The prime mission of your force is the establishment
and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad 
Wilayet. Your mission is, therefore, primarily defensive, 
but, while making every possible preparation to meet
attack, you should take advantage of your central position 
and of the superiority of your communications over those 
of the enemy to make your defence as active as possible 
and to strike at the enemy whenever he gives you an 
opportunity of doing so with success.
4. It is important to enlist the co-operation of the 
Arab tribes in your theatre, and induce them to harrass 
the enemy*s communications and refuse him supplies.
For this an active propaganda, which should snake the most 
of our recent successes in Palestine and Mesopotamia, 
should be undertaken. As to this you will consult and 
be guided by Sir Percy Cox.
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in his new role, replacing that of Chief Political Officer, was 
given responsibility of greater scope than hitherto permitted by 
General Maude, who had been loth to develop the civil machine.
The general principles by which H. M. Government wished 
the administration to be conducted was summarised in a telegram 
of August, 1917:
The Civil Administration must be carried on under such 
military supervision as the General Officer Commanding-in- 
Chief considers essential, with due regard to local condit­
ions and prejudices, if only to prevent disorder which might 
necessitate the detachment of troops urgently required else­
where... For the present only such minimum of administra­
tive efficiency should be aimed at as is necessary for the 
maintenance of order and to meet the requirements of the 
force: the amendment of laws and the introduction of re­
forms should be kept within the narrowest possible limits.
His Majesty1 s Government do not wish large or controversial 
administrative questions raised or referred to them until the 
danger of Turkish attack is passed... (1)
Previous instructions had already ordered that
the existing administrative machinery was to be preserved as 
far as possible, substituting Arab for Turkish spirit and 
personnel, and that every effort ahould be made to induce 
local representative men to come forward and participate in 
the civil administration, British co-operation being limited 
as far as possible to advisory functions. (2)
These orders, while indicating the procedure to be adopted 
until the enemy had been driven from the field, did not indicate, 
except by implication, Great Britain's future intentions towards 
Baghdad. In May, before the above orders had been issued, con­
fidential information had been sent to those in authority in 
Mesopotamia that His Majesty's Government had in view
the establishment, in conformity with the Sykes-Picot agree­
ment, of a predominantly British regime in the Basra Wilayet,
(1) Cited. Admin. Report, Baghdad, 1917, p. 1.
(2) Cited, Wilson, op. cit., p. 240.
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under a High Commissioner, of an Arab regime under some 
form of British protection in the Baghdad Wilayet, and of 
an autonomous Arab regime (under French protection) in the 
Mosul Wilayet. (1)
It was clear on the one hand, that H« M. Government de­
sired, in preparation for post-war settlements on the basis of 
its secret understanding (with France and Sharif Husain), the 
separate organization of Baghdad Wilayet to which the Indian 
regime was not to be deliberately extended, and the laying of 
the foundations of an Arab administration under British auspices
On the other hand, it was also apparent that H. M. Govern­
ment, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle in Europe, and 
lacking a definite policy for the final disposition of the 
Wilayet, other than the establishment of some measure of con­
trol, wished to raise no question which might prejudice the 
eventual settlement.
Under such circumstances, it was perhaps not unnatural 
that the instructions of H. M. Government concerning the admin­
istration of the Wilayet should be somewhat contradictory, nor 
that they should be held by men on the spot to be not only 
impractical and out of touch with local conditions, but also 
contrary to Great Britain1s true interests in the Middle East.
The desirability of providing local means for the prose­
cution of the war, in accordance with the instructions, was 
duly recognized by the local authorities. The legitimate 
claims of the civil population for the restoration of govern­
ment had to be at least partially satisfied, in compliance with 
military law. Even more important was the necessity of
(1) rbld., p. 241.
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creating at the outset an administration whioh from the extent
and solidity of its foundation as well as its appeal to the
Iraqis would ’meet future as well as present requirements’ and
(1)
provide a firm basis for continued British control. As Sir
Arnold Wilson wrote later: ’Neither Sir Percy Cox nor, at a
later stage, I myself, could subscribe to the view that we should
aim only at ”the minimum administrative efficiency necessary to
preserve order.” Much more was at stake than the preservation
(2)
of order.1
The proposed administrative and political differentiation 
between the Wilayets of Baghdad and Basra found little favour in 
Mesopotamia. It was felt that it would hamper administrative 
efficiency and would lead to undesirable difficulties with local 
opinion. If British control were to be set up, it should be
i
established in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement rather
than the tenor of the promises made to the Arabs through the
Sharif of Mecca. Sir Percy Cox, from the first, had advocated
(3)
that Baghdad should be added to Basra whioh, as he had reason 
to know, was to be administered directly by the Government of 
India.
The admission and encouragement of Arab participation in 
the administration of Baghdad Wilayet, the apparent intention
(1) An aim apparently achieved during 1917, in the .gyes of
the Acting Civil Commissioner. Cf., Admin. Report, Baghdad, 
1917, p. 1.
(2) Wilson, op. cit., pp. 264-5. But, cf., Admin. Report, 
Baghdad, "1017, p. 1.
(3) Supra, pp. 63-4 .
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of H. M. Government, seems to have met with particular opposition 
from those in authority, including General Maude; the Civil 
Commissioner, who viewed the policy with misgivings, mainly on 
grounds of immediate expediency and the inability to find suitable 
•Iraqis willing to take part in the administration; and, later, 
the Acting Civil Commissioner.
It was under the regime of the latter, following the depar­
ture of Sir Percy Cox for Persia, March, 1918, that the gulf 
widened between the original instructions of H. M. Government and 
local administrative opinion. The Acting Civil Commissioner 
held that H. M , Government’s policy was based on a series of mis­
conceptions, fostered and disseminated by irresponsible enthusi­
asts at the Foreign Office and in Egypt, concerning not only the 
ability of the Arabs to govern themselves, their desire for self- 
government and their willingness to serve in the administration 
of Mesopotamia, but also the best interests of Great Britain in 
the Near and Middle East. The account of his efforts to combat 
these misconceptions and to impose an administration which he 
believed best suited to the country belongs to succeeding pages.
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CHAPTER VI.
INITIATION OF ADMINISTRATION IN BAGHDAD WILAYET.
In view of the divergence of opinion, both between London 
and Baghdad, and, to a lesser extent, between the local military 
authorities and Sir Percy Cox, both as regards the policy and the 
character of the administration to be set up in Baghdad, it is not 
surprising that those in charge of the Civil Administration in 
11raq should have failed to adhere to the instructions laid down 
for their guidance; that the administration should have taken on 
aspects beyond the limits prescribed by H. M. Government; and 
that the immediate differentiation between the administration of 
Basra and Baghdad should be confined to a separation of adminis­
trative organization rather than to any alteration of spirit or
(1)
character of the administration except in the Judicial System. 
Administrative Organization.
Under the organization adopted after the fall of Baghdad a 
Deputy Chief Political Officer remained in charge at Basra while 
Sir Percy Cox took up his headquarters at Baghdad. Later, when 
Sir Percy became Civil Commissioner, 1 September, 1917, both 
Wilayets were separated into divisions. Basra Wilayet, with the 
addition of Kut, remained the same as in Turkish days. Its 
five divisions were: Basra, Qurna, Nasiriya, *Amara and Kut.
(1) Infra, pp. 155 ff
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Baghdad was divided into eight divisions: Baghdad, Samarra, 
Ba’quba, Khanaqin, Ramadi, Shamiya, and Samawa. To each of these 
a Political Officer was posted, as well as to ’Aziziya and to 
Karbala. Under each Political Officer, Assistant Political 
Officers administered subdivisions or districts. A Deputy Civil 
Commissioner assumed control of the Basra divisions until Septem­
ber, 1918, when the two Wilayets, largely for political reasons, 
were merged and the administration directed from Baghdad.
Political Control and Revenue Administration.
As at Basra, military exigencies largely controlled the 
situation. General Maude*s own attitude to the Civil Administra­
tion had been in accordance with his views as to the necessity of 
establishing the unquestioned authority of the military 
authorities rather than with the spirit of the proclamation issued 
in his name after the fall of Baghdad. The appointment, often 
without reference to the Chief Political Officer, of military 
officials many of whom knew nothing of Arabic or of Arab condi­
tions, to civil administrative positions, gave no suggestion that 
he took seriously the statement ’I am commanded to invite you, 
through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate 
in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the
Political Representatives of Great Britain who accompany the
(1)
British Army.f The government by proclamation, with its
harrassing and sometimes unnecessary regulations, gave as little
(1) Proclamations, 1914-1919, Proc. No. 9, p. 5. Text: App. I.
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hint to the people of Baghdad as earlier regulations had given
to the people of Basra, that the armies had *not come into your
(1)
Cities and Lands as Conquerors or enemies hut as Liberators. 1
Nevertheless, Sir Percy Cox, concerned with the future as
well as the present, deemed it essential to extend political
control throughout the Wilayet, as much as permitted by the
military authorities and by General MaudeTs centralization of
authority into his own hands. Such control could be best
attained, as had been discovered in Basra Wilayet, by extending
the administration and collection of revenue, which, in the eyes
of the tribes, was regarded as a sign of government authority,
just as revenue payment was considered an outward sign of their
submission. Much of the confidence engendered by the Political
Officers in Basra Wilayet had been the result of their revenue
(2 )
activities which included far more than the collection of taxes 
since the Revenue Board had been forced to assume a far wider 
range of responsibilities than merely revenue work. The extension 
of land-revenue collections in kind from the fertile areas of the 
Middle Euphrates would produce local foodstuffs for the anny and 
thereby release much precious tonnage. Hence, after the fall of 
Baghdad, Sir Percy Coxfs chief efforts were directed, not only to 
the establishment of friendly relations with leading dignitaries, 
but also, through the First Revenue Officer, to the collection of
(1) Ibid. p. 6.
(2) fI have been long convinced that Revenue work is the most 
important part of their duties.’ Deputy Civil Commissioner 
in Admin. Rep., Basrah, 1917, p. 8.
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information as to the customary rates of demand; the sorting of 
a mass of papers; the foundation of a Revenue system capable of 
extension; the inceptions of departments such as Auqaf, Educa­
tion, etc, and the actual collection of revenue in Baghdad and
(1)
surrounding districts.
There was every need for haste. The First Revenue Officer
reached Baghdad on 22 March; the harvest was due to begin in the
middle of April. Before it was cut, customary assessments had
to be made, demands made according to the usual rates and the
local variations as to payment taken into consideration. The
easiest plan would have been to auction the right to collect the
taxes and to support the successful bidders with troops. But,
if it was deemed necessary to emphasize, by the collection of
revenue, the coming of peaceful conditions, fit was still more
important to gain the confidence of the cultivator so that
(2 )
measures for future development should be welcomed.1
The complexities and inconsistencies of the Turkish Revenue 
system, to which reference has already been made, proved, as 
in Basra Wilayet, one of the greatest obstacles in the way of 
a rapid establishment in Baghdad Wilayet of a system based on 
its principles.
(1) Administration Report, Re venue Board, Baghdad, March 22 to 
December 31, 1911?. (Baghdad, 19l8), p. 1. (Hereafter Revenue 
Report, 191771
(2) Revenue Report.1917, p, 24. See also. Review C. Admin.. 
1914 1^9^  , ?. hii. ~   1
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The Turkish Revenue System.
Under the Turks, general revenues in each wilayet had been
collected under the authority of the Daftardar (Provincial
Director of Finance), either directly or through departments.
Among the taxes collected directly were land-revenue in its
various aspects, kodah (animal head-tax), tamattu (income or
professional tax), conscription exemption-tax and several minor
taxes. Tax-collecting Departments controlled by the Daftardar
included the Dal rat al Liman (Marine Department) and the Nufus
or Statistical Department. Twelve other heads of revenue,
together with one quarter of 3% of the customs receipts which
had been assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, by
the decree of Muharram, 20 December, 1881, following the default
of the Ottoman Government on its European-held debts, were
(1).
collected by a special Civil Service.
(2 )
A few other revenues, provincial in character, were 
accredited to the Muhaslba al Khususlya (Special Accounts 
Department) created by the Young Turks as a sop to the outcry 
that the Central Government drained the Arab provinces of all 
funds. Customs were also in charge of a special staff.
In any account of land-revenue, the most important of the
(1) For the decree, and full list of the assigned revenues? 
Young, Sir George, Droit Ottoman, vol. V, pp. 69 ff.
(2) The fpublic works’ and ’education1 cesses on land-revenue;
5% cess on kodah: 10'jo cess on income tax; half the proceeds 
of the slaughter-house fees; rents and profits of education 
trust property.
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general revenues, it must be clearly recognized that the Ottoman 
Government made a distinction between its right over land as 
Sovereign and its right as actual possessor or owner of the soil 
as well as between the dues exacted in accordance with each right.
In ’Iraq, the Ottoman Government, by right of conquest, 
deemed itself in theory both Sovereign and sole owner of all 
land save in so far as it had divested itself of its rights of 
ownership by a specific act of alienation to individual owners.
y
Lands so alienated absolutely, under the Land Code or Qanun
(1 )   (2 )
Aradhi of 7 Ramadhan, 1274 (1858) were known as Sirf Mulk.
Those alienated conditionally by tapu sanads were known as Aradhi
Amiriyaft under the Code but were more commonly called tapu lands
in ’Iraq. Such alienated lands formed but a small proportion of
the arable of ’Iraq. Most of it, although great sections had
(1) Text: Ongley, P., Ottoman Land Code (1892), Bk. I, pp. 1 ff.; 
Young, Sir G., op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 45 ff; Fisher, Stanley, 
Ottoman Land Laws Tl919). Under the Code five legal cate­
gories of land were recognized;
1. Aradhi Mumluka, land held in undiluted ownership.
Aradhi Amiriya, state land, the usufructuary possession 
oT~which is granted on a registered tenure.
3. Aradhi Muqufa, land dedicated to pious purposes.
4* AratThl MaErufca, land especially reserved for some 
public purpose.
5* Aradhi Mawat, waste land.
These classifications had never been applied as a whole to 
fIraq. Terns were also misapplied. Thus Aradhi Amiriya 
is known as tapu land in ’iraq, while land held in legal 
possession of the state is called mlrl. Category 4 seems 
not to have been generally recognized in ’Iraq.
(2) See Howell, Sir E., J. C. Aslan Soc., vol. IX (1922), 
pp. 20 ff. for an authoritative article on Qanun al - 
Aradhi.
been in the actual possession and cultivation of the tribes for
years, had never been granted on sanads^ and was, therefore,
Aradhi Amiriya or miri land in 'Iraq, Other large sections
had found their way to the personal possession of the Sultan or
(2)
Ottoman Royal family, and thence to Aradhi Mudawwara.
In the case of the unalienated state lands, the Government 
was entitled to exact from the user both rent as landlord or 
owner, and revenue as accruing to it as Sovereign. The dis­
tinctions between these exactions had tended to become obscure 
since the two were usually paid as a single contribution.
In the case of mulk or tapu land, the Government demanded 
revenue only since it possessed merely dominion. The possessors 
of the titles to such lands had the right to demand the land­
lord^ share, normally the same as the revenue share, which was, 
on the principle of the 'Ashar, the tenth part of the fruits of 
the earth. On lands watered by flow irrigation, an additional 
tenth part of the crops was demanded as representing the fruits 
of the water.
Numerous graduations and variation of these shares had 
grown up, however, in recognition of the general principle that 
land taxation and rent were proportional to profits made on the 
land, which varied yearly on account of faulty water control,
(1) 1 The tenure of some four fifths of the cultivated land in
the country was not governed by law, was not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the Courts, and was not regulated in
any methodical way at all. 1 Dow son, Sir E. M. , An -Enquiry 
in to Land Tenure and Related Questions, (Le tchwo r th, 1932) 
p. 5.
(2) Aradhi Sanniya or Crown Lands until 1909, when the Young 
TurksTransTerred them to general revenues.
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weather vagaries, floods, pests, dust storms, and lack of security 
from marauding neighbours or nomadic tribes. Annual assessments 
were also made on most crops in accordance with the same prin­
ciple. Such assessments were usually made by sight estimation of
grain shortly before it was reaped, or on the threshing floor, or
(1)
by a combination of these methods. The measurement of small
sample areas was another method commonly used in numerous sections
(2)
of the Hilla and Shamiya divisions. Occasionally fixed assess­
ment existed, as on the number of pumping engines or lift machines
(3)
on an estate, or where taxes where farmed ibr a period of
(4)
years at a fixed sum.
(5)
The Turkish theory of variation in rates of demand and 
(6)
in assessment which took into account local conditions was* on 
the whole, well suited to a land of violent contrasts such as
(1) Outlines of Turkish Assessment methods in Re venue Re po r 1, 
1917, p. 18, Admin. Report of Revenue DeparimientTBaghdad, 
1^16, (Hereafter Revenue Report,I5IS1 (Baghdad P. 6-7,
rSTd., 1919, p. 6.
(2) Revenue Report, 1917, p. 18.
(3) Ibid., P. 15. Ibid., 1918, p. 7.
Ibid,, 1917, p. 18.
(5) A comprehensive list of Turkish demands, together with 
those adopted by the Civil Administration (never higher, 
often lower) ini Revenue Report, 1918, p. 8; Ibid. , 1919,
App. B., pp. 45-7. Revenue Circular No.7, 26 February, 1919;
also Report on Mesopotamian Spring Harye'st’"(Baghdab7~~l§r^
p. 6.
(6) For instance, land irrigated by lift on the right bank of 
the Tigris, above Ktfadhimain, paid fixed assessments in 
cash. Land opposite on the left bank paid fluctuating 
demands, Revenue Report, 1917, p. 15.
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’Iraq. Behind the variations also existed a substratum of
custom and of habit so firmly entrenched in the life of the
country that Turkish legislation often did no more than foimalise
or commit to paper the habit of ages, as for instance Midhat
(1)
Pasha’s fliman on ’Uqr. Even the Civil Administration and, 
later, the ’Iraq Government, although condemning the lack of 
unifounity of the Turks and aiming at fixed assessments, had to 
recognize the validity of the variations with constantly recurr­
ing rebates and remissions of taxes to meet difficulties caused 
by abnormal weather, flood or agricultural conditions. The
system in application was not without its abuses, which rightly 
drew the disapproval of the British authorities. Once a
variation had been made, either in increase or in reduction of 
demand, valid enough at the time it was made, it was often assumed 
to be permanent after the original circumstances had passed into 
oblivion. Thus inconsistencies had grown up side by side with 
elasticity.
The right to collect the assessment was frequently put up 
to auction or sold by negotiation. In Basra Wilayet, the prac­
tise was also followed of making each shaikh responsible for 
the revenue of his tribe. In Baghdad Wilayet, however, the 
practise had been to make the sarkars (invariably pronounced 
sarkals) or sub-lessees, directly responsible for cultivation, 
and also responsible for revenue payments.
The system of annual estimates, no less than the method of
(l) Cited Revenue Report, 1917, pp. 11 ff.
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collection had afforded opportunities for bribery and corruption. 
The assessors, without adequate supervision, varied the assess­
ments according to the inducement offered them; auctioneers 
who sold the right of collection could be bought or intimidated 
into selling to particular bidders. Shaikhs had to be placated 
to peimit collection, while official machinery had to be oiled 
in case it was necessary to employ gendarmes to overcome oppo­
sition by the tax-payers.
From the occupation of Basra Wilayet onward, British 
officials had deemed the opportunities for corruption, the lack 
of encouragement of agricultural development by means of fixed 
assessments, and, above all, the inconsistencies of the system, 
as sufficient reasons for frowning upon the system, particularly 
the fluctuations in assessments and the variations in demand. fThe 
ultimate aim’, the Revenue Secretary wrote .in 1918, ’of our revenue
policy is to make a fixed assessment at equable rates and payable
(1)
in cash, instead of the present arrangement.’
Fixed assessments, however, were found to be impossible for 
the time, as was the immediate creation of a revenue system which, 
while based on the familiar fiscal system, would embrace the 
improvement of the revenue staff, the settlement of ’Iraq’s 
fundamental agricultural problem, that is, the definition of the 
rights of labourer, tenants, landowner and state over the land, 
and the resuscitation of agricultural prosperity in a manner
(1) Revenue Circular Bo. 7, 26 February, 1919. Cf. Revenue 
Report, 1917, pp. 5 and 42.
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that should be politically sound. Nevertheless, steps were
taken in that direction. Consolidation of position occupied
most of 1917. By the end of 1918, it was claimed by the Revenue
Department that, although Turkish methods were still employed,
the results were better than under the Turks, even after years
(1 )
of effort on their part. In fact, in that year the British
authorities issued demands for and collected more land revenue
than had the Turks in any pre-war year. The latter in 1911-1912
collected approximately Rs.96,97,000 or about £660,000 In tithes,
(2)
kodah and minor land taxes. In 1918, similar categories of
  (3)
taxation produced Rs.157,47,430 or £1,124,817, or one and
two-thirds times the receipts of 1911. Even greater progress
was made in 1919, the civil authorities collecting Rs.182,23,497
(4) (5)
or £1,301,784, or nearly double the 1911 receipts.
Kodah, the Turkish head-tax on camels, buffaloes, sheep and
Revenue Report, 1918, p. 6.
(2) Bulletin Annuel de Statistlque, 1527, (1911), Imperial 
Ottoman Ministry of Finance (Constantino'pTe). Turkish 
piastres converted throughout at 7.5 per rupee and 110 per 
pound sterling.
(3) Exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the Aimy, valued at
60 lakhs; Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, p. 118. Rupees con­
verted throughout to sterling at 14 £o the pound.
(4) Budget Estimates, 1920-1921, p. ii.
(5) Notwithstanding the statement 'the land-revenue receipts 
for 1919-1920 were substantially lower than in Turkish 
times1, Wilson, op. cit., p. 264. Cf. statement In Review C. 
Admin., 1914-1920', p. 88, an official report prepared under 
EEe Acting STvil Commissioner's supervision; 'The country 
has paid more In taxation than it used to pay. ' See infra 
pp. 175-6 for further comparison of revenue receipts.
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goats from time immemorial, had been, at the time of the occupa­
tion of Basra, converted to a slaughter-house tax in order to 
lower the price of meat for the army. In other regions, as in
Lower ‘Iraq, where the Turks had given up the attempt to collect
(1)
the tax, the British made no effort to revive it until 1919.
Elsewhere, the tax was collected by a variety of methods at the
rate of a rupee per camel or buffalo, and eight annas per sheep
or goat. The most common method in the tribal areas was to
assess the tribe, and, in accordance with the policy of using the
shaikhs to govern, lay the collection on the shaikhs and sarkals,
giving them a percentage for their efforts. It was hoped to
(2)
extend this method throughout the country.
Other foraer Turkish sources of revenue, such as the militaiy 
tax, fell into abeyance. Others, such as the income tax, 
tamattu, were abandoned, although its re introduction had been
(3)
reconsidered in April, 1915, by Mr. Dobbs, and again in 1919,
when the Revenue Secretary believed that by ‘postponing its
imposition we are throwing an unduly heavy share of the cost of
government on the shoulders of the agricultural community and
allowing many to escape direct taxation who have profited most by
(4)
the occupation. ’
(1) Revenue Report, 1918, p. 4.
(2) Ibid. , P. 14.
(3) Dobbs, H. R. G. , Collection of Notes on Revenue Matters, 
1915-1916, (Confidential).
(4) Revenue Report, 1919, p. 18.
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Although the necessity of safeguarding the interests of the
bond-holders of the Ottoman Public Debt had been recognized in
1914, the exigencies of war and the necessity of entrusting the
collection of all revenues to one Revenue Organization made
it difficult to collect and to accredit the revenue under its
various heads as previously. In Basra, an attempt was made, but
in June, 1917, it was decided to abolish the Public Debt as such
in both wilayets, and to accredit where possible its usual
revenues to its account, subject to settlement after the war.
In Baghdad Wilayet, the Revenue Department included, as it
had in Basra, a number of duties other than purely revenue work.
It dealt with Customs, Public Debt, Waqf Administration, Land
Regulation, Education, and, under military supervision, with
Irrigation and Agriculture. During 1918, however, as the staff
increased and organization extended, each department tended to
become a separate unit. Nevertheless, the Revenue Department
continued to expand, dealing with 17 varied aspects of adminis-
(1)
tration in September, 1919. By April, 1920, its activities
(2)
had extended to some 22 branches of the Administration.
Irrigation and Agriculture.
In a country so predominantly agricultural as fIraq, where 
rainfall, generally speaking, is too slight for its needs, the
(1) Note on the Organisation of the CivilAdminlstration of 
Mesopotamia, September 1st. , 191§T TS’aghdad, 19>1$ )•
(2) Ibid., April 1st, 1920. Baghdad, 1920)
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provision of irrigation from the rivers, the traditional source
of the country’s prosperity, remains one of the major problems.
The problem of irrigation, however, is more than one of mere
extraction of water from the rivers. It is also the maintenance
of the natural drainage of the country, its protection from
(1)
floods and the preservation of navigable waterways.
After the invasions of Hulagu and Timur, the irrigation
system, the remains of which can still be seen, collapsed. No
government which assumed power was able to maintain canals or
regulate the flow of water. Each man did what was good in his
own eyes. Many canals silted up. Other canals, cut in the
banks by the cultivators, without adequate knowledge or without
regard for the future, came to carry more water than the parent
river. In many cases, the abstracted water, through improper
drainage ruined the land through salination or else filled vast
marshes. The rivers, unable to scour their beds in the lower
reaches, increased the dangers from floods and hampered
(2)
navigation.
Not until comparatively modern times were efforts made by the 
Turks to prevent flooding and to secure the services of engineers 
to study and to undertake irrigation works. The most prominent 
of the foreign engineers was Sir William Willcocks, who, from his
(1) Note on Irrigation in Mesopotamia, December, 1919 (Baghdad,
19So), pT~9.
(2) Ibid. , p. 7; Brief Note on Irrigation Work in Mesopotamia 
and~"the operations of the Irrigation Directorate , M.kT.F. , 
up to November, 1918] ("Baghdad, 1919)’, p. 1.
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appointment in 1908, studied and proposed schemes for the
irrigation and drainage of the country. His programme was,
briefly: the construction of two barrages on the Euphrates, at
Hindiya and at Falluja, and two on the Tigris, at Kut and Balad;
the construction of a proper canal system from these barrages;
the utilization of the Habbaniya-Abu Dibbis depression as an
escape for the flood-waters of the Tigris; the regulation of the
swamps above Basra; the rehabilitation of the Nahrwan Canal from
the Diyala; and the provision for drainage, escapes and
(1 )
afforestation in connection with the entire project.
The Turks, however, lacking both money and initiative for
(2)
the whole programme, undertook, with encouragement from Great 
Britain and from Gemany, the construction of the Hindiya barrage 
and the Habbaniya escape, of which only the former was completed 
in 1914.
At the beginning of the Occupation, the interest of the 
military authorities in irrigation and in agriculture had been 
confined to restricting the former where it hindered navigation, 
and encouraging the latter to meet the needs of the aimy, although 
a certain amount of flood prevention work was undertaken from 
late 1915 onwards. Urgent repairs of the Hindiya Barrage and the
(1) Willcocks, Sir W. , The Irrigation of Mesopotamia (1917,
2nd. ed.), pp. 15 fT.
(2) Sir William Willcocks1 estimate for his programme was 
£T. 29,105,020 or about £26,537,000. He anticipated the 
return, once the schemes were completed, to be about nine 
per centum. Ibid,, p. 52.
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completion of its canal were also carried out by military
engineers in June, 1917, but not until the necessity arose of
meeting a threatened shortage of local food supplies for the
(1)
army, and later for the civil population, was the extension and
protection of a agriculture by means of irrigation taken seriously
in hand through the Agricultural Development Scheme. This scheme,
put forward by Mr. G. C. Garbett, First Revenue Officer, in July,
(2) (3)
1917, and finally approved by the War Office, 16 September,
(4)
with a budget of £400,000, had been confined to the Hindiya
Barrage area but later, 28 November, 1917, was extended to the
whole of the Occupied Territory. Except at Ba’quba, however,
little work was undertaken outside of the original area. ’The
plan was to complete canals left half finished by the Turks, dig
new ones, improve old ones, to import and advance to the cultiva-
(5)
tors plough-cattle and seeds.’
Neither the acreage of land brought under irrigation or the 
tonnage of grain produced under the Scheme were up to the 
original estimates. Nevertheless, new irrigation works in the 
Euphrates area, from the middle of 1917 to November, 1918 brought
ftQVQuue Report, 1918, p. 2. Hewitt, Sir J. P., Report for 
tSSe* "Army Council on Mesopotamia (1919), pp. 4, 6, 9 ™
(2) See minutes of Conference, 10 August, 1917, which formally
proposed the scheme: Hewitt, op. cit. , App. V, p. 44.
(3) Hewitt, op. cit. , p. 5.
(4) Revenue Report, 1917, p. 28.
(5) Revenue Report, 1918, p. 3.
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( 1 )
Into cultivation land for winter or shitwi crops, estimated
(2)
at 249,157 acres and land for summer or saifi crops, estimated
at 69,995 acres or a total of 319,152 acres out of an original
(3)
estimate of 606,000 acres. Mr. Garbett had calculated that
(4)
280,000 tons of grain from 30,000 tons of seed would be
produced. Actually between 50,000 and 60,000 tons of grain
(5)
for the army, besides supplies for the civil population, have 
been attributed to its operations and to the irrigation works. 
Even more valuable than these supplies and the consequent reduc­
tion of prices and economy of shipping, were the political 
results of averting a famine, the show of encouragement of
agriculture, and the hold acquired over the shaikhs and tribes
(6)
of the regions opened up under the Scheme.
The Irrigation Department was taken over by the Civil
(1) Such crops include wheat, barley, beans, hurtuman, a kind 
of oat. They are sown between October and March, and 
harvested in April or in May.
(2) These crops are dates, rice, millet, maize, lentils, kidney 
beans, sesame, cotton and tobacco. They are planted in 
April, May or June and harvested in the summer (saifi), or 
in August, September and October.
(3) Brief Note on Irrigation Works in Me so. to November, 1918, 
pp. 3-47”7« Results in the Tigris’”valley are not available.
(4) Actually a net total of 5,507 l/2 tons of seed was sown.
Pinal Report of the Agricultural Development Scheme 
^Baghdad, 1920*7, p7 3.
(5) 56,472 tons according to Hewitt, op. cit. , p. 13. See also, 
Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, p. 80; Revenue Report, 1918,
pp. 2-3.
(6) Pinal Report, p. 1; Revenue Report, 1918, p. 2. Hewitt, 
op. cit., p. 9.
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( 1 )
Administration, 1 April, 1919 The Acting High Commissioner
envisaging, no doubt, a long period of British control, advocated 
immediate caution and retrenchment. He recommended concentration 
of attention on securing and improving already existing systems 
where necessary' on the grounds that 'shortage of labour alike 
for construction and cultivation and financial stringency makes 
it impractical and inexpedient to open up considerable fresh
Commissioner as well as the 'small and unambitious programme of
were, no doubt, believed to be in accordance with the needs of 
the moment. Col. R. G. Garrow, Officiating Director of 
Irrigation, had estimated that the existing population could 
cultivate approximately 1,500,000 acres of which approximately
1,320,000 acres were to be in cultivation by the end of 1919.
(1) Irrigation Directorate, M.R.F. , Admin. Report for period 
1st April to 51st December, 1919 fBaghdad, 1920) , p. 4.
(2) Memorandum, A. C. C. to D. M. G. , Baghdad, 27 December,
1918. Also Draft Report Covering the Last Ten Years of 
the Work of the Irrigation Department, *Iraq, dated Baghdad, 
14 kay7~X§3T, para.~o, [Hereafter,~T)raft HeportT 1920-T£H50)
( 3) Irrigation Directorate, Admin. Report, 1919 , p. 2.
(4) Memorandum, Col. R. G. Garrow to D. Q. M. G. , Baghdad, in 
Correspondence Regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in 
Mesopotamia, T§T9 [Baghdad, l91§)7 p. 9. Ajso, Handbook
of Mesopotamia, p. 171.
(2)
areas for cultivation. ' The arguments of the Acting Civil
minor works' evolved under his direction, and centring about
(4
the gradual establishment of the natural regime of the rivers,
)
(5)
(5) Ibid,, p. 2.
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Nevertheless, the policy as enunciated and the programme as 
evolved f o r  one of the most essential departments of government 
f o r  the country was unfortunate. They set up standards for works 
and expenditure which were to extend over into the Anglo-Arab 
regime. They gave little or no encouragement to the depart­
ment as constituted under that regime and tended to create a 
non-possumus attitude which was to add to the inherent difficul­
ties of development of the country along progressive lines.
Out of the military Agricultural Development Scheme and the
(2)
Directorate of Agriculture established in connection with it,
also grew the Agricultural Department of the Civil Administration
which took over from the Deputy Quarter-Master General on 1 March,
(3 )
1919. Until late 1920, the functions of the Department were
threefold;
1. The improvement of Agriculture by scientific research, 
demonstration and education.
2. The supplying of seeds and advice to military units in 
connection with vegetables and fodder production.
(1) The actual expenditure of the department in 1919-1920 was 
8.4> of the total, while in succeeding years the proportions 
to total expenditure were;
1921s 6.2/i; 1922: 7.1$; 1923: 7.65$; 1924: 6.26$;
1925: 3.78/o; 1926: 5.35$; 1927: 5.49$; 1928: 5.27$;
1929: 6.97$; 1930: 4.07$; 1931: 3.25$.
(2) General Routine Order No.820, 30 July, 1918.
(3) Admin. Re port Agricultural Directorate, 1919 (Ba ghda d,
1920T7 p T l .
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( 1 )
3. The administration of the Military Farms Department
(2)
attached to the Expeditionary Force.
The prospect of developing Mesopotamia as a cotton growing
country had, from the first, attracted the attention of India,
which apparently had hopes that Mesopotamia might provide a
(3)
possible outlet for her surplus population, and of the British
Cotton Growers Association, which anticipated that it would
become an additional source of suuply of Empire cotton. A
(4)
cotton expert, Capt. Roger Thomas, was engaged, a cotton fam
at Karrada, near Baghdad, and other Experimental Plots estab-
lished in the country. Mr. Thomas made comprehensive experi-
(5)
ments, both in the growing of cotton and in the marketing of 
the product, which seemed to hold out bright prospects for the
(1) Report Local Resources Depart., 1918, pp. 7 , 9 , 11.
(2) Note on Organization of Civil Admin., 1 September, 1919,
p. 2.
(3) Andrews, C. F. , Foreign Affairs, April, 1930, p. 441; 
infra, pp. 18Q-1.
(4) At the suggestion of the Trade Commissioners, Messrs. R. E. 
Holland and J. H. White, in their report, 16 June, 1917,
The Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia and the 
Persian GulfTDelhl, 19l7T“TConfidentiaiy.“ They pointed 
out that in view of the prospective importance of Mesopotamia 
as a cotton growing area, an expert should be appointed to 
conduct tests with Egyptian, American and Indian seed.
(5) Thomas, R. , Possibilities of Mesopotamia as a Cotton Growing 
Country, Note I, June 13, T918 (Baghdad, I§T8Tji ffo'te II, 
January 15, 1^19 (Baghdad ,1919); Note III, November 5,1919 
'fBaghdad, 1§19) ; Report on Cotton ffxVeTimenta tion Work In
Mesopotamia2._T918 (Baghdad, 19l9); Ibid~77' I9i8-19l9 ,
(Baghdad, 1920J; Report of Deputation to England (Baghdad, 
1919). Also, Philby, H. St. J. B. , Cultivation of Cotton 
in Mesopotamia (Baghdad, 1919).
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( 1 )
future of Mesopotamia as a cotton growing country.
Other efforts of the Department were largely experimental,
(2)
"both in improving agricultural products, such as wheat,
(3)
dates, citrus fruits, flax etc., and in the study of the soil
(4)
and of the diseases and pests attacking the crops. Experi­
mental faims and research stations were created at Shargat, Kut,
Hilla, Bafquba and near Baghdad, at Rustam, where an Agricultural
(5)
College was projected in connection with the Central Farm.
Most of the technical staff, both gazetted and non-gaze tted, con­
nected with the department, came from India, as did most of the
(6)
experimental equipment.
Although the activities of the Department centred about 
experimental work, attempts were also made to encourage better 
agricultural methods, both by the dissemination of information 
and by the demonstration of modem machinery. The handicaps,' 
however, of the long years of Ignorance and dependence on 
traditional methods, the consequent apathy of the actual cultiva­
tors, the lack of education, the weather vagaries, the uncertainty
(1) Thomas, R. , Note III, 1919, p. 10. Also, Baghdad Times, 
14 April, 19237 ----------
(2) Garbett, C. C. , Note on Wheat Experiments, Mesopotamia, 
1917-1918 (Baghdad,"1&1877
(3) Results of these early studies of dates and of later 
experiments are given by Dowson, H. V., Dates and Date 
Cultivation (Cambridge, 1924).
(4) Results of these experiments were embodied in a series of 
leaflets published by the Department.
(5) Admin. Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopo­
tamia- , ^Baghdad 7"~19*2T7, P* 7.
(6) Ibid. , pp. 2, 3.
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of water supplies and the uncontrolled pests as well as the 
scarcity of funds available, hampered the Department on every 
side. Under such conditions, the pioneering activities of the 
Department, often discouraging in the lack of apparent results, 
laid the foundations of service which might have played a greater 
part in regenerating the country had its early efforts been main­
tained during the succeeding years.
Education.
Under the Turkish Government, an excellent system of educa­
tion existed for ’Iraq, with a Mudir al-Mu'arif (Director of
(1)
Education) in every wilayet, each having a budget, staff, 
syllabus and long list of schools. To judge by results, however, 
the system was a Whited sepulchre’. The schools were rarely as 
numerous nor as well attended as government statistics indicated: 
the teachers possessed little learning and even less moral charac-
mm
ter. Arabic was little stressed as a language. Shi’is, com-
prising the majority of the population, would not send their sons
to government schools, invariably taught by Sunnis, nor were they
encouraged to do so by the Sunni Ottoman Government*
Mr. Dobbs, a s Revenue Commissioner, had, in early 1915,
studied the educational problem and had written suggestions for
(2)
British policy. He advocated extreme caution in initiating a
(1) A. pre-war Budget for Baghdad Wilayet was:
Law School and Secondary School L. T. 9,000
Other schools (from Local Revenue) L.T. 25,000
Revenue Report, 1917, p. 45. Total: L.T. 34,000
(2) Dobbs, H.R.C., Notes on Education, 13 February, 1915.
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system of education in order that the mistakes made in India
might be avoided. The shortage of primary teachers led him to
declare that if it were not for the urgent necessity of equipping
Arabs for government service and for avoiding the imputation that
the British Administration was not inclined to provide education,
he Should be inclined to advise that not a single school should
(1)
be opened for the next two years’.
Under the circumstances, however, he recommended that one or
two primary schools be opened and that subsidies be given to the
American Mission Schools under Mr. John Van Ess and to the Cama-
lite Freres School. The opening of other schools would have to
(2)
be left to the future. Thus from the beginning, the necessity 
of encouraging education to provide youths for government service 
became a guiding factor, which stimulated the establishment of 
educational facilities where the natural tendency on the part of 
the British authorities was to restrict education or to regard it 
as of secondary importance in the work of regenerating the country. 
Nevertheless, only two primary schools were established by the end 
of 1915, although subsidies had been granted to the two institu­
tions already mentioned.
During the same period only Rs. 6,500 were spent on promoting
(3)
education, or 0.4# of the civil expenditure, Rs. 16,22,344.
(1) . Ibid. , para. 2.
(2) Ibid. , para. 11.
(3) Note by Financial Secretary in Review 0. Admin., 1914-1920, 
p. 119. For table of expenditures by heads, see Table l7
Main Headings. 1915-1916 1916-1917
1. Headquarter Administrative 
Expenditure.(1)
Rupee s 
5,54,230
Rupees
11,83,425
2. Political Officers, 
Revenue Establishments. 5,48,892 9,19,085
3. Customs - - - - - - - - - - 1,11,898 3,85,800
4. Transport - - - -  - - - - - --- ---
5. Judicial - - - - - - - - - 1,20,207 1,27,295
6. Medical - - - - - - - - - 61,345 87 ,180
7.
J u W, k
Education - - - - - - - - - 6,500 23,530
8.
*. •
Police- - - - - - - - - - - 1,99,146 2,86,975
9. V  ■Jails - - - - - - - - - - - 20,126 44,460
10. Public Works - - - - - - - --- 1,05,450
11. Posts - - - - - - - - - - - --- ---
12.
• ■ ft'
Telegraphs - - - - - - - - --- ---
13. Survey - - - - - - - - - - --- ---
14. Irrigation - - - - - - - - --- ---
15. Agriculture - - - - - - - - --- —
16. Levies - - - - - - - - - - -- —
Totals 16,22,344 31,63,200
----
(1) Includes Salaries, Secret Service, Subsistence Allowa] 
Sea Passages, Telegrams, Stationery, Press, etc.
Figures for all years, except 1919-1920, based on Rev' 
Admin., 1914-1918, p. 119. Figures for 19l9-1920""5ai 
actuals I n Budget Estimates, 1920-1921, p. iii.
[.
L7 1917-1918 1918-1919 1919-1920
Rupe e s Rupee s Rupee s
>5 24,18,253 33,90,100 73,60,714
S5 51,89,233 93,21,690 70,67,420
)0 5,80,350 6,75,000 29,64,169
---- 30,87,834
>5 2,14,983 3,73,000 8,21,145
SO 1,39,887 4,63,750 20,31,542
SO 35,500 1,80,000 8,86,808
'5 8,90,163 12,04,080 22,71,389
SO 98,517 1,67,400 5,44,304
SO 4, 61,400 8,74,700 49 , 63 , 2 92
---- ---- 23,74,831
---- ---- 8,19,8 68
---- ---- 94,859
---- ---- 38,78,605
---- ---- 3,81,738
---- ---- 66,49,490
>0 100,28,286 166,49,720 461,98,008
.ownnces,
Review C. 
) bt s e c P  o n
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Table II.
Main Headings
1915-
1916
1916-
1917
1917-
1918
1918-
1919
1919-
1920
Total Expenditure (1) 100$ 100$ 100$ 100$ 100 $
1 . Headquarter Administrative 
Expenditure (2) 34.16 37.41 24.11 20.42 15.93
2. Political Officers 
Revenue Establishments 33.83 29.06 51.76 55.99 15.30
3. Customs 6.90 12.20 5.79 4.09 6.42
4. Transport - - - - 6.68
5. Judicial 7.41 4.02 2.14 2.24 1.78
6 • Medical 3.78 2.76 1.39 2.79 4.40
7. Education 0.40 0.74 0.35 1.08 1.92
8. Police 12.28 9.07 8.88 7.23 4.92
9. Jails 1.24 1.41 0.98 1.01 1.18
10. Public Works - 3.33 4.60 5.25 10.74
11. Posts - - - - 5.14
12. Telegraphs - - - - 1.77
13. Survey - - - - 0.21
14. Irrigation - - - - 8.40
15. Agriculture - - - - 0.83
16. Levies - — — 14.40
(1) Total Expenditure, in rupees, for each year given in 
Table III.
(2) Includes Salaries, Secret Service, Subsistence Allowances, 
Sea Passages, Telegrams, Stationery, Press, etc.
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(1)
In the following fiscal year however, Rs. 23,530 or 0.74$ of 
the total civil expenditure were spent, entirely in Basra Wilayet. 
Nor did the situation improve after the taking of Baghdad, the 
attention of the authorities being almost exclusively taken up 
with consolidating the military and political situation. Expend­
iture on education in 1917-1918 totalled but 0.35$ of the total 
civil expenditure.
Not until the appointment of a Director of Education,
(2 )
Major H. E. Bowman in September, 1918, was a vigorous start
made towards creating an educational system. By the end of
(3)
1918, 20 primary schools had been set up, but expenditure 
still formed only 1.08/e of the total expenditure.
The desire for schools and educational facilities, especially 
the opportunity to learn English was everywhere manifest, peti­
tions and requests coming from all parts of the Occupied
(4)
Territories. To meet these demands, 21 new primary schools
(5)
were opened in 1919, while a further 15 were added in 1920,
(1 )  1 A p r i l  to  31 M arch .
(2) E g y p t ia n  M in is t r y  o f  E d u c a t io n ,  1903-1923; D i r e c t o r  
P a le s t in e  E d u c a t io n  D e p a rtm e n t, 1920-1936.
(3) A d m in is t r a t iv e  R e p o rt of E d u c a t io n ,  1918, p . 10. (Hereafter 
A dm in . ~Rep7~J?d. 7 f e W .  ~
(4) Fortnightly Reports of Political Officers, Baghdad Wilayet, 
Tst-T5tE June, 1918; Han dal 17 P« £3 ("He re a Fte r~~Fort nightly 
Repots.7; "HontETy Rep 1ts, January, 1919; Basra Sanj a q ,~
p . S’S"; Q urn a , p . T97 iVid. , August, 1§'19; E r b i l ,  p .  45; 
I b i d . , Novem ber, 1919: Du 1 a im , p. TTi
(5 )  A dm i n i  s t r a t i o n  o f  the D e p a rtm e n t o f  Education for the year 
l9 l '9  (Ba ghda d , 1920 7 7 [He re  a f te  r  Adm in. Rep. 'E d . ',  19197 .
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which, including 24 subsidized schools, brought the total number
(1)
to 85 boys1 schools of all types, and five girls* schools with
a total enrolment of 6,182 pupils or one for every 462 of the
(2)
population. The proportion of the expenditure for Education
to the entire expenditure in this year, the fifth of the British
(3)
Occupation, had risen to 1.9$.
The years of neglect of education, including the war years,
the lack of trained teachers and of equipment and the paucity of
the funds sanctioned by the Civil administration which rendered
it impossible to overcome adequately the lack of teachers by
bringing them from Syria and Egypt, made for the slow creation
of educational facilities. Nevertheless, the aims of the
Department were kept high. These, as summarized by the Director
of Education in 1918, were
to provide a sound elementary education, on which to base 
an edifice lasting, endurable and firm. To open new 
schools gradually as trained teachers become available.
To select as teachers only the best candidate, socially, 
morally and mentally, and to pay them well. To never 
lose sight of the real object in view - the formation of 
character and the spirit of good citizenship. (4)
(1) Review C. Admin., 1914-1920 , p. 10 4.
(2) On the basis of the census, 1918-1919, of 2,890,000 
inhabitants.
Education..................................Rs. 8,86,808*
Total Budget...............................Rs .461,98,008.
These figures are taken from actual expenditure given in 
Budge t Estimates , 1920-1921, p. iii. They differ slightly 
?rom the estimates given in Review G. Admin., 1914-1920, 
p. 119.
(3) See Table II.
(4) Admin. Rep. Ed., 1918, p. 10.
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As long as British advisers played a decisive part in the 
educational affairs of ’Iraq, these aims formed the basis of 
their policy.
Judicial System•
In accordance with Great Britain’s policy of establishing
an Arab administration in Baghdad, of which the promise, in
General Maude’s Proclamation, not to introduce alien institutions
was an indication, instructions had been issued that the ’Iraq
Occupied Territories Code was not to be introduced into Baghdad
(1)
Wilayet. The policy adopted, therefore, was not ’to make a
clean sweep of the Turkish legal system based on English models,
as had been done in Basrah Wilayet* but rather ’to carry on the
Turkish organization of Courts and system of law, making such
immediate modifications only as are necessary to ensure justice
(2)
and a reasonably efficient administration,’
As at the occupation of Basra, most of the Turkish Judicial
personnel had fled. The more recent records had been removed
or destroyed. Beyond the institution of a Court of Small Causes
(3)
and a Shara’ Court (Moslem Law Court) in July, Civil Courts 
were in abeyance until the Courts’ Proclamation of 28 December
(1) Supra, pp. 124-5.
(2) Administrative Report o f  Justice from the Occupation of 
Baghdad t o “ 3T. 121 P 7, p. 4. T^ereafter ""Admin. Rep. Justice,
Zltrr.  ----------------- -------
(3) Proclamations, 1916-1918; Proclamation No. 8, 2 July, 1917.
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(1)
1917, reconstituted the Civil Courts under Mr. (later Sir)
Edgar Bonham-Carter, as Senior Judicial Officer. He had arrived
in October, and after studying the situation with the experience
gained in his long and distinguished career in the Sudan Legal
Department, had outlined the essential requirements to be
embodied in the proclamation.
Under the Turks, First Instance Courts had existed at the
headquarters of each Llwa or District, and of each Qadha or
Sub-district: a total of 10 Liwa Courts of First Instance and
40 Qadha Courts of First Instance in the three Wilayets of Basra,
Baghdad and Mosul. Obviously, from the standpoint of the
prevailing poverty and the sparseness of the population, the
number was excessive. In addition, most of the judges had been
untrained if not actually incompetent. Under the new system,
a Civil Court of First Instance, nomally to be composed of a
British judge and two Arab judges, was to be reopened at Baghdad
(2)
and later, elsewhere, as deemed necessary. Peace Courts which
were also Small Cause Courts, such as had been e stablished in
Baghdad and a few other places just before the war, were to be
(3)
reconstituted wherever required. Where they were not estab­
lished, either Judges of Courts of First Instance or Political
(1) Ibid., Courts1 Proclamation No. 17, 28 December, 1917.
The date !end of December, 19181 given for this Proclama­
tion in Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, p. 94, is obviously 
a misprint.
(2) Ibid., Courts1 Proclamation, Section 3 (1).
(3) Ibid. , Section 5.
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Officers or other officers were given the right to officiate.
In the days of the Turks, Appeals lay from the lower Courts
(1)
to a Court of Appeals situated at the capital of each Wilayet.
Decisions from these Courts could be revised by the Court of
Cassation at Constantinople. The Courts1 Proclamation abolished
(2)
appeals to any Court outside TIraq, and replaced all other
Courts of Appeal by a single Court of Appeal composed of a
(3)
British President and two Arab Judges. Religious Law Courts,
in addition to those already established, were to be created as
(4)
required.
Religious Courts.
The importance of reconstituting Sharaf or Religious Law 
Courts, as provided in the Proclamation, had been recognized in 
1917 by Mr. Borham-Carter. He had then pointed to the respect 
with which the Courts were regarded in Muslim countries, to the 
practical advantage of deciding certain classes of cases by Muslin 
Judges in accordance with Muslim Law, and to the immense addi­
tional political advantage of associating with the Government
< the influential religious class of the !Ulama from which the Qa 
were drawn. He had indicated these alone as adequate reasons
(1) Normally composed of a Turkish President and four Arab 
Judges. Admin. Rep. Justice, 1919, p. 1.
(2) Courts1 Proclamation, Section 9.
(3) Ibid, Section 6.
(4) Ibid., Section 10.
( 5) Admin. Rep. Justice, 1917, p. 4 (12).
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for continuing them.
Sunni <4adhis, therefore, were appointed with these ends in 
view to 14 centres by the end of 1918, and to 12 additional ones 
by the end of 1920, as well as to the Shara* Court set up in 
Baghdad in July, 1917.
Not only were Sunni Shara* Courts established, but a long­
standing grievance partly remedied by peimitting Shi*Is to refer 
k their cases to Shi*a Q,adhis. Under Turkish rule, the Shl*is had 
been forced to submit their personal status cases, if they took 
them to court, to the Sunni Shara * Courts where the cases were 
decided in accordance with Sunni Law. Shi*a religious Judges 
under the name of Nayabat-al-Ja*fariya were appointed in 1918 to 
six centres, to four others in 1919, and to two others in 1920.
Criminal Courts.
The reorganization of the Criminal Courts was more difficult
than that of the Civil Courts. In the first place, the Ottoman
Criminal Procedure required a multitude of Courts, investigating
magistrates and procurators, which it would have been beyond the
capacity of the Civil Administration to supply. Nor would it
have conduced to the effective administration of justice if the
Magistrates, most of whom were English officers with little
previous experience of the administration of law, attempted to
(1)
follow the elaborate Ottoman Procedure.
In addition, the Ottoman Penal Code present^difficulties.
(!) Admin. Rep. Justice, 1920, p. 2 (7).
-159-
Although based on the French Penal Code, it had been subjected 
to so many amendments since it was issued in 1859 that it was, 
in the opinion of the Senior Judicial Officer, Unscientific,
in
ill-arranged and incomplete.1 The first difficulty was
overcome by the creation of a special code known as the Baghdad
(2)
Criminal Procedure Regulations, brought into operation 
1 January, 1919. Until then all criminal cases had been tried 
by Military Governors and Political Officers.
Although the Regulations adopted one or two sections from
(3)
the Ottoman Criminal Procedure, the ultimate origin of which 
was the French Criminal Procedure, its main provisions revealed 
the inability of those in the Civil Administration to dissociate 
themselves from Indian traditions or to escape from the applica­
tion of British Military Law. Both of these formed the basis of 
the Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure from which the Regulations
were drawn. The new Regulations were admittedly subject to the
(4)
exigencies of war and of military occupation. Offences com­
mitted by members of the A m y  of Occupation even against the 
inhabitants of the country were not to be tried under them. It
(1) Memorandum on Baghdad Penal Code, by the Senior Judicial 
Officer, 21 November, 1918. Also Admin. Rep. Justice, 1918, 
p. 2 (7).
(2) Promulgated by Proclamation of General Officer Commanding,
15 November, 1918. (These Regulations hereafter Bd. C. P. 
Reg.)
(3) Particularly Chapters III and IX, concerning Procurators, 
and Chapter XI, concerning Civil Complaints and Civil 
Damages. For Ottoman Criminal Procedure, see Young,
Sir G. , op. cit. , vol. VII, pp. 226 ff.
(4) Bd. C. P. Reg., Sec. 2 (1).
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was expected, however, that after the conclusion of hostilities,
a permanent Code would be prepared.
Pour classes of Criminal Courts were to be constituted:
1. Courts of Session. 2. Courts of Magistrates of the First Class.
3. Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class. 4. Courts of
(1)
Magistrates of the Third Class. A Court of Session was to be
a Court consisting of three Magistrates, of whom one at least
(2)
must be a Magistrate of the First Class. Political Officers
and British Judges were to be Magistrates of the First Class,
Assistant Political Officers and Arab Judges were to be Magis-
(3)
trates of the Second Class. The Civil Commissioners might
appoint any person a Magistrate of the First, Second or Third
(4)
Class •
The Ottoman Penal Code was replaced on 1 January, 1919, by
( 5 )
the Baghdad Penal Code, based largely on the former, but with 
amendments and additions from Egyptian sources, in themselves 
based on the French Penal Code.
Among the tribes, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes
(6)
Regulation continued to be applied with considerable success.
(1) Ibid., Sec. 4. (2) Ibid., Sec. 5.
(3) Ibid., Sec. 6. (4) Ibid., Sec. 5.
(5) Promulgated by Proclamation of the General Officer
Commanding, 21 November, 1918.
(6) For views of Political Officers: ibid.: Shatrah (Nasiriyah)
p. 387; Qurnah, p. 306; Kut, p. 384; Admin.' Report, ffillah, 
1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 3; *Amarah Division Admin.' Report, 
1926-1921 (Baghdad, 1921), p. 7; Monthly Rep!ts., January, 
1919; Basra Sanjaq, p. 32.
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It was regarded in the tribal areas as * undoubtedly the most
(1)
satisfactory* method of settling tribal disputes, as the
(2)
reason for decrease of crime and as * one of the props of the
(3)
tribal system.* Although doubt was cast on both the wisdom
and ability of the Administration to continue the tribal system
(4)
indefinitely, only in 'Amara Division was uncertainty felt as
(5)
to the usefulness at that time of the Tribal Disputes Regulation,
Amalgamation j>f Basra and Baghdad Courts and the Creation of 
the Judicial Department.
The political and administrative considerations which
motivated the amalgamation of the administration of the Basra
(6)
and Baghdad Wilayets in September, 1919, applied with equal
(7)
force to the judicial systems which had not then been assimilated.
On 1 January, 1919, however, the two systems were finally con- 
(8 )
solidated, the * Iraq Occupied Territories Code and all Indian
(1) Admin. Reports, 1918: Hillah, p. 127.
(2) Ibid.: Nasiriyah, p. 355.
(3) Ibid.: Hillah District, p. 144.
(4) Admin. Reports, 1918: *Amarah, p. 336; Hillah District, 
p. 34; Hiniah frivi's'i'on, pp. 120-1; *Amarah" Report, 1919, 
P* *Ama'rah Hepdr57~'l92Q-1921, p. 25.
(5) *Amarah Report, 1919, p. 11.
(6) Supra, p. 129.
(7) Cogent reasons for amalgamating the two judicial systems 
were advanced in Review Admin. Basrah, 1917, p. 6.
(8) Basrah Courts* Amalgamation Proclamation, 1918, by the 
General Officer Commanding, “’2’4’TFecember, 1918.
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and British Acts operative under it being repealed with the ex­
ception of nine Indian Laws and one English Law, set forth in a 
special schedule. !The change was effected without difficulty 
and was welcomed by the population since it replaced a foreign^ 
system of law and procedure by one with which they were familiar.’ 
The judicial system of Mosul, the administration of which 
H. M. Government had at one time desired to organize separately, 
in anticipation of it being assigned to Prance at the Peace 
Settlement, was also assimilated, on the same date, to the system 
in operation throughout the Occupied Territories.
The number of Courts established under the Civil Administra­
tion, 1914-1920, had been recognized as being as insufficient as
(2)
the number under the Turks had been excessive. Expansion and 
reform, however, had proved difficult owing zo the necessity of 
subordinating the policy of the Department to that of the General
(3)
Administration, owing to the lack of funds and to the diffi­
culty in finding suitable staff, whether ‘Iraq or English, to
Admin. Rep. Justice, 1919, p. 4 (12); Admin. Report, 1918: 
Nasirlyah, p. 555'.
(2) Admin. Rep. Justice, 1918, p. 1. Ibid. , 1919, p. 2 (4).
(3) Ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16). The proportion of expenditure on 
Judicial services to total expenditure and to receipts, 
based on figures given in Table I, p. is as follows;
Percentage of Expenditure 
on Judicial services to 
total Expenditure.
1917-1918 1918-1919 1919-1920
Rupees Rupees Rupees
2.14# 2.24# 1.78#
Percentage of Expenditure 
on Judicial services to 
total Receipts
1.57# 1.41# 1.43#
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. ( D
undertake them.
Recognition was not lacking of the unsatisfactory nature of 
legislation which, during the whole period of the Occupation, 
was by proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, or by 
regulations or orders issued by the chief civil authority and the 
Judicial Officer, under authority of the General Officer Command­
ing. Colonel Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, in his report for 
1917 had commented:
It is high time that he (Senior Judicial Officer) be 
relieved of his legislative duties, which should be the 
special task of a legal Secretary ... Assigning work to one 
such person would put an end to notices of spurious legality, 
threatening the public with dire and unspecified penalties 
for dubious offences.'2)
Mr. Bonham-Carter, on his side, believed that while consider­
able legislation would be necessary before the Courts could con­
tribute to better conditions in 1 Iraq, no radical legislative
improvements could be undertaken without the coming of peace and
(3)
without a Representative Legislative body.
Under Mr. Bonham-Carter, the policy of employing 1 Iraqis
both as Judges and as clerical staff was applied from the first.
Although difficulty was often experienced in making suitable
(4)
selections of Judges and Qadlls, he »had no hesitation in saying
(1) Admin. Rep. Justice, 1920, p. 8 (16).
(2) Review Admin. Basrah, 1917: Report on Admin, of Civil and
Criminal Justice in Basrah Wilayet, by Courts established 
under “f i jC T ^ T T C o d e r d u r ln g T 9T7T p r w : -------------------------------
(3) Admin. Rep. Justice, 1919, p. 9 (23). Ibid., 1920, p. 8 (16)
(4) Admin. Rep. Justice, 1918, p. 6 (15).
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Table III.
‘The following Table indicates the nationality of 
personnel of the Judicial Department.
1918
(Bd.Wilayet only)
1919 1920
British 6 10 11
Indians - 4 6
1Irakis (Muslims) 82 197 247
Tt (Christians) 1 9 12
Tt (Jews) 9 9 12
Syrians - 1 1
Egyptians - 1 -
Armenians 2 1 -
Total non TIrakis (A) 8 17 19
Total TIraq.is (B) 92 215 271
Percentage of A to B. 8.7J5 736 6.636
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( 1 )
that the work had been done efficiently1 through the 1 valuable
services of the Arab Judges and staff,* without whose *help it
would have been hardly possible... to carry out the policy of
(2)
applying Turkish Law and Procedure.1
To this policy of rendering more than lip-service to the 
principle of omploying Arabs wherever possible may be attributed 
the comparative immunity of the Judicial Department from the 
criticism and hostility directed by * Iraqi Nationalists, during 
the period before the establishment of the National Government, 
against the unsympathetic attitude in other Departments of the 
Civil Administration.
(3.) Ibid., p. 2 (5).
(2) Ibid., p. 6 (15). Also Ibid., 1920, p. 8 (15).
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CHAPTER VII.
POLICY OF TEE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION,
Before the publication of the Anglo-French Declaration, 7
(i)
November, 1918, those in authority in Mesopotamia apparently
assumed * that the policy envisaged by the British and the French
Governments in the Middle East was one in which the principles
and methods followed by Lord Cromer in Egypt would, with suitable
(2)
modifications, find acceptance both on the spot and at home,1
The original instructions of H. M. Government, General Maude!s
Proclamation, the Prime Minister's Declaration of 5 January, 1918,
(3)
concerning fion-annexatlon of Turkish territory and President
(4)
Wilson's 14 points, which had been accepted both by the Allied and
(5)
the Central Powers as the basis of Peace, had been regarded by 
those in charge in 1 Iraq as merely introducing disturbing elements
(1) Released simultaneously in London, Paris, New lork and Cairo,
8 November, 1918. Copies distributed to Arabs in Palestine
bore the date of 9 November, 1918, For text, see Appendix 
IV.
(2) Thus wrote the Acting High Commissioner 12 years later; 
Wilson, Sir A. T., Mesopotamia, 1917-1920, p. 110.
(3) The Times, 7 January, 1918.
(4) Made in an address to U.S. Congress, 8 January, 1918. Text:
Brit, and For. St. Papers, III (1918) 950 ff.; App. III.
(5) 5 November, 1918. See H.P.C.P., vol. VI, p.24. Turkey and 
Austria,, who had signed their Armistices previously, were 
not legally bound by the agreement of 5 November, but the 
Allies had propagandised the subject peoples of the two 
Empires on the basis of the Points and could not repudiate 
them entirely. Ibid., p. 24, also Wright, Quincy, A.P.S.R., 
November, 1926, p • 744.
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( 1 )
into the situation. These utterances were held to be incon­
sistent with the traditional aims of British policy in the 
Middle East, and with confidential information received concern­
ing the Secret Agreements. They were therefore disregarded.
The Anglo-French Declaration, however, placed a different 
complexion on the situation. Issued after the Armistice of 
Mudros, it was generally accepted throughout the East as a pro­
nouncement of policy by victorious Powers no longer engaged in 
encouraging a non-Turkish population to hostilities against the
Turks. In the eyes of the Acting Civil Commissioner, however,
(2)
it was a 1 disastrous error1.
Nothing in the political situation in Syria or 1 Iraq 
rendered such a declaration necessary. Unfettered by 
such an announcement, France and Great Britain could have 
come to an agreement as regards their spheres of influence 
and have proceeded to endow the indigenous populations 
with institutions calculated to attain the objectives men­
tioned in the Declaration. (3)
So strongly convinced was he that nothing but ill could
follow if H. M. Government persisted in a literal interpretation
of the Declaration that he took the first opportunity to voice
his disapproval, not only of the Declaration but also the policy
it symbolized, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for
(4 )
India. The telegram, in part, is given below:
(1) President Wilson1 s 14 Points were withheld from publication 
in * Iraq by the authorities until 11 October, 1918:
Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, p. 126.
(2) Wilson, op. cit., p. 103.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Telegram, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, No. 9926,
16 November, 1918.
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Your telegram Nov* 14*
I should not be doing my duty if I did not first of 
all record my convictions that the Anglo-French Declaration 
of November 8th, in so far as it refers to Mesopotamia, bids 
fair to involve us in difficulties as great as Sir A. H* 
MacMahon1 s (sic) early assurances to the Sharif of Mecca*
It is for the representatives of H. M. Government on 
the spot to make the best of the situation created by this 
Declaration, and as Government is aware I am trying to do 
so, but unless the latter is superseded or modified by a 
pronouncement of the Peace Conference, I anticipate that in 
years to come we shall be faced with the alternatives of 
evading the spirit whilst perhaps keeping within the letter 
of this Declaration, or of setting up a form of Government 
which will be the negation of orderly progress and will 
gravely embarrass the efforts of the European Powers to in­
troduce stable institutions into the Middle East.
The Declaration involves us here on the spot in diplo­
matic insincerities which we have hitherto successfully 
avoided and places a potent weapon in the hands of those 
least fitted to control a nation1s destinies*
I would emphasize the almost entire absence of politic­
al racial or other connexion between Mesopotamia and the 
rest of Arabia*
If the future of this country is to be dealt with 
successfully it must, I am convinced, be treated independ­
ently of Arab problems elsewhere.
The Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate that foreign 
Arabs should have any say in their affairs, whether those 
Arabs come from Syria or from the Hijaz. In practice they 
dislike and distrust both. National unity means for them 
unity of Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or 
Hijaz. So, too, they resent the importation of social or 
administrative institutions or methods that savour of India.
The average Arab, as opposed to the handful of amateur 
politicians of Baghdad, sees the future as one of fair deal­
ing and material and moral progress under the aegis of 
Great Britain, and is clear-sighted enough to realize that 
he would lose rather than gain in national unity if we were 
to relinquish effective control. He will learn more 
quickly than the Indian. But he is still behind him in 
education and experience.
Irrespective of this, the tribal element is a constant 
potential source of dissension and grave public insecurity. 
Nor can we afford to ignore the mutual contempt and jealousy
that exist between townsmen and tribesmen.
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With the experience of my Political Officers behind me,
I can confidently declare that the country as a whole 
neither expects nore desires any such sweeping scheme of 
independence as is adumbrated, if not clearly denoted, in 
the Anglo-French Declaration,
The Arabs are content with our occupation; the non- 
Muhammadan element clings to it as the tardy fulfilment of 
the hopes of many generations; the world at large recog­
nizes that it is our duty and our high privilege to estab­
lish an effective protectorate and to introduce a form of 
Government which shall make possible the development of this 
country, which in spite of centuries of neglect is still the 
ganglion of the Middle East,
If we allow ourselves to be diverted from this path by
political catch-words, our soldiers will have fought and died
in vain and the treasure we have lavished in this country 
will in the eyes of the world and of the peoples of the 
Middle East have been wasted; for it was not merely to de­
feat Germany that we came here.
This reaction of the Acting Civil Commissioner to the policy 
of the Declaration was only natural to one of his background,
training and experience. His services in the Indian Army, in
*
Persia and in the Persian Gulf had confirmed him in what he be­
lieved to be the needs and interests of India and the British 
Empire in general, in whose greatness he gloried. He was fully 
aware of all the reasons which had brought the Expeditionary
Force to Turkish Arabia, and for which such great sacrifices had
been made. These interests of the Empire were paramount with
(1)
him as he was frank to admit. In * Iraq they could be served
but ill by relinquishing the country to an indigenous adminis­
tration which had no prospect of being either sound or efficient.
In common, however, with other men of similar training, he 
believed in England*s peculiar mission: to bestow its gifts
(1) Wilson, op. c i t ., p. 322.
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of efficient administration, of impartial justice, of honest
finance, and of security on backward peoples, who in return for
these services were to assume places in the economic and defen-
(1)
sive system of the Empire* His attitude was, apparently,
one prevalent among British administrators in India: that as
long as the material well-being of the subject peoples were be­
ing advanced, no other standard need be set up by which to judge 
the administration. As long as administrators spent the best 
of their bodily and mental vigour on the people, there was no 
need to justify the measures which kept them in authority. 
Political aspirations and the desire for self-government were to 
be dismissed as vagaries of ungrateful extremists or to be re­
pressed as firmly as wayward thoughts in any adolescent youth.
Whether or not a literal application of the Anglo-French 
Declaration was expected, it would seem that, following its ap­
pearance and a further divergence of opinion between London and 
Baghdad, traced in detail in succeeding pages, the policy in 
1 Iraq tended to develop in accordance with these views of the 
Acting Civil Commissioner. Indeed, there is reason to believe 
that the main efforts of the divil authorities, from the capture 
of Baghdad until the Insurrection of 1920, were increasingly 
directed, not to meeting the needs of the country but to estab­
lishing a regime so substantially British and so definitely
(1) ’I felt it to be in our power, as in that of no other
people, to seek justice and ensue it - to protect minority 
interests - the fair treatment of which is the best rough 
test of any civilization.1 Ibid., pp. x, 322.
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dependent on the Indian Empire, on the one hand, so convincing 
in its show of machinery and of material progress, and so osten­
sibly supported by local opinion on the other, that the influ­
ence of the 1 SharifianT school in Whitehall Councils might be 
checked and that H. M* Government might hesitate before wreck­
ing the established administrative machinery by handing it over 
to the Arabs•
That such was the tendency of the Civil Administration 
seems to be borne out by the tendency to increase, from 1918 on­
ward, the size and extent of the Headquarters Administration, to 
the neglect of other services. Secretariats, Departments,
Directorates, Bureaus, Circles, and varieties of forms, reports,
(1)
files and procedure were created in the best Indian adminis­
trative tradition to such a degree as to draw down the censure
of even the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon,
(2)
formerly Viceroy of India.
Examination of the annual expenditure from 1914 also seems 
to indicate that even when the increase of occupied territories 
is taken into consideration, the steadily increasing funds de­
voted to Headquarters Administration expenditure, culminating in
(3)
an approximate 220> increase between 1918-19 and 1919-20, and 
the stringency of funds for those branches of the administration 
which directly benefitted the public, such as Education, Judicial
(1) The index of files in the Civil Commissioners office alone 
in 1920 comprised 207 printed foolscap pages ranging over 
some 170 subjects.
(2) Sunday Times, 20 September, 1920.
(3) See annexed Table of Expenditures.
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(1)
and Medical Services, and Public Works, were based on the
aim of building up a machine with a view to the future. In­
deed, the large proportion of expenditures on Headquarters Ad
ministration and on staff organization in relation to Educa­
tion. Judicial and Medical services make it appear that it was
lack of suitable personnel which restricted the development of 
social services, but rather the absence of the will to create 
them.
It may be argued that the small proportion of revenue de­
voted to services which directly benefitted the civil population 
was not a true index of the benefits accruing to thegi, as the 
Army undertook a number of services, such as Irrigation, Agri­
cultural development, building of roads and bridges which would 
have normally fallen under Civil Revenues. These activities, 
executed and originally paid for by the military authorities,
(1) Ibid.
(2) Table II, p. To percentages given under items 1 and
2, should be added the administrative costs of the other 
services which on the estimated budgets of 1919-1920 varied 
from 81/i> in the case of Surveys to 9% in the case of Public 
Works.
(3) Surpluses occurred every year of the Occupation:
Total .. Rs.336,51,777.
♦ Prom Financial Secretary’s Note, Review C. Admin. 1914- 
1920, pp. 118-19.
** Prom Actuals in Budget Estimates, 1920-1921. p. i.
(2)
nor thenot merely the excuse that funds were not available
♦ 1915-1916
t 1916-1917 
1- 1917-1918
tt 1918-1919 
tt 1919-1920
Rs. 29,46,298. 
Rs. 49,45,050. 
Rs. 52,23,762. 
Rs. 94,61,745. 
Rs.110,73,932.
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did undoubtedly confer great benefits on the country, causing a 
development within a period of two or three years under the 
stimulus of war, such as it would otherwise not have gained in 
as many decades.
It must not be overlooked, however, that these works and 
expenditures were originally undertaken to facilitate winning 
the war, to which they contributed no less than other manifold 
activities on which no other return had been demanded or ex­
pected, This fact was recognized by Sir John Hewitt, who, 
after spending three months in TIraq in late 1918 and early
(X)
1919, on behalf of the Army Council, reported:
We are unanimously and emphatically of opinion that 
there is no ground for the suggestion that the expenditure 
of Army funds has been prompted by the desire to provide 
for after-peace developments, and we consider that they have 
been uniformly expended with the primary object of securing 
the efficiency and comfort of the force.(2)
Nevertheless, the demands by the military authorities for
repayment of their expenditures, incurred at unprecedented
rates, for objects which they considered, often arbitrarily,
would prove useful to the civil population, and the enforced
necessity of taking over unfinished programmes of the Public
Works and of other departments, also conceived on a war-time
scale and which had to be completed to avoid losing the original
outlay, placed an undue strain on the Occupied Territories
Budgets. The large sums necessitated for the completion of
these programmes, often attended with wasteful expenditure, due
(1) Terms of reference for the Hewitt Commission are given in 
Hewitt, op. clt,, p. 3,
(2) Ibid., p. 27.
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( 1 )
to lack of supervision and of trained personnel, and the ex­
penditure on quarters and amenities for the British and Indian 
personnel of the Civil Administration account for the comparat­
ively large increase in funds expended on services for develop­
ing the country Between 1919 and 1920.
Further examination of the Budgets for 1919 and 1920 seems 
to indicate the intention, in anticipation of the continued ex­
tensive employment of British and Indian Officials, to provide 
equipment such as motor transport, to acquire land, and to build 
offices, billets and residential quarters, such as the Alwiya 
cantonment. The transport budget for 1919-1920 was estimated 
at Rs. 50,62,280; land acquisition at Rs. 12,01,250; while 
approximately 40$ of the Public Works Budget was set aside for 
plans to promote the comfort and efficiency of these British and
Indian officials. Although these estimated amounts were not
(2)
entirely spent in 1919-20, the estimates for 1920-1 provided
(3)
even larger amounts: Transport being allotted Rs. 60,31,641,
while Public Works estimates, of which offices and residential
(4)
quarters composed the largest single item, drew Rs. 98,43,500.
(1) A typical example, cited Hewitt op. clt., pp. 18-22 and 
App. XVI-XIX, is that of the purchase ~of irrigation pumps 
by an inexperienced officer, dispatched to India without 
adequate instructions. Two hundred pumps were asked for, 
of which the pre-war price, in new condition averaged £188, 
delivered in Basra. After months of delay 14 second-hand 
pumps were delivered, at a price averaging £1,177 in Bombay. 
The pumps were eventually re-sold by the Director of Agri­
culture at a considerable loss.
(2) Budget Estimates, 1920-1921, p. 111.
(3) Ibid., p. 91.
(4) Ibid., p. 112. Also Budget Estimates of Expenditure for 
the~Civil Administration for the year 1920-1921; Director­
ate of Military and Civil Works. (Baghdad, 1920).
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To meet these Public Works budgets, it seemed reasonable
to the Civil Administration that they should be defrayed from
(1)
the surplus accumulated by means of revenue collection on 
the basis of the former Turkish demands but, unlike the Turks, 
with insistence on the payment of the full demand wherever pre­
sented, and of expenditure on objects ’which could only be 
justified or explained’ , as Mr. Asquith declared in the House 
of Commons, ’on the assumption that you are going to deal with
’ Iraq as a province or district which was going to be governed
(2)
in the Anglo-Indian fashion.' In the two years of 1918 and
(3)
of 1919, the Civil Administration collected Rs. 805,44,502,
or an average of twice the revenue collected in 1911, equival-
(4)
ent to Rs. 206,57,000. In 1920, the revenue receipts were
(5)
Rs. 693,22,587, excluding railway revenue, or three and a
third times the Turkish receipts of 1911. The original estim-
(6)
ate had been Rs. 760,65,698. The surplus for 1919 alone was
one half the total receipts of the Turks in the pre-war year
(1) Report by H. M. High Commissioner on the Finances, Adminls- 
•bration ihid Condition of the ’ Iraq for the period from 
October 1, 1920, to March 5lst, 192^7 (Baghdad, 1922),
p. 22. (Hereafter Admin. Repj, 1920-1922)• The figure 
for the annual surpluses are given supra,p. 172.
(2) Pari. Debates, H. of C., 5th S* vol. 151 (1922), pp. 1554-5; 
also ibid.y vol. 130 (1920), p. 2234.
(3) This total (exclusive of revenue grains supplied to the 
Army, valued at 60 lakhs: Review C. Admin., 1914-1920,
p. 118) is based on Actuals in Budget Estimates, 1920-1921,
p. 1. ----------
(4) Bulletin Annuel de Statistique, 1527. For comparison of 
iand-revenue receipts see supra. ppT 138 ff.
(5) Admin. Rep., 1920-1922, pp. 23-4.
(6) Budget Estimates, 1920-1921, p. ii.
just mentioned, while the entire surplus accumulated in the
period of the Military Occupation was one and a half times the
(1)
revenue collected in the same pre-war year. These figures
are all the more remarkable when the amounts remitted as subsid­
ies or for political services, as in the ‘Amara and Dulaim 
Divisions, are taken into consideration.
It need not be supposed, however, that taxation was unduly 
oppressive, although it tended to press most heavily on the 
agricultural worker to whom the burden was eventually passed 
under the prevailing land tenure. Prosperity was general: 
trade was flourishing, the price of agricultural products was 
high, wages had risen beyond the bounds of imagination, and 
rents had soared. In addition, classes who had never paid
taxes were no longer able to evade payment by bribery or force
(2 )
as in pre-war days. Others who had paid little through
faulty assessment or official discrimination were now forced to 
pay in full.
The accusation made by Lord Islington in the House of Lords
that the political unrest of 1920 was primarily due to heavy
(3)
taxation was essentially untrue. Nevertheless, the fact 
that the landlords, dignitaries and tribesmen who had once es­
caped taxation were no longer able to escape, undoubtedly in­
fluenced them to throw their weight against a regime which was 
able to collect what it demanded. Moreover, gratitude for the
(1) Supra, p. 172.
(2) Handbook of Meso., vol. I, p. 145, estimates that in pre-war 
days V/lOths of the population of the Wilayet of Basra es­
caped scot-free of all taxation and paid nothing whatever 
except perhaps bribes.
(3) Pari. Debates, H. of L., 5th S., vol. 40 (1920), pp. 850-1.
fact that for the first time in the lives of the tax-payers, 
tangible and concrete returns for their money were visible, was 
often lost in the knowledge that they had no voice in the init­
iation or incidence of taxation or in the choice of the ob­
jects of expenditure which, because they were essentially desir­
able in the eyes of the Anglo-Indian officialdom, were placed 
in the budget estimates, regardless of whether or not the ex­
penditure had corresponding value in the desires and standards 
of the tax-payers or whether it was necessary for the peculiar
needs of the country.
In responsible administrative positions, the Civil Admin­
istration fi*om 1914 to 1920 employed comparatively few Arabs.
(!)
The Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month formed but 3.74/b
of the 534 officers in the same category on 1 August, 1920,
numbering 20, while the remainder, 514, were British or Indian
officials. The distribution of the 20 Arabs so employed was
as follows: Judicial Department 10; Divisional Political
Staff 4; Irrigation 3; Tapu 2; Waqf 1. This situation was
due, partly to the lack of Arabs who by training, education and
character could stand comparison with the high ability of the
British officers, and partly to the view that 1 the interests of
the country will be served by having a large proportion of
(2)
British personnel in all branches of the Administration.1
(1) Following the official division as in Review C. Admin., 
1914-1920, p. 122.
(2) Admin. Report, Baghdad, 1917, p. 3. The figures above, to 
gether with the Acting Civil Commissioner^ persistentre- 
fusal to set up an Arab Government in Mosul, as ordered by 
H. M. Government, 9 May, 1919, make it difficult to under­
stand his later statement, (Wilson, op. cit., p. 313) 1 From 
the outset I did my best to induce h. M. Government to allow 
me to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil 
Administration.1
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Nor were the various advisory Councils, of which so much
has been made as indicating the participation of Arabs in the
(1)
Government, of any practical value. They were so organized
that their effect on the conduct of the Administration, except
in minor local affairs, was nil.
Indeed it was from Indian rather than Arab sources that
both methods and officials were drawn. Thus in 1917, of the
59 officers serving in the Civil Administration of Baghdad
Wilayet, 29 came from services in India, either directly or on
loan from the military authorities. The proportion, roughly,
(2)
held good in Basra Wilayet also. In 1920, although only
70 of the 507 British officers drawing over Rs. 600 per mensem
were on the active lists of Indian Government services, a much
greater proportion of these as well as of the 515 British
officers drawing less than Rs. 600 possessed Indian experience.
In addition, 2,216 Indians were employed, who, with the 1022
British officials, composed 50.5$ of the total administrative
personnel, excluding the railroad staff and non-administrative
(3)
ranks of the Levies and the Police. Of the Railway personnel,
numbering 24,928 of all grades, on 1 April, 1920, 80$ were 
Indians, 3$ were Europeans, and 17$ were inhabitants of the
(1) Review Civil Admin., Occupied Territories, 1914-1918,
pp. 24-6, (hereafter Review C. Admin., 1914-1918). Ibid., 
1914-1920, pp. 131-2.
(2) Admin. Report., Baghdad, 1917, p. 2., Residents of the 
Occupied Territories, however, composed 83$ of the subordin­
ate officials in the same year.
(3) Table IV.
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Table IV.
Officers and Personnel
Employed by the Civil Administration, 1 August , 1920.*
British Indian
Inhabitants 
Occupied Terr.
Part I Officers & Personnel 
drawing over Rs.6G0 
per m.
Central Admin. 5 -
Divisional Admin. 106 4
Other branches 396 7 16
Total 507 7 20
Part II Officers Drawing less 
than Rs.600 per m.
Central Admin. 55 62 123
Divisional Admin. 28 316 862
Other branches 432 1,831 2,167
Total 515 2,209 3,152
Grand Total 1,022 2,216 3,172
Total non-Arab staff 3,238
Above does not include Railways or non-administrative rank 
and file of Police and Levies (less than Rs, 600).
* Based on Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, p. 122, and on
various monthly Lists of Officers (Part I and II) Serving 
Under the Civil Commissioner, M.E.3T.
-180-
( 1 )
country, including Arabs, Kurds and Jews.
The Judicial system as created in 1919 was scarcely less
indebted to Indian and British Military Law than the 11raq
Occupied Territories Code had been. Those familiar with the
Indian Administrative system will find repeated in ’Iraq the
familiar titles borne in India: Civil Commissioner, Political
Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial
(2)
Officer, etc.
Much of the Indian influence was undoubtedly due to the 
fact that India had both the motive and personnel for the ex­
peditions. Officers came afterwards from other parts of the 
Empire, but the tradition remained. There had even been a sug- 
gestian of a Civil Service on the lines of the Indian Civil 
Service, but comprising ’Iraq, the Sudan and the Levant gener-
(3)
ally.
The early mention of Mesopotamia as a colony of India or
as an outlet for India’s surplus population, which had been
(4)
current from 1915 to 1917, had subsided, although the idea
(5)
continued in official circles. The stronger claim, however,
(1) Review C, Admin., 1914-1920, p. 118.
(2) Political Officer H. R. P. Dickson had suggested in 1917
that familiar Arab titles be given to the Britida. officers.
Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh, 1916-1917, p. 20.
(3) Wilson, op. cit., p. 159; Ormsby Gore, W., J. C. Asian 
Soc., vol. VII (1920).
(4) J.C. Asian Soc., vol. IV (1917),p. 87.
(5) The Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, writing in
February, 1918, in My Indian Diary (1930) p. 250, seems to 
have had in mind some colonizing scheme for Mesopotamia.
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which India and Indian methods had in ’Iraq, lay in the inter-
(1)
ests of the Indian Empire in the future of Mesopotamia, to 
which it had so long been bound by political and economic ties. 
These interests had to be safeguarded, as none knew better than 
the Acting Civil Commissioner. To him, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, 
Assistant Under Secretary of State for India, who had lent his 
weight to the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force In 1914, wrote 
on 12 March, 1918:
Entirely different currents are flowing now, and we 
must shape our course to them if we are to get what we want 
in ’Iraq. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the ques­
tion is how we are to secure what is essential under the 
new ones. The thing can be done, but a certain re-orienta­
tion is necessary. The ’Arab faqade’ may have to be some­
thing rather more solid than we had originally contem- 
plated. (2)
(1) The recognition of the interests of India in the House of 
Commons, ’The matter cannot be settled without a great deal 
of careful study and conference with the Indian authorities 
and others’, (Pari. Debates, H. of C., 5th S., vol. 120 
(1919), p. 1798) tended to confirm the Arabs in their belief 
that India might take over ’Iraq. Also infra, p. 240.
(2) Cited Wilson, op. clt., p. 166.
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CHAPTER VIII 
PLANS FOR THE FUTURE.
The Armistice of Mudros, 30 October, 1918, terminated hos­
tilities between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Only 
by the addition of Mosul to the Occupied Territories was the 
status quo altered. British troops, under the command of 
General Marshall, pressing towards Mossul had been within four­
teen miles of the city on 31 October, when the Armistice of the 
previous day was announced.
Acting under orders received from the War Office on the
night of first November, and on the authority of clauses VII and
(1)
XVI of the Armistice, General Marshall occupied Mosul on 7
November in spite of resolute protests from * Ali Ihsan Pasha,
the Turkish commander. The latter maintained that the terms of
the Armistice did not cover the occupation of the oity or the
(2)
country beyond. By his prompt action and his determined
stand in face of the opposition of the Turkish commander, General 
Marshall carried out the undoubted wishes both of H. M. Govern­
ment and of [France to whom Mosul had been assigned under the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement. In deference to that Agreement, the 
Administration was organized separately from that of the Occupied
(1) Brit, and For. St. Papers, 111 (1918) 611 ff; also H.P.C.P., 
vol. II, p. 496.
(2) This contention formed one of the main arguments of the 
Turkish claim to Mosul, not relinquished until the Treaty 
of Angora, 5 June, 1926; Brit, and For. St. Papers, 123 
(1926) Pt. I, 599 ff.
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Territories, » , with the exception of the Judicial system which
was assimilated on 1 January, 1919, to that of Baghdad and 
(1)
Easra•
The Armistice apparently found H. M. Government without a
definite policy for Mesopotamia other than that proclaimed
generally for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire by the
(2)
Anglo-French Declaration. Nor could they, although the
Interdepartmental Committee on Near and Middle East Affairs be­
gan almost at once to meet, in an attempt to frame *a policy for
(3)
those territories likely to remian under British influence,* 
hope to bring immediate order to the complexity of aspirations, 
interests and viewpoints left in the wake of the war.
Agreements, Declarations and Correspondence had piled up 
conflicting responsibilities. Promises and Proclamations had 
been made under the stress of abnormal war-conditions. These 
had to be liquidated or England's prestige and reputation for 
fair dealing would be forfeited. Thus, there arose the necess­
ity of reconciling the Husain-McMahon Correspondence with the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement among the three parties concerned, of 
satisfying the aspirations of the Arab Nationalists whose war­
time services, in response to encouragement of the Allies gave
(1) Even separate postage stamps were issued: Turkish fiscal 
stamps overprinted I.E.F.D. with new values.
(2) The original 'intention of the Anglo-French Declaration was 
primarily to clear up the existing situation in Syria which 
Arab suspicion of French intentions had created.' Tele­
gram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, 29 November, 
1918.
(3) Young, Major Sir H. W. op. cit., p. 279.
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substance to their demands, and of ensuring that the interests 
of the Empire for which British blood and treasure had been so 
lavishly expended, should not be bartered for transitory gains 
or monetary conditions. In addition, the necessity existed 
for obtaining the approval, not only of the Peace Conference, 
at which President Wilson1 s 14 Points threatened to play a prom­
inent part, but also of world opinion, which, because of constant
appeals to it during the war, had acquired the position of a
(1)
super-tribunal•
In formulating a policy for 1 Iraq, the primary decision 
lay between two main issues. Would Great Britain retain oontrol 
of * Iraq or withdraw entirely? These issues, however, were 
complicated by important side issues. If Great Britain made 
an attempt to control, would she exercise direct control or 
would some form of indigenous administration under British In­
fluence be established which would guarantee her essential 
interests? The question was further complicated by uncertainty 
as to the area to be occupied. Would it be Basra only, as 
originally foreshadowed at the outbreak of war and as still 
urged in some quarters, or would it be Basra and Baghdad, as the 
amalgamation of the two wilayets in September, 1918, seemed to 
presage? Or would British control be extended, as the Anglo- 
French negotiations seemed to suggest, to Mosul and on to Dair 
uz-Zor, or even Jazirat ibn 1 Umar and BIrejik as some military
(1) For a discussion of world-opinion and its influence on
post-war diplomacy, see Nicolson, Harold, Curzon, the last
Phase (1934), pp. 382 ff.
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(1 )
experts desired.
Direct control of any area, save perhaps that of Basra
Wilayet, would run counter to General Maude’s Proclamation, to
the Anglo-French Declaration, and to the general tenor of the
Hus a in-McMahon Correspondence as well as to the Prime Ministers
statement of 5 January, 1918 and to the twelfth of President
Wilson’s 14 Points. It would, on the other hand, meet the
(2)
views of the Government of India, of the officials of the
’Iraq Administration, many of whom were still on the active list
of Indian services, and of the Imperialists in general who saw
in the occupation of ’Iraq the logical climax of three centuries
of British activity in the Middle East. It would ensure the
safety of the alternative route to India, of which Baghdad was
to he the Clapham Junction of the air, the protection of India
from Bolshevik Russia, now more dangerous than ever before,
(3)
her ambitions sustained by insidious social doctrines, and 
the safeguarding of commercial interests, of which oil in Persia, 
in the Transferred Territories and at Kirkuk has assumed pri­
mary importance.
On the other hand, if Great Britain were to support an 
Arab Government, problems would immediately arise as to the type 
of Administration to be established and as to the degree of
(1) Wilson, op. clt., p. 116.
(2) The Government of India, however, was somewhat perturbed 
by the prospect of the financial responsibilities involved; 
Ormsby-Gore, W., J. C . Aslan Soc., vol. VII (1920), p. 93.
(3) For Lord Curzon* s views, see inf pa, p. 221* also J. C. Asian 
Soc., vol. VII (1920), p. 98; vol. VIII (1921), pp. 21,
33.
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power and responsibility with which it was to be endowed, bear­
ing in mind both the necessity of safeguarding British interests 
and the fact that the Arab state must be constructed almost from 
the foundations.
Among those who would restrict the participation of Arabs in
*
the government of 1 Iraq were those who favoured direct British 
control. At the other end of the scale, varying in their views 
as to the degree of responsibility to be given to an indigenous 
administration, were the Arabs themselves, having an unlimited 
belief in their rights and in their own untried abilities; the 
Englishmen who, like the late T. E. Lawrence, believed in the 
sanctity of Great Britain*s pledged word; those who believed, as 
doctrinaires believe, In the rights of Arabs to a national exist­
ence; and those who held that the interests of the Empire could 
be as well served and at a much less cost by friendly Arabs sup­
ported by Great Britain, as by a direct administration of the 
country.
The alternative policy of complete withdrawal was compli­
cated by the undoubted fact that the Turks would immediately 
return. Against their return, Great Britain had long set her 
face as being inconsistent with her own interests. The British 
Government, however, from the first, had refused to make any 
reassuring announcements with the result that uncertainty, even 
fear of the future existed among many of the inhabitants, par-
(if
ticularly in regard to Mosul.
(1) A number of the inhabitants, especially ex-Turkish officers 
regarded the return of the Turks with favour. The Acting 
Civil Commissioner drew attention to the influence of this 
class of Inhabitants in Telegram No. 10025, Political,
Baghdad, to s/s for India, 19 November, 1918.
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The creation of an independent Arab state following a 
British withdrawal was a distinct possibility if the Anglo-French 
Declaration were to be taken literally, of which the establish­
ment of the Arab regime in Damascus gave some hope. This line
of action the Arab Nationalists were to demand and the British
(1)
Press was to urge in the coming months, but, apparently, it 
was never seriously considered by H. M. Government. Nor did it 
meet the approval of those in 1 Iraq who were bringing order where 
confusion had reigned before, those who were engaged in creating 
a complicated administrative machine, those who genuinely feared 
for the prospects of an Arab state in the presence of both inter­
nal and external dangers, and all those who saw in even partial 
withdrawal a complete disregard of Imperial interests.
The solution of these problems, difficult both in themselves 
and in regard to the interests of the Empire, was rendered none 
the less difficult by the necessity of settling them to the sat­
isfaction of the Allied Powers, P'rance In particular, and of 
adjusting them in relation to European problems, which, for the 
first time since the days of Napoleon, assumed a greater share of 
attention from H. M. Government than did those of the Empire.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the 
dispatches of the next few months should give the impression 
that beyond the desire to give effect to the Anglo-French Dec­
laration, by establishing an indigenous government with an 
Arab Amir under British influence, H. M. Government had no
(1) It is one of the curious phenomena of the day that the
British Press, in keeping with its hysterical misinterpreta­
tions of the post-Armistice European situation, should 
vehemently demand the evacuation of the Middle East areas in 
which, during pre-war days, it had insisted, in no uncertain
tones, that Great Britain should maintain, at all costs, her 
vital interests.
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definite plans as to how it should "be done. Indeed "by Its 
Immediate post-war actions, H. M. Government gave the impression 
that it would welcome any inspiration which would point the way 
out of the maze. Nor is it surprising that the inability to 
frame a straightforward policy in the presence of so many con­
flicting issues, should prolong the period of indecision Into 
many months and heighten the difficulties of the Acting Civil 
Commissioner and his staff in dealing with the political situ­
ation arising in *Iraq.
In 1 Iraq itself, the end of the war brought no other indi­
cation of the future save a proclamation by the General Officer
Commanding and the Anglo-French Declaration. The Proclamation
(1)
by General Marshall, on 2 November, 1918, stated: *We are
now in a position to show that the promises that have so often 
been made to you are to be kept at the first possible opportu­
nity.* The Anglo-French Declaration of 8 November, following 
closely on the appearance in the 1 Iraq press of President
Wilson*s 14 Points, withheld from publication until 11 October
(2)
by the Civil Administration, had introduced a new factor
into the situation, although it was dismissed by the Acting 
Civil Commissioner and local official circles as being too 
idealistic to form the basis of official policy. Its publica­
tion, however, had * thrown the whole town (of Baghdad) into a 
(3)
ferment.’ Even worse consequences might follow if it were
(1) Proclamations, 1914-1919, pp. 20-1: Proclamation No. 31.
It was drafted by the Acting Civil Commissioner.
(2) Supra, p. 167, n. 1.
(3) Letters of Gertrude Bell, vol. II, p. 463 (Hereafter, Bell; 
.betters) .
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taken literally as an indication of the policy of H. M. Govern­
ment •
Feeling as the Acting Civil Commissioner did concerning
(1)
the Declaration and the policy it implied, he could have been
in no happy frame of mind to receive the following telegram on
(2)
19 November, 1918, from the Secretary of State for India:
Colonel Lawrence, now home on leave from Syria has 
submitted proposal to H. M. Government for dealing with 
Arab question. He advocates viz: 1. Lower Mesopotamia,
2. Upper Mesopotamia, 3. Syria, to be placed respectively 
under 1 Abdullah, Zeid and Feisal, sons of King Hussain. 
Hussain himself would remain King of Hejaz and would ulti­
mately be succeeded by his eldest son Ali. He would have 
no temporal authority in three states above-mentioned and 
in fact no position at all there save insertion of his 
name in Friday prayers in all mosques as Emir el Momenin 
... It is of course understood that both states would be 
in the British sphere and Lower Mesopotamia under effective 
British control. I recognise that these proposals as 
involving definite separation of Mosul from Baghdad con­
flict with recommendations in Baghdad telegram 8745 though 
interstatal boundary does not appear inconsistent with that 
suggested in Baghdad telegram 8744; also that importation 
* Abdullah into Mesopotamia would be in direct opposition 
to (Ibn S a * u d ? )  ^ B u t  j should be glad if you would review 
whole question in light of existing conditions and let me 
have your views on Lawrence*s proposals with as little 
delay as possible.
In the opinion of the Acting Civil Commissioner, the pro­
posals not only failed utterly to meet the situation in 1 Iraq
(1) Vide supra pp. 167 ff.
(2) Telegram, S/S for India to Foreign, Delhi, repeated Politi­
cal Baghdad, 18 November, 1918.
(3) The frequent and uncritical assertion, as found in Kohn, H., 
A History of Nationalism in the East (1928), p. 308, that 
Great Britain at no time considered the effect on Ibn Sa*ud 
of the introduction of sons of Sharif Hussain Into 
Mesopotamia and Syria, is, in the light of the above tele­
gram, inaccurate. See also, infra Chapter IYII.
/
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but they also confirmed his fears of the degree to which H. M. 
Government were permitting themselves to be guided by the unprac­
tical counsel of the Western Arabia school. He prefaced his reply 
with statements from shaikhs and notables of Diwaniya, Rumaitha, 
Nasiriya, Qalfat Sikar, Hai and Kut, in which they expressed them-
(X)
selves as desiring British rule only.
(2)
He then proceeded, in a second telegram, to answer the 
proposals. They were wholly impractical. The introduction of 
the sons of the Sharif, however acceptable Faisal might be to the 
Syrians, was in the interests of neither the British nor the 
inhabitants of the country, nor to the wishes of the latter. 
Division of the country into Upper and Lower Mesopotamia had no 
historical, political or economic basis. The Wilayets of Basra, 
Baghdad and Mosul were essentially one unit and should be admin­
istered as such under effective British control. He concluded 
by saying:
I would therefore urge H. M . Government if they wish to 
promote the welfare of peoples of Mesopotamia and value aid 
to spirit underlying Anglo-French Declaration, to exclude 
this country definitely once for all from any contemplated 
Sharifian settlement and from further discussion in that 
connection, our past conversations with the Sharif notwith­
standing. Our moves are being carefully watched by oritical 
audiences and any move capable of being attributed to polit­
ical motives rather than desire for welfare of Mesopotamia 
will evoke bitter criticism.
A few days later he telegraphed:
Arab state under Arab Amir, including Basrah, Baghdad 
and Mosul is considered an ideal solution by all.
(1) Telegram No. 10030, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 
20 November, 1918.
(2) Telegram No. 10031, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 
20 November, 1918.
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British High Commissioner and British Advisers in all 
the ministries of the Arab State and throughout the country 
are unanimously desired*
All agree in wishing Sir P. Cox to be the first incumbent 
of the post.(l)
He put forward the idea of a plebiscite to take the opinion 
of the country saying:
All agree that the opinion of the country must be taken 
before any decision can be rightly come to and on the clear 
understanding on which the inhabitants of the country them­
selves rely, that a protectorate will in due course be 
declared and that for the present military administration 
will continue. I am prepared to arrange for this in a 
manner consonant with educated opinion and not inconsistent 
with public order* I do not doubt that our confidence will 
be justified by results. (2)
Although he reported that none agreed as to the Amir to be
chosen, four names had been put forward which he submitted 1 in
(3)
the order of public preference as far as can be ascertained.1
1. Hadi Pasha al-*Umari; 2. member of family of Sultan of Egypt;
3. son of Sharif of Mecca; and 4. Naqib of Baghdad. Of these,
Hadi Pasha was suggested as the most eligible candidate. He
would be especially welcomed in Mosul, from which the family
(4)
originally came. Concerning the second name, he plead that 
insufficient knowledge of Egyptian affairs excused him from ex­
pressing an opinion.
(1) Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 
24 November, 1918, paras. 4, 5, 6.
(2) Ibid., para. 7.
(3) Ibid., para. 8.
(4) Ibid., para. 8. Also, Telegrams: No. 10251, Political,
Baghdad, to S/S for India, 24 November, 1918; S/S for India 
to Political, Baghdad, 28 November, 1918; No. 10465, Polit­
ical, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 29 November, 1918.
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In regard to a son of the Sharif, he stated:
I am now convinced that the third proposal would meet with 
widespread acceptance in Baghdad, and that it would probably 
be well received outside because all know who the Sharif is.
It is also considered that he would be acceptable to Shi'is 
on account of the Sharif*s well known latitude in religious 
views. I am, however, strongly opposed to it. For reasons 
connected with Persian Gulf and Central Arabian politics and 
on other grounds. (1)
The other candidate put forward, the venerable, religious
dignitary, 'Abdur Rahman al-Gailani, Naqib of Baghdad, he negatived
as a possibility on account of his great age, his failing health
and his lack of influence save in Sunni religious circles. In
addition, the Naqib was not known in Basra and Mosul, which would
be a further disadvantage in case Mosul and Kurdistan were added
to the prospective state. Nor were any of his family better
qualified. The Acting Civil Commissioner, in making this answer
(2)
to the special inquiry from the India Office, also stated: 'The
above appreciation differs fundamentally from that formed by Sir
(3)
Percy Cox in 1917.'
(1) Ibid., para. 8. Sir Arnold Wilson, writing in 1931, in 
reference to his sentiments towards a son of the Sharif as 
ruler of 'Iraq, transmutes 'strongly opposed' above to 'mis­
givings' (Mesopotamia, 1917-1920, p. 108)and also apparently 
forgets entirely his Telegram No. 10031, 20 November, 1918.
(2) Telegram S/S for India to Foreign, Delhi, repeated Political, 
Baghdad, 22 November, 1918.
(3) Sir Percy Cox's views concerning the Naqib at this date may 
be seen in the Handbook of Mesopotamia, p. 128: 'Much the
most influential Sunni in Mesopotamia is the Naqib of Baghdad, 
the official head of the Arab community in that town... It is 
worthy of note that extreme deference is paid to the Naqib
of Baghdad and his family by many of the most influential and 
wealthy, as well as the humblest and poorest, of Indian and 
Afghan Moslems.'
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Under the existing circumstances, it no doubt seemed to the 
Acting Civil Commissioner that the solution lay in another alter­
native candidate as head of the proposed new state, which he put
(1)
in the same telegram:
A fifth alternative has not yet been discussed in 
Baghdad, but if I might be authorized to suggest it would 
probably meet with immediate acquiescence in Baghdad and 
would be even more acceptable to the rural districts, namely 
that Sir P. Cox should be appointed High Commissioner for 
the first five years without any Arab Amir or other head of 
the State, but with Arab Ministers backed by British Advisers, 
I earnestly hope that this course will be adopted if it is 
at all compatible with our national peace policy and the 
general scheme of things in Arabia.
Its adoption will save Government, the public in 
Mesopotamia and the representatives of His Majesty1 s Govern­
ment on the spot from being rushed into a premature decision.
A solution along this line as proposed must have appealed
to the Acting Civil Commissioner for reasons mentioned in his
(2)
telegram, but it must have also met his own personal views by 
supplying a check to the dangerous tendency towards Arab National­
ism by restricting the pov/er to be placed in Arab hands, and by 
ensuring effective British control with the minimum of controll­
ing machinery. The arrangement would secure, for a few years 
at least, a protected Arab National State with a maximum of pro­
tection and a minimum of Arab Nationalism.
No doubt he relied on the personal popularity of Sir P, Cox 
to overcome any threatened opposition arising from disappointment
(1) Telegram No. 10250, para. 12.
(2) He returned to the attempt to influence H. M. Government to 
accept his views in Telegram No. 10465, Political, Baghdad, 
to S/S for India, 29 November, 1918.
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that an Arab Amir was not to be set up immediately, or that the 
Anglo-French Declaration wa3 not to be given a more literal 
int e rpr e t at i on.
Authorization of the Plebiscite.
In London, the Interdepartmental Committee on 27 November 
considered the views and suggestions of the Acting Civil Commiss­
ioner. Still unable to enunciate a concrete policy, the 
Committee resolved to formulate a general statement which might 
guide the Acting Civil Commissioner, and to request him to obtain
a)
expressions of public opinion.
This statement of policy, the first which H. M. Government
had enunciated for 1 Iraq since the Armistice, was received In
Baghdad with the order for the plebiscite on 30 November. After
declaring that the final status of the Arab provinces would be
settled at the Peace Conference, the statement did little more
than reiterate the policy of the Anglo-French Declaration,
although, in conclusion, it stated that H. M. Government had no
intention of relinquishing control or of abandoning their friends.
It also betrayed their indecision by stating: * In the meantime
our attention is being given to the question of the best form of
(2)
Government to set up.*
In requesting the plebiscite, H. M. Government said in the
(1) Young, op. cit., p. 280.
(2) Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, 29 November, 
1918.
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same telegram:
W© are anxious in particular that you should render us 
an authoritative statement of the views held by the local 
population in the various areas affected on the following 
specific points:
(1) Do they favour a single Arab state under British 
tutelage stretching from the Northern boundary of the Mosul 
Wilayet to the Persian Gulf?
(2) In this event, do they consider that a titular Arab 
head should be placed over this new State?
(3) In that case, whom would they prefer as head?
In our- opinion it is of great importance to get a 
genuine expression of local opinion on these points, and one 
of such a kind that could be announced to the world as the 
unbiassed pronouncement of the population of Mesopotamia,
On the same day that the order was received, instructions 
for taking the plebiscite were sent out, together with the salient 
features of the above telegram and the related correspondence. 
These were:
I have been instructed by H. M. Government to ascertain 
authoritatively without delay the views of the local popula­
tion in the areas affected upon the following points:
(1) Are they in favour of single Arab State under British 
tutelage from northern boundary of Mosul Wilayet to Persian 
Gulf.
(2) If so, do they consider that the new state should be 
placed under a titular Arab head.
(3) If so, whom do they suggest as Amir for future * Iraq
state.
Great importance is attached to obtaining a genuine 
expression of local opinion in these points, and one that can 
fairly be placed before the world as an unbiassed pronounce­
ment of all classes of the population of Mesopotamia of their 
own free will.
In connection with first point, you should ascertain 
whether the inhabitants of your area wish to form part of an
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1 Iraq state stretching from Raqqah on the Euphrates and 
Jazir ibn! Umar on Tigris to Basrah and the head waters of 
the Greater and Lower Zab. This question only arises in 
Kurdistan, Mosul Wilayet and Dair uz-Zor. But it is of 
greatest importance. Alternative is establishment of 
separate state, roughly Mosul Wilayet not under British 
Protection.
As regards second point the correspondence annexed to 
this memorandum sufficiently indicates the arguments for and 
against and the possible alternatives.
As regards third point, answer is of course inseparable 
from the decision in point*(2) Here again the correspond­
ence is sufficiently explicit as regards possible choices.
Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the importance of avoid­
ing the exacerbation of religious differences which might 
follow upon an indiscreet selection in this connection...
As soon as you conveniently can after tho receipt of 
this letter, you should discuss the questions raised therein 
confidentially with the principal personalities in your 
area, and ascertain from them what the trend of public 
opinion is likely to be, and inform me accordingly.
When public opinion appears likely, under the guidance 
of the persons you have consulted, to take a definitely 
satisfactory line, you are authorized to convene an assembly 
of all leading notables and shaikhs with a view to placing 
before them the above questions, informing them that their 
answers will be communicated to me for submission to Govern­
ment. When public opinion appears likely to be sharply 
divided or in the unlikely event of its being unfavourable, 
you should defer holding a meeting and report to me for 
instructions.
In such cases, it may be anticipated that the favourable 
verdict of neighbouring districts will tend to have a 
favourable effect in forming public opinion.
When opinion is favourable, it is desirable it should 
be reduced to writing and signed by as many as possible. (1)
The task of conducting the plebiscite presented grave 
difficulties, of which the Acting Civil Commissioner as chief 
Political Officer and as the agent of H. M. Government in carry­
ing out the plebiscite must have been fully aware from the time
(1) Memorandum 27190, Civil Commissioner to Political Officers,
Baghdad, 30 November, 1918.
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he suggested it to H. M. Government, To extract the desired 
information and, at the same time, to maintain public order and 
to prevent the exacerbation of religious and racial feeling would 
not be the least of these problems in a land where the two chief 
Islamic sections were highly antagonistic to each other; where 
the religious leaders of Najaf and Karbala opposed any secular 
government as a matter of principle; where Christians and Jews 
lived as uneasy minorities; where Arab, Kurd and Turcoman 
possessed racial antipathies; and where propagandists, Nationa­
list, Turkish and Bolshevist, were already at work.
He must have recognized also, although H. M. Government 
apparently did not, that the first of the three questions would 
be regarded by many, not merely as a choice between a single 
Arab state or several, but rather as a referendum between inde­
pendence and British control. He may have felt, in spite of his 
confident assurances to H. M. Government, just six days before, 
that public opinion as he knew it was in favour of continued 
’British advice, assistance and control,’ that a free expression 
of opinion, uncontrolled and unorganised, might result in such 
an outburst of feeling against British control that would under­
mine all the administrative work of the past two years and leave 
no basis, save that of arms, on which Great Britain might 
establish her claims to occupy and to control the country.
The most careful examination of the instructions fails to 
produce the impression that they were framed primarily to meet 
the difficulties of maintaining order and quiet in the land.
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The Political Officers had been instructed to convene assemblies, 
not when they were likely to be orderly and peaceful, but when 
public opinion was * likely to take a definitely satisfactory 
line.* They were ordered to report to headquarters for further 
instructions, not when the situation was likely to be disorderly 
but when public opinion was 1 likely to be divided or unfavour­
able .*
Nor does examination of the communications from the India 
Office to the Acting Civil Commissioner reveal that H. M. Govern­
ment had given any indication of what they would consider 
favourable or unfavourable*. Nothing in the telegram ordering 
the plebiscite indicates that H* M, Government was not genuinely 
seeking for guidance in setting up the best forms of government 
in *Iraq; that it had reached any definite conclusions concern­
ing the questions it had sent to the Acting Civil Commissioner; 
or that its instructions were not to be followed literally. It 
would appear that as far as H. M. Government was concerned, any 
straightforward, authoritative statement of genuine and unbiassed 
views would be welcomed as indicating the trend of public opinion, 
on which they might base the government of the new state.
The emphasis placed by the Acting Civil Commissioner on 
securing ’satisfactory opinion* together with the inclusion of 
his own strongly worded telegrams as guides as to what might be 
considered satisfactory, seem to point to a desire on the part 
of the Acting Civil Commissioner to make sure that the results 
of the plebiscite would be satisfactory to his own proposals.
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It is possible that he had seen, at the time he suggested a 
consultation of public opinion, the opportunity, in a well- 
controlled plebiscite, to confound and discredit, once and for 
all, the Western Arabia party and others of like ilk who sought 
to give independence to * Iraq by demanding a literal interpre­
tation of the clause in the Anglo-French Declaration, 1 the 
establishment of national governments and administrations 
drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of 
indigenous populations.1 If this group could be confronted 
with the established fact that all sections of public opinion 
had been consulted and did not want independence but rather 
continued British control, he believed it would no longer be a 
menace in the councils of H. M. Government.
It may be also that he had seen from the first the oppor­
tunity which a plebiscite presented to convince H. M. Government, 
palpably without strong convictions of its own, save the obser­
vations of the Anglo-French Declaration, that his own proposals 
drew * their authority from the initiative and free choice of 
indigenous populations*, and therefore afforded the only real 
bases on which H. M. Government, in safety and in self-interest, 
could establish the new government.
It must not be imputed to the Acting Civil Commissioner 
that he suggested the recourse to public opinion and then took 
steps to ensure answers favourable to his own proposals, because 
they were merely his own views. It may be suggested, rather, 
that he genuinely believed that his policy, founded on his own
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knowledge of the country, on his own background and training 
as a servant of the Indian Empire, and on a desire to promote 
its interests as well as those of the people of !Iraq, presented 
the only way to draw H. M. Government away from the dangerous 
tendencies which they seemed to be following, and of combatting 
the idealism of those who, from Cairo and from Whitehall, had 
encouraged and sympathised with the cause of Arab Nationalism.
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CHAPTER IX.
THE PLEBISCITE OF 1918-1919.
(1)
In obtaining1the views held by the local population1, 
the Acting High Commissioner believed that the extension of the 
plebiscite to the rank and file of the inhabitants was both im­
practical and unnecessary. The masses were too illiterate, too 
ignorant and dependent on their leaders to merit consideration. 
The garden cultivators and date growers of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates, the orange growers of Ba!quba, the shepherds of the 
Dulaim, the rice cultivators of Diwaniva and Shamiya, the marsh 
dwellers of 1Amara and Qurna, the tribesmen throughout the land 
and the townsmen of little substance were regarded as having 
neither opinions of their own nor ability to form them other 
than as echoes at the behest of their religious and secular 
leaders. The attention of the Civil Administration was thus 
directed to those elements of the population, who, by position 
and by character were presumed to be favourable to continued 
British control, and whose opinions might be put forward as 
representative•
In the tribal districts and in small towns, therefore, 
operations of conducting the plebiscite were confined to the 
shaikhs and land-owning dignitaries, called together in assem­
blies where they gave their declarations under their seals and 
signatures. Among the shaikhs, dependent on the British for
(1) Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, 29 November, 
1918. Cited, supra, pp. 195-6.
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(1)
support of their position, for possession of their lands, as
(2)
at ’Amara, or for their highly-prized subsidies, and with
whom the British Political Officers were usually on terms of
friendship, the declarations or madhibat were almost unanimous
for continued British rule. At a mailis in ’Amara, at which
(3)
the Acting Civil Commissioner was himself present, the shaikhs
declared that they desired 1 Englishmen speaking Arabic1 and that
they would not accept French, American or Arab officials. They
requested that Sir Percy Cox become the governor of ’Iraq. In
conclusion they asked that no higher offers for their lands be
entertained and that they be protected in possession thereof as
(4)
long as they were loyal to the Government. The Qurna
(5)
shaikhs replied in much the same vein.
In Nasiriya, a declaration or madhbata, signed by 271 tribal
shaikhs, town notables and others, implied the continuance of
the British administration; scorned the idea of an Amir as not
coinciding ’with our interests nor with the interests of ’Iraq 
(6)
in general’ and, In conclusion, requested that the management 
of their affairs should be undertaken by Sir Percy Cox.
(1) During the troubles of 1920, many shaikhs were forced into 
the towns, as they had no power to maintain themselves other- j 
wise over their tribes.
(2) As in Diwaniya Division, where every shaikh until 1920 re­
ceived a subsidy from the Civil Administration.
(3) Monthly Reports, December, 1918: ’Amara. p. 7.
(4) Self-Determination in ’Iraq (Secret compilation of Declara­
tions "in Arabic, with English translations.) (Baghdad,
17 May, 1919): ’Amara Declaration,, p. 8.
(5) Ibid., Sec. 2, Qurna Declaration, p. 7.
(6) Ibid.: Nasiriya Declaration, p. 11.
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The tribal shaikhs of Diwaniya and of the Hilla Division
in their declarations approved of continued British control.
The former thanked the British Government for its desire to give
them an Amir which they agreed was in accordance with common
sense and the dictates of their religion which enjoined them to
appoint an Imam. They considered it premature, however, not
only because of their own lack of experience in affairs, hut
also because no man seemed suitable for the office. They asked,
therefore, for an officer of the British Government to govern
(1)
them.
The tribal shaikhs around Karbala, where the acute hostil­
ity of the Mujtahids made the suspension of inquiries desirable 
in accordance with the Acting Civil Commissioner’s instructions, 
also declared for British administration. They stated: ’We
do not want to elect a king over us, but a man well qualified
for that post. The person qualified for it is His Honour Sir
(2)
Percy Cox.' Prom Kut al-1Amara, Musaiylb and Khanaqin came
(3)
similar pronouncements of approval of British rule and re­
quests for British officers.
In larger centres, as in Basra, individuals of importance
were interviewed personally by the Acting Civil Commissioner and
(4)
by the Political Officers. At Basra, where most of the
(1) Self-Determination: Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 4, 
(Diwaniya) p. 17#
(2) Ibid.: Section 8, Hilla Declaration, No. 5, p. 18.
(3) Ibid.: Section 4, Kut Declarations, pp. 9-10; Section 8, 
Ilill'a Declaration No. 3 (Musaiyib) p. 16; Section 10, Khana­
qin Declaration No. 1, p. 20.
(4) Monthly Reports, December, 1918; Basra, p. 10; Hilla, p. 14
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dignitaries so interviewed were landowners or had benefitted
personally by the British Occupation, the majority of the dec-
(1)
larations were for British control* In Mosul, the ten
(2)
declarations taken from representatives of religious com-
(3)
muni ties, seven of them from non-Muslim groups, asked for
British rule directly or for British protection* Two of the
Muslim groups, Kurds, asserted that they would never live under
Arab rule, as did also the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar. The other
Muslim declaration, representative of nearly 65,000 Muslims of
(4)
Mosul city and about 100,000 non-Kurdish Muslims of the
(5)
Wilayet also asked for British protection.
In other districts, notably the Holy Cities, Najaf, Karbala 
and Kadhimain, and in Baghdad, the course of the plebiscite did 
not run so smoothly nor were the pronouncements so favourable*
In Najaf, 1 the subject passed through three stages as far as 
the Government officials responsible for conducting it were con­
cerned. At first sight, it appeared to present no great
(1) Self-Determination: Section 1, Basra Declarations, pp. 1-5.
(2) Ibid.: Section 14, Mosul Declarations, pp. 15-28.
(3) Representing 18.3$ of the total population of the Wilayet, 
according to the official estimates of 1918-19, which gave 
the figures for Mosul Wilayet, excluding Kirkuk, as;
Muslims- Non-Muslims-
Sunnis-425,813 Christians-55,370
Shi1as 22,100 Jews -13,835
_______ Others- 31,180
Total -447,913 100,385
(4) Report, Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, 1919, P&rt I, 
Mosul (Calcuttaa 1920), p. £8, estimated the population
of the city at 80,000, of which four fifths were Muslims, 
the remainder being Christians, with a negligible number 
of Jews.
(5) Self-Determination; Section 14, Mosul Declaration, No. 2,
p. 26.
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(1)
difficulty,1 The Acting Civil Commissioner, realizing the
strategic importance of Najaf, appeared before the 1 Ashraf, rep­
resenting the divines and tribal shaikhs, and explained to them 
that their opinion was to be asked on three questions. The
gathering was unanimously in favour of British protection from
(2)
Mosul to the Gulf without an Amir. Two days later, however,
a Shi!i of some local reputation came from Baghdad to Najaf
(3)
and persuaded the dignitaries not to send the original petition.
On learning of the difficulty, the authorities got in touch
with the leading notables including Saiyid Kadhim Yazdi, with
whose unostentatious help 1 the matter was brought to a success-
(4)
ful conclusion1, a series of 14 declarations from individ-
(5)
uals and groups being secured. Most of these asked for a
British Protectorate and an Amir when the country should be 
ready for him. Several asked outright, however, for an Arab 
Government with an Amir, no mention whatever being made of 
Great Britain. Other declarations alleged that their religion 
prevented the authors from answering the questions.
In the city of Karbala, the religious leaders or Mujtahids
(1) Admin. Report, Shamlyah Division, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), 
p. 36.
(2) Memorandum on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia (Secret 
Memorandum No. S'2'4, by Miss G. L. Bell, 22 February, 1919) .
An abridged version appears in Wilson, Sir A. T., Mesopotamia, 
1917-1920, App. III.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Admin. Report, Shamiyah, 1919, p.30.
(5) Self-Determination: Section 7, Shamiya Declarations,
pp. 14-15.
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issued a decree or fatwa that any person who desired other than 
a Muslim government was an infidel. Under this pronouncement 
the people of the town hesitated. When they did make a decla­
ration,
their opinions were not in accordance with those taken by 
the Najafis. Fortunately, in Najaf the step had been
irrevocably taken, and there could be no turning back. The 
double effect was that in Karbala no progress was made and 
the opinion formulated was never expressed officially, (1) 
while in Najaf the discussion was closed beyond reopening.
In Kadhimain, anti-British feeling ran high. ’The ’Ulama
threatened with excommunication and exclusion from the mosque
(2)
anyone who voted for British Occupation.’ A group of in­
habitants, however, was found which drew up a declaration in
which the question of protection was left until after the Peace
(3)
Conference.
In Baghdad, the centre of anti-British agitation, the 
difficulties facing the Civil Administration were even greater 
than elsewhere. The plan of delaying the plebiscite in Baghdad
(1) Admin. Report, Shamiyah, 1919, p. 30.
(2) Memo, on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.
(3) Self-Determination: Section 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 8 
(Kadhimain). A translation of the declaration, indicative 
of the trend of opinion in the Holy Cities, is as follows:
In accordance with the liberty conferred on us by 
the Great Powers, the principal of which are the two 
esteemed Governments of Great Britain and France, we, 
being of the local Arab nation, choose a new Muslim 
Arab Government to be ruled by a Muhammadan King, one 
of the sons of our Lord the Sharif, bound by a local 
majlis, and the question of protection will be considered 
after the Peace Conference. Dated 5th Rab’ el Thani, 
1337.
(Signed by 143 Muhammadam residents of Kadhimain) .
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to the last, in the hope, as expressed in the instructions to the
Political Officers, that favourable declarations in other districts
might influence Baghdad opinion, would not, it was soon apparent,
produce the desired results. The inhabitants of the city, more
politically minded and less inarticulate than other sections of
the country, would not be influenced or even controlled as in
other towns or in the tribal areas.
The attempt to convene an assembly of local dignitaries,
carefully selected by persons believed to be favourably inclined
to British rule, also failed. The Acting Civil Commissioner
had proposed that the 25 Sunni delegates should be selected by
(1 )the Sunni Qadhi.v 1 Similarly, the 25 Shi'a representatives 
were to be chosen by the Shi*a Qadhi, fa creation of the British 
Administration, no Shi’a Qadhi having been recognized by the 
Turks ... a weak and colourless individual whose self-effacing 
piety* was ’his best recommendation.’ ^  The heads of the 
Christian communities were to nominate the Christian delegates 
and the Grand Rabbi, the Jewish representatives.
In the selection of the Muslim delegates, on whom the 
character of the declarations of Baghdad opinion would depend, 
the Qadhls, ’either by intent or under religious or political 
pressure, did not execute their task loyally.* Instead of
(1) The Naqib, although asked to act with the Qadhi. had refused.
(2) Memo, on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.
(5) If friendly Muslim magnates were chosen as intended, the 
Assembly would almost surely give the desired declaration 
since the non-Muslims were known to be standing solidly for 
continued British rule.
(4) Review C. Admin.. 1914-1920, p. 128.
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selecting representatives, they called ’meetings of their com­
munities for the purpose of selection. At both gatherings, 
extremely inflammatory language was used and the delegates 
chosen were bound down to ask for an Arab Government without
(i)
European protection,1 Not all the Muslims so chosen would
serve, however, seven Sunnis and one Shi’i resigned and were 
replaced by five Sunnis. The group, with whom the Christians 
and the Jews were too frightened to act, passed on 22 January, 
1919, a declaration of which the following is a translation:
As it has been understood that the object of the
Governments of Great Britain and Prance in the East is the
liberation of the people and the constitution of local 
Governments and administration founded on a practical basis, 
according to the wishes of the inhabitants, we being of the 
Muslim Arab nation and representing the Muslims of the 
Shi’a and Sunni Communities inhabiting Baghdad and its 
suburbs, resolve that the country extending from northern 
Mosul to the Persian Gulf to be one Arab State, headed by a
Muhammadam King, one of the sons of our Sharif Husain,
bound by a local Legislative Council sitting at Baghdad, the 
capital of ’Iraq. (2)
The anti-British declaration of the Muslim delegates may 
well have been a disappointment to the Civil Administration.
The vehemence of the group, however, brought about-a reaction 
among the landowners and the more sober-minded notables who, 
responding to the suggestions judiciously thrown out by members 
of the Civil Administration, readily brought in declarations
(3)
formulated along the desired lines. They were joined by
Jews, Armenians and other Christians, tribal shaikhs about 
Baghdad and Muslim merchants in petitioning for continued British
(1) Memo, on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.
(2) Self-Determination: Sec. 13, Baghdad Declaration, No. 2 
p. 23.
(3) Ibid.t Nos. 1, 3-9, pp. 23-5.
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rule, either directly or as protection for an Arab Government. 
Two declarations asked specifically for Sir Percy Cox as head 
of the British administration.
Ostensibly the results of the plebiscite confirmed the 
views put forward by the Acting Civil Commissioner to H. M. 
Government. An almost universal desire that Mosul should be
(i)
included in the new state had been expressed. Notables,
(2)
both individually and collectively, of seven Divisions had 
indicated a desire for British administration without substan­
tial changes. A majority of declarations in five Divisions 
had manifested a desire for an Arab Government, but, as the 
Acting Civil Commissioner had predicted, admissions were made 
that no suitable person could be found, and that consequently 
British protection was desirable. Two Divisions had specifi­
cally declared against a son of the Sharif of Mecca. The
Acting Civil Commissioner’s suggestion of Sir Percy Cox as head
(3)
of the new State had been supported by declarations from four
(1) The Nasiriya Declaration (Self-Determination: Sec. 5, 
Declaration No. 5, p. 11) stated the common belief:
Ever since our boyhood we have been hearing that 
’Iraq is composed of these wilayets: Basra, Baghdad,
and Mosul, which as a whole are called ’Iraq. Their 
capital has always been Baghdad. Anyhow, Mosul is
attached to Baghdad, as Baghdad is watered by Mosul and 
Mosul gets food from Baghdad by the sea trade. We, 
therefore, can never agree that the ’Iraq country should 
be detached from the Mosul wilayet.
In the beginning of Islam, when war was waged 
between ’Ali and Mu’awiyah, Syria and its dependencies 
were under Mu’awiyah, while ’Iraq, along with Mosul was 
controlled by ’Ali. This is a sufficient reason. '
(2) ’Amara, Qurna, Mosul, Kut, Basra, Hilla and Khanaqin.
(3) Telegram No. 10250, Political, Baghdad, to S/S for India,
24 November, 1919, cited supra, p. 194.
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(1)
divisions. The three declarations which had declared for an
(2)
Arab Government with a son of the Sharif as ruler were dis­
counted as being the opinion of irresponsible and fanatical ele-
(3)
ments, aroused by nationalists and by ex-Turkish malcontents.
In reality, it seems certain that the greater portion of 
public opinion, at that moment, was, on the simple issue of 
continuance of British Occupation, in favour of such rule, 
either direct or in support of an Arab Government. Yet the 
picture was not so definitely clear-cut; public opinion was 
not so one-sided; nor was pro-British sentiment, so preponderant 
as the declaration and the reports forwarded to the India Office 
might seem to indicate. The results were hardly the unbiased 
pronouncements requested by the India Office. The instructions 
issued by the Acting Civil Commissioner, the method of select­
ing those who signed the declarations, the personal interviews 
conducted by the Acting Civil Commissioner and by the Political 
Officers and the safeguards adopted so that none but favourable 
views might be registered, precluded a ’genuine expression of 
local opinion’ in ’Iraq from ever finding its way to H. M. 
Government, unless the local opinion were satisfactory to the 
Civil Administration itself.
In Baghdad, seven men were deported for their activities in
(1) ’Amara, Nasiriya, Karbala and Baghdad (two).
(2) Self-Determination: Sec. 13, Baghdad No. 2, p. 23 and
K adhimain (Baghdad No. 8}, p. 25; Sec. 9, Ba’quba (town), 
No. 3, p. 19.
(3) Memo, on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.
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connection with the plebiscite. The declaration of the chosen
representatives of the Muslims, far from being accepted as the
official declaration as originally intended, was dismissed as
being unrepresentative of the politically and economically im-
(1)
portant inhabitants of Baghdad. The opinion formulated by
the city of Karbala, the second most important of the Holy
(2)
Cities of ’Iraq, was ’never expressed officially’, on
account o f  the opposition to British rule which it c o n ta in e d .
No declaration was obtained from Samarra, the fourth of the
Holy Cities. No declarations were taken in the Dulaim Division,
either from the tribes or from Falluja, Ramadi or other towns.
One declaration signed by 20 Muslims represented the 160,000
Muslims of Mosul Wilayet. Official pressure had to be brought
(3)
to bear in Najaf before its notables produced satisfactory 
declarations.
The knowledge that all statements with their signatures 
would be sent to the G-overnrnent by the Political Officers, in 
accordance with their instructions, did not decrease the willing­
ness of notables, both tribal and urban, to make protestations 
of loyalty and devotion, if such declarations met the manifest 
desires of the Hakuma or Government and placed them in its good 
books•
The main criticism of the plebiscite as ’ an authoritative
(1) Memo, on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia.
(2) Admin. Report, Shamiyah, 1919, p. 30. Cf. Admin. Report, 
Hillah Division, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 17.
(3) Admin. Report., Shamiyah, 1919, p. 30.
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(1)
statement of the views held by the local population1 , is
that it failed to indicate the elements of opposition in the
country and to reveal the relative strength of such elements.
It gave no hint, for instance, of the large section of opinion,
(2)
particularly strong in Basra, which, while recognizing the 
benefits and the increased prosperity of British rule, found the 
constant growth of the military machine - ports, camps, depots; 
the continuation of military regulations; and the very effic­
iency of the administration with its insistence on promptness, 
probity and justice, too disturbing to their life-long habits
of mind and of action, and too much of a strain on their patience
(3)
to be endured.
The plebiscite gave no hint that the tribesmen, uncivil­
ized, even barbarous, were already restive under the British 
tribal policy which gave the shaikhs, relying on British support, 
almost unlimited power over the details of tribal life, a power 
too often abused for the advancement of the shaikhs1 own per­
sonal interests. It gave no inkling of such tribal feeling, 
which was to grow in intensity during the next 18 months and 
which was to pave the way for the rebellion against both shaikhs 
and the British rule which maintained them in control.
The Mujtahlds of the Shi1is and the other religious dig­
nitaries who, firm in their opposition to any but a theocratic
(1) See Telegram, cited supra, pa. 195-6.
(2) See statement by the Rev. J. Van Ess, cited Wilson, op. cit.f 
p. 112, confirmed to writer, in April, 1935.
(3) Admin. Report, Shamiyah, 1919, p. 1.
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Muslim state, would allow no idols other than of their own mak­
ing, were dismissed, although their power over the masses was 
enormous, as too ignorant of modern state-craft, too self- 
centred and too alien to be allowed to influence the creation 
of a new state.
The Nationalist elements, composed of those who had worked 
for Arab autonomy before the war, those who prided themselves 
on being the intellegentsia of ’Iraq, and the religious leaders, 
were brushed aside, although they were destined to grow in 
power and influence during the coming months, especially under 
the stimulus of Nationalism in Syria, as being too negligible, 
too irresponsible and too full of sound and fury to merit con­
sideration. No inferences seem to have been drawn from the 
fact that the anti-British declarations, almost identical in 
tenor and phraseology, pointed to a carefully organised opposi­
tion, just as the close resemblance of many of the pro-British 
declarations indicated the care and attention which the Civil 
Administration had devoted to the conduct of the plebiscite.
The failure of the plebiscite to represent all these ele­
ments of current opinion in their relative importance and to re­
flect local opinion in its true proportions, was destined to 
mislead H. M. Government in its attempts to set up a new state 
satisfactory to the inhabitants of ’Iraq, and, by making it 
complacently unaware of the need for quick and decisive action 
in settling the future of the country, to prepare the ground for 
the disastrous events of 1920.
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CHAPTER X
¥
COMMITMENTS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, DELAYS.
In the few months following the Armistice, it became in­
creasingly evident that any intention or desire which H. M.
Government may have had of giving effect to their promises to
(1)
guarantee Arab independence, would be circumscribed by the 
necessity of preserving the Entente Cordiale in the face of more 
pressing problems arising in Europe, and by Imperial interests, 
held to be even more insistent than at any time before or during 
the war.
In Syria, it became clear that the Arab Government set up
at Damascus chiefly by the efforts of Colonel Lawrence with the
concurrence of H. M. Government, in accordance with the promises
(2)
of 1915-16, and the Declaration of Cairo, 11 June, 1918, that 
Arabs should keep what Arabs could win, would be abandoned to 
French protection, in exchange for compensation elsewhere* The 
advice given to Amir Faisal, both before and during his visit
(1) Lawrence, although one of the chief agents in convincing 
the Arabs, that these promises were genuine, was sceptical 
throughout the war of the intention of H. M. Government to 
fulfil them* Op* cit., pp. 502, 545, 550-2, 556, 608.
Also Philby, Sunday Times, 21 July, 1935. The reported 
understanding_nbetween Lloyd George and Clemenceau, December 
1918, H.P.C.P., vol. VI, p* 141, also gives the same im­
pression^ although at the secret meeting of the Four Powers, 
20 March, 1919 (Baker, R. S., Woodrow Wilson and World 
Settlement (3 vols., 1922-3) vol. Ill, pp. i-l§) the former 
defended 'the British promises to the Arabs.
(2) Lawrence, op. cit*, p. 555; Young, Sir H. W., op. cit.,
pp. 276-7.
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(l)
to Europe in the winter and spring of 1918 and 1919, was hut 
a warning of the application of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, re­
vised along lines discussed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau in
(2)
December, 1918, and formalized at the San Remo Conference in 
April, 1920.
In return for British concurrence in the application of
(3)
French control to Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo, for 
British support against American objections to such extension, 
and for French participation in oil development in Mosul Wilayet, 
the French were to agree that Mosul Wilayet was to become part, 
de jure as well as de facto, of the Occupied Territories of 
Mesopotamia. France was also to relinqish its claim to admin­
ister Palestine. Great Britain, instead, was to assume direct 
control of all Palestine, essential for implementing the Balfour
Declaration of 2 November 1917, regarding the establishment of
(4)
a National Home for Jews, and for securing the western base
and springs of the two arches of land and water communi cat ions
(5)
between the Eastern Mediterranean and India. Palestine, and
(D H.P.C.P. , vol. VI, pp. 142, 144.
(2) Tardieu, A., in L1Illustration, 19 June, 1920. His account 
seems confirmed by Baker, op. cit., vol. I, pp.-78-9.
(3) Statement of French policy in Near East: Journal des 
Debats, 29 December, 1918.
(4) For text, see facsimile of Mr. Balfour1s letter to Lord 
Rothschild: Stein, L., Zionism (1926); also The Times,
9 November, 1917, and infra., App. II. For origins:
H.P.C.P., vol. VI, pp. l7o ff; Stein, op. cit., ch. IV.
(5) Roughly speaking, one arch, resting on Egypt and on India, 
passes through Palestine, Transjordan, and the Syrian desert 
to Baghdad and thence down the Tigris and Euphrates valleys 
and the Persian Gulf to India. The other arch, inverted, 
based also on Egypt and on India, passes down the Suez Canal,
the Red Sea and around Arabia to India.
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with it Jerusalem (in Arabic, al Quds ash-Sharif or the
Sanctuary), almost as sacred to Muslims as to Jews and to
Christians, was to be withdrawn from the Arab sphere. Thus
(1)
was laid the basis of the bitterness and frequent bloodshed
in the Holy Land, for whether or not Palestine was originally
included in the lands promised to the Arabs, as they stoutly
claim and as representatives of Great Britain as vehemently
(2)
deny, the Palestine Arabs had been, without doubt,
(1) Relations have been strained throughout the period from 
1920 to the present. Bloodshed has been largely confined 
however, to four occasions:
(i) April 1920: 9 killed and 222wounded. Report of the
Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1$2§,
Cmd. 3530, p. 1'S. See Also P^he Times, 15 May, 1920; The 
Morning Post, 25 August, 1920.
(iiJ "May, 1921: 95 killed, 219 so seriously wounded as to
need hospital attention. Palestine Disturbances in May, 
1921: Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with Corres­
pondence thereto, Cmd. 1£>40, p. 60.
(iii) August, 1929: killed - 133 Jews, 116 Arabs; 
wounded - 339 Jews, 232 Arabs. Report. 1929, Cmd. 3550, 
p. 65.
(iv) October, 1933: killed - 26; wounded 243. Morison
Commission, in The Times, 10 February, 1934. See also 
Manchester Guardian, 28 October, 1933.
(2) Palestine was never specifically reserved from territories 
guaranteed to the Arabs by any of the letters to Sharif 
Husain from Sir H. McMahon. The latter1s explanation in a 
letter to the Colonial Office, dated 12 March, 1922, nearly 
seven years after the Correspondence, that he meant Palestine 
to be excluded, although it was not mentioned, is hardly 
proof that it was so excluded. His explanation, if taken 
literally, reflects little credit on his ability as a nego­
tiator. On the other hand, the claim, made by Amin Rihani, 
the Lebanese-American poet, of a secret treaty, of January 
1916, granting to Sharif Husain all territory between the 
northern boundaries of Aleppo and Mosul Wilayets and the 
Indian Ocean, and between Persia and the Mediterranean and 
the Red Sea, except Aden (Kings of Arabia, vol. I, p. 60), 
which he maintains (Manchester Guardian/ '22 January 1934) 
must be considered authentic until formally denied by the 
British Government, can scarcely be accepted as historical 
evidence that such a treaty exists.
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propagandized into believing that they were fighting for their
(1)
freedom from foreign rule*
In Mesopotamia, the keystone of the upper arch of the 
overland route, a state or group of states was to be set up to 
further the general policy of creating a chain of friendly 
states between Europe and the borders of India. The adminis­
tration of the new ’Iraq states, in accordance with the prevail­
ing tendencies in political thought, with the desire to honour, 
as far as convenient, their pledges, and with the fundamental 
necessity of easing the British taxpayers’ burdens, for whom 
the Northcliffe press and other journals had taken up cudgels, 
were to be administered according to the wishes of the inhabi­
tants, in so far as they coincided with strict British tutelage 
and control, essential to the maintenance of British interests 
there and in the Middle East generally. The success of Great
Britain’s policy in Persia, for example, depended on possessing
(2)
in ’Iraq what was tantamount to a British frontier.
With the policy of creating friendly states, Lord Curzon, 
Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had long been
(1) Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances 
of August, 19&9, Cmd. 5550, pp. 124-fr, reviews, with
documents, the means adopted to arouse Arab feeling in 
Palestine during the war. See also Hogarth, D. G., 
Quarterly Review, vol. 234, (October, 1920), p. 420.
(2) Extract from address by Lord Curzon to Eastern Committee 
of 'War Cabinet, 30 December, 1918.
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(1)
in agreement. In the War Cabinet, to which he had been
brought from his involuntary retirement, he had already become,
in all questions of British policy in Asia, a ’dominant and
(2)
challenging figure.1
Lord Curzon, with other members of the Cabinet, including
(3)
Sir William Robertson, held that Germany, operating through 
prostrate Russia, v/as still the chief enemy of Great Britain in 
Asia, although concern was not lacking that Bolshevist doctrines 
might reach India, a fear which was later to become paramount.
He declared, on 25 June:
She (Germany) can afford to give up everything she has 
won in Western parts, in Prance and Flanders, if only this 
door in the East remains open to her. If peace proposals 
were made now, Germany could, I venture to submit to you, 
afford to give back Belgium, to make large concessions in 
respect of Alsace-Lorraine ... and she would still have the 
illimitable range of future ambitions and opportunities which 
I have been describing.(4)
(1) ’It was all part of a perfectly definite and logical policy 
which had taken shape with his first glance at the political 
map of Asia while still a boy at Eton, and had remained 
clear-cut in his mind ever since. It rested upon a single
and quite simple conception - the creation of a chain of
buffer states stretching from the northern confines of India 
to the Mediterranean sea, to serve as a screen, giving pro­
tection against attack to India and the arterial line of 
communication between Great Britain at one end and Australia, 
New Zealand, and the Par East at the other.’ Ronaldshay, 
Lord, The Life of Lord Curzon (3 vols., 1928), vol. Ill,
p." 209.
(2) Ibid., p. 154.
(3) See 0.H., vol. IV, p. 138, for his strongly worded appreci­
ation to the War Cabinet, 14 March, 1918.
(4) Extract from an address by Lord Curzon to the Imperial War 
Cabinet, 25 June, 1918. Similar views had been put forward 
in a Memorandum of 21 September, 1917.
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As a programme against the menace,, he proposed that 
neither Germany or her allies should ever again he permitted to 
occupy Palestine or Mesopotamia. Every effort should be made 
to re-create Russia - ’even though it may take ten years or 
twenty years’ - as a bulwark against German penetration towards
India, and, finally, ’we must endeavour by any means in our
(1)
power to secure a friendly Persia and a loyal Afghanistan.’ 
These views were amplified in an address to the Central 
Asian Society, 12 October, 1920, when he stressed Bolshevist 
Russia as the great menace to Britain. He said in part:
Our aim is to give security to what we possess ... I
hold that what we have to do is to try to make islets in 
the ocean, peaceful spaces in the chaos, landing places in 
the storm; to elaborate palisades of stable and peaceful 
states around the fringe of India. It is for that object 
that I am working.
We want ... freedom from the contagion of Boldievist 
misgovernment and anarchy, which will‘not only be iniurious 
to the British Empire, but which will mean its ruin.1^ )
Urge these views as he might, he was not able to give 
effect to them until January, 1919, when he was Acting Secret­
ary of State while Mr. Balfour was at the Peace Conference.
Even then, he did not possess full responsibility, Mr. Balfour 
remaining titular Secretary of State until October, 1919. Nor 
had he a free hand. Mr. Lloyd George, assuming that the 
Foreign Office was but an extension of Ho. 10 Downing Street, 
kept his finger on most affairs. Nevertheless, although cir­
cumscribed in action on most of the great problems of the day,
(1) Ibid.
(2) J. C. Asian Soc., vol. VIII (1921), pp. 8-9
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he placed his impress on Egypt and on the Near and Middle East, 
The Treaty of 1919 with Persia, negotiated by Sir Percy Cox, 
whereby Persia was to become a link in the chain and was to be 
bolstered up against encroachments from the north, was due 
directly to his initiative* In matters concerning !Iraq, al­
though Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, was nominally 
responsible for its affairs, Lord Curzon practically took 
charge, using as a channel the Chairmanship of the Inter­
departmental Committee on Middle East Affairs, sometimes called
(1)
the Curzon Committee, composed of representatives of the
Foreign Office, the India Office, and the War Office. Most of
the steps taken in ’Iraq by H. M. Government in the following
months, owed their origin to him.
The results of the ’Iraq plebiscite as sent to London
(2)
must have been indeed welcome to H. M. Government, who, torn 
between the desire of consolidating Great Britain’s position in 
’ Iraq and that of taking no action which might be assailed in 
the peace Conference or which might prejudice their case in 
world opinion, were still unable to decide upon the method of 
giving effect to their policy. In the trends of ’Iraqi public 
opinion as reported, they seemed to find sufficient promise of 
a solution of their difficulties to justify an advance towards
(1) Pari. Debates, H. of C., 5th S., vol. 151 (1922), p. 1559.
(2) The results of the plebiscite also assisted the Acting 
Civil Commissioner in his successful efforts to dispense 
with an International Commission of Inquiry (Telegram,
A. T. Wilson, London, to Officiating Civil Commissioner, 
Baghdad, 10 April, 1919), a proposal by President Wilson,
20 March, 1919, which resulted in the King-Crane Mission 
to Syria.
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setting up the new government, and a further statement of 
policy. The India Office telegraphed to Baghdad on 14 February:
They (H. M. Government) will be glad if you will 
telegraph outline of constitution of Arab State or group 
of States, which you would propose on basis of wishes of 
inhabitants, as disclosed in telegrams and of necessity of 
effective and indisputable British control. By Anglo- 
French Declaration we are committed to indigenous adminis­
tration and we must adhere to this, not only in letter but 
in spirit. Our objective should be a flexible constitu­
tion, giving full play to different elements of population 
and recognizing and incorporating local peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies such as will provide for Arab participation 
as the time goes on in the actual Government and Adminis­
tration of country, and preventing Arab nationalists from 
being drawn Into opposition to British control.
These general ideas may not be any great hindrance to 
you in endeavouring to work out solutions of an extremely 
difficult problem, but they will serve to show you what is 
in the mind of H. M. Government. (1)
The promises of the Anglo-French Declaration, thus, were 
not overlooked, but to any who might demand full independence 
on the basis of that document, H. M. Government could now 
point to the array of documents resulting from the plebiscite, 
as proof positive of the concurrence of the population in the 
form of government proposed. To those who demanded that 
England should not forego her imperial Interests, they could 
point to the Effective and indisputable British control1 which 
they proposed to maintain in accordance with the expressed 
wishes of the inhabitants. The difficulties of giving a tang­
ible and workable expression to this dual-purpose policy were 
realized, but, relying on the support of the more substantial 
elements of the population, which they believed to stand behind
(1) Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, 14 February, 
1919.
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them, H. M. Government might well have "believed that a beginning 
could be made.
The Acting Civil Commissioner’s draft Constitution for
(1)
which the India Office had asked, was ready on 20 February.
Five days later, he left for Paris and London to discuss the sit­
uation in person. His constitutional proposals were based on 
the following assumptions:
One. There will be no Arab Amir, but a British High 
Commissioner.
Two. Mosul Wilayet and Dair-uz-Zur will be included in 
’Iraq, as also those portions of Kurdistan which are now a 
part of Mosul Wilayet and which are not included in the 
future Armenian state, i.e. the whole of the basin of the 
Greater Zab. This is necessary in order to admit of inclu­
sion of Assyrians.
Three. British control, however expressed in words, 
will be effective in practise and will be ensured by reten­
tion of adequate military and air-forces distributed prim­
arily with a view to aid the civil power in the maintenance 
of order.
Four. Adequate British Financial support for the ’Iraq 
State in its early stages, firstly by loan secured on revenue, 
secondly by allowing Civil Administration to take over sur­
plus military assets such as Railways, Bridges, Motor Works, 
Electric Plant, etc., at a low valuation.
The proposals in an abridged form were:
One. ’Iraq to be ruled by a High Commissioner having 
under him four Commissioners controlling provinces as follows : 
Basra, ... Baghdad, ... Euphrates, ... Mosul... If Kurdistan 
is included there will be five Commissioners.
Two. Divisional Councils ... to be made full use of as 
advisory and deliberative but not as legislative bodies...
Three. Provincial Councils to be formed in each of 
the above provinces from members selected of their own
(1) The draft proposals, in Secret Letter S/ll, dated 20th Feb­
ruary 1919, were sent to Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, Senior 
Judicial Officer, to Col. Evelyn Howell, Revenue and Financial 
Secretary, to Col. F. C. C. Balfour, Military Governor of 
Baghdad, and to the Political Officers of Divisions with the 
request that they discuss the proposals among themselves and 
with leading notables.
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choice by the Divisional Councils, The latter are nomin­
ated bodies ..•
Carefully selected Arabs of good birth and education, es-
(1)
pecially from those in Government Posts in Syria, were to be
given, from the outset, positions of executive and administra-
(2)
tive responsibility, as
Governors of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and ’Amarah, with a 
specially chosen British official of ability and character 
as Municipal Commissioner and Adviser to the Governor, in 
which dual capacity he could control finances and mitigate 
inevitable inefficiency in early stages.
This draft constitution had been formed, the Acting Civil 
Commissioner declared, ’in consultation with the most experi­
enced officers on my staff, on whom the responsibility of giv­
ing effect to it will fall, I am authorised by them to assure
Government that it will have their v/hole-hearted, if cautious
(3)
support,’
In reality, the above statement was not in strict accord­
ance with the facts. To many of the British Officials, the 
Acting Civil Commissioner’s letter of 20fck February had been 
their first intimation of the proposals, and, as the Acting 
Civil Commissioner has himself stated: ’Before their replies
(4)
could reach me I received instructions to go myself to Paris,1
(1) Cf. his views here with those expressed in his Telegram 
No, 9926, 16 November, 1918, cited supra, pp. 167 ff.
(2) The tribal districts were to be excluded from the operation 
of such a scheme, since it would not be welcome to the 
tribes or to the officials, who, moreover, were not’fit for 
responsible district work from any point of view,’
(3) Draft Proposals, 20 February, 1919,
(4) Wilson, op, c i t , p. 115.
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All the proposals did not have the whole-hearted support which 
was claimed for them. Among the senior officials, the division 
of the country into Provinces, the erection of Provincial and 
subsidiary Councils, and the scheme of indirect election to the 
latter commanded general agreement. The establishment of town 
Governors, however, found little support. The Revenue Secret­
ary, Colonel E. B. Howell stated frankly: 1 The more I think 
of Wilson1s four town Governors the less I like them. I do not
believe that if they are to come from outside, the people will
(1)
like them any better.1 The Military Governor of Baghdad was
convinced of the 1 impossibility of finding men who could run an
administration so closely involved as that of Baghdad with
military and technical departments, which will continue to be
run by Englishmen.1 There was also the difficulty of getting
(2)
British officials to serve under natives.1
It was the Judicial Secretary, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter,
whose ability and experience had established him as one of the
outstanding senior officials, who offered the most trenchant
criticisms. His familiarity with India, the Sudan and Egypt
and with the judicial and administrative practises there, and
his store of experience and knowledge enabled him to approach
the task with a more mature judgment and, perhaps, a more toler-
(3)
ant spirit than did some of the other officials. In a
(1) Letter, Col. E. B. Howell, to Sir E. Bonham-Carter, 21 
February, 1919.
(2) Secret Letter, C.9/1: Military Governor, Baghdad, to Act­
ing Civil Commissioner, 24 February, 1919.
(3) He had already written a Memorandum, The Place of the Arab
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letter to the Acting Civil Commissioner, 11 March, 1919, Sir 
Edgar pronounced himself strongly in favour of the proposed 
provinces. They would facilitate the adaptations of adminis­
trative measures to local sentiment and make it 1 easier to 
satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Shiyahs.’ They might 
lead, also, to a federal form of Government, under which ’self- 
government as regards internal affairs could be combined most 
easily with the control of the protecting power.’ He pointed 
out, however, that Provincial self-government was a long way 
off save on restricted lines. The country was not sufficiently 
developed nor were the revenues sufficient to grant independent 
powers to the Provincial Councils.
His main objection to the proposals, however, was that they 
did not
go far enough, either to satisfy the declarations which had 
been made on behalf of the British Government nor to put 
the Arabs in a position to obtain a fair and increasing 
share in the administration ... I think from the outset 
some Arabs should be employed as Assistant Political Officers 
and Deputy Assistant Political Officers ... I consider also 
that the positions of importance should be given to Arabs 
in the Civil Administration either as Ministers or as 
Assistant Secretaries and that a Legislative Council should 
be formed, similar to the Council of Ministers in Egypt, 
consisting of the Arab Ministers or Assistant Secretaries 
and a rather larger number of the principal British heads 
of departments. Notwithstanding the impossibility of now 
finding men fitted for the position,(1) I think it wise to 
give the designation to these appointments of Ministers 
rather than Assistant Secretaries. To begin with, the
(3) (Continued): in Administration, 5 February, 1919, remarkable 
for its reasoned appreciation of the situation. For his 
achievements, in reconstituting the Judicial system, em­
ploying Arabs both as Judges and Staff, see supra, pp. 155 ff«
(1) He had reviewed this difficulty in his Memorandum of 
5 February, (incorrectly'
cxSxiixMatROh;^ dated 8 February in typescript versions.
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Arab Ministers would be little more than figure-heads, but 
their position would be none the less valuable* It would 
maintain the social and political status of the Arabs and 
would encourage the employment of Arabs in lower posts and 
without any upheaval such as would be necessary to replace 
a British head of a department by an Arab* An Arab 
Minister of ability could, at any time, make his influence 
felt and exercise real powers. If all posts of importance 
in the Administration are reserved for the British, this 
must necessarily lower the status of the Arab, and make it 
increasingly difficult to introduce Arabs into the Adminis­
tration. (1)
The Acting Civil Commissioner, on arriving in Paris, took 
part in the discussions for which he had been summoned* He 
also discussed the problems of ’Iraq and Arabia in general with 
numerous individuals, English, American and French. The atmos­
phere, in his opinion, was dominated by the Western Arabia
viewpoint, the experts being lamentably ignorant of conditions
(2)
in ’Iraq and even in Persia. On the other hand, he himself
created the impression that he was out of touch with conditions 
under which the Peace Conference was proceeding, and that he had 
little conception of the strength of Arab Nationalism or of the 
forces which had given rise to it.
In London, his appeals for an official pronouncement of 
the intentions of H. M. Government regarding ’Iraq were not 
fruitful. It was felt that until further progress had been 
made toward the settlement of peace, the telegram of 14 February
( 3)
must suffice. The Secretary of State for India agreed that
(1) He embodied his suggestions in a Tentative Draft of Arab 
Institutions (not dated); see App. V. There is no indi­
cation that It was ever submitted to the Acting Civil Com­
missioner.
(2) Wilson, op. cit., p. 116.
(3) Cited supra, p. 223.
i
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the Acting Civil Commissioner should make specific proposals, 
and suggested that Lord Curzon might help him in formulating a 
policy and in obtaining sanction for his plans.
The Acting Civil Commissioner, therefore, bespoke the aid 
of Lord Curzon in obtaining an agreed scheme on which to build 
and an accepted policy by which he might be guided. His con­
stitutional proposals, drawn up in February, were placed, by 
the arrangement of Lord Curzon, before the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Middle East Affairs on 6 April, at a meeting be­
fore which he appeared personally. His proposals for prov­
inces (five instead of four proposed) in ’’Iraq proper1 were 
sanctioned, together with Provincial Councils for each. Divi­
sional and Municipal Councils were to be developed and consoli­
dated. Arab Advisers were to be appointed to the British 
heads of three Departments of State, Revenue, Justice and Edu­
cation. The Arab Secretaries of the Divisional Councils were 
sanctioned as Advisers to the Political Officers, and Arabs 
were to be appointed Presidents of the Municipal Councils of 
Baghdad, Basra and ’Amara.
In deference, however, to Lord Curzon’s idee fixe that 
nothing should be done to anticipate the decisions of the Peace 
Conference, the appointment of a High Commissioner and the 
Provincial Commissioners, as suggested by the Acting Civil 
Commissioner, were not sanctioned, while the distinction between 
Mosul and ’Iraq proper was to be continued by giving the former 
an Arab administration.
The Acting Civil Commissioner left England armed with
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(1)
authority to proceed along these lines The former official
authorization which, however, reached Baghdad on 10 May, the 
day following his arrival there, read as follows:
We authorize you to take in hand the construction of 
five provinces for ’ Iraq proper on the same lines as 
recommended by Howell in enclosures five and six of your 
letter of April 6th, You will also proceed with the crea­
tion of the Arab province of Mosul fringed by autonomous 
Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs who will be advised by 
British Political Officers.
We also approve of the formation of Provincial 
Councils and the development and institution of Divisional 
and Municipal Councils. (2)
The references to 11 Iraq proper’ and to ’Arab province of 
Mosul’ were undoubtedly disconcerting to the Acting Civil Com­
missioner. The inference, however, that the above telegram 
was his first intimation that H, M. Government intended to ex­
clude Mosul from the operations of the proposals, which he later
that his strenuous efforts of the next few months were due to 
his anxiety to counter this new and unexpected turn in policy,
as he later implied seems hardly in accordance with the facts 
available. The Secretary of the Committee, in his account of 
the meeting of 6 April has stated: ’The meeting decided to
make a start by creating five provinces in Mesopotamia proper
(1) Young, op. cit., p. 286; Wilson, op. cit., p. 122.
(2) Telegram, S/S for India to Political, Baghdad, 9 May 1919.
(3) Wilson, op. cit., p. 122.
(4) Ibid., pp. 119, 123.
(5) Young, op. cit., p. 285.
claimed had ’been accepted almost without discussion’
(4)
(5)
and an ’Arab’ province of Mosul, etc.’ and that the Acting
-231-
Clvil Commissioner had. 'returned armed with authority to pro-
CD
ceed on these lines.1 It would seem, therefore, that his
continued efforts to influence the policy of H. M. Government 
were due to his desire to make a final attempt to insure the 
inclusion of Mosul in the new state, his efforts in London hav­
ing already proved unsuccessful, rather than to any reaction 
to what he has inferred was a novel policy suddenly put for­
ward by H, M. Government.
The Acting Civil Commissioner had long considered the in­
clusion of Mosul in 'Iraq as essential. Sir William Marshall's
strong action in completing the conquest of the Wilayet after
(2)
the Armistice, had met with his approval. It had rounded
out 'Iraq geographically and had pushed hack the Turks to a 
more natural frontier. It had brought under British protec­
tion the Christian population, including the Assyrians who, 
encouraged by the Allies, had taken up arms against the Turks.
It had put the Wilayet's economic resources, including its 
revenue, at the disposal of the rest of 'Iraq, of whose autono­
mous existence without these potentialities, the Acting Civil 
Commissioner was inclined to be sceptical. It gave Great 
Britain control of oil resources, which, if not wholly proven, 
were enough to disturb the chancelleries of several nations and 
to produce the oil agreement, 15-17 May, 1916, and the
(1) Ibid., p. 286.
(2) Wilson, op. cit., p. 22.
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( 1 )
Berenger-Long Agreement, 18 April, 1919.
He saw little reason, other than the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
why ‘Iraq and Great Britain should forego these advantages by 
any post-war settlement. Inasmuch as Lloyd George had given 
him to understand that the French claim to Mosul, under the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, had been settled, as far as France was 
concerned, he saw no justification for the non-extension of the 
proposed new regime to the Wilayet. Any serious attempt to set 
up an Arab Administration would be followed by violent protests 
against such discrimination from Arab Nationalities of Baghdad 
and lower ‘Iraq, where little self-government had been author­
ized save Arab Advisers, Municipal Presidents and local Councils, 
stripped of any real authority or power. He also foresaw that 
when Mosul was assimilated, as it would undoubtedly be, any 
attempt to bring its Arab Government into line with the rest of 
‘Iraq would be met by storms of opposition, not only from the 
Arab inhabitants of Mosul but also from those of ‘ Iraq and of 
the entire Arab world, intent on demanding their rights in the 
face of the hostile Western Governments.
Accordingly, when an announcement was made of the impending 
changes on the occasion of the King1s birthday celebration in 
Baghdad on 29 May, the Acting Civil Commissioner spoke only in 
generalities. No mention of Mosul was made nor was any hint
(1) Also the San Remo Agreement, 25 April, 1920: Brit, and
For. State Papers, CXIII (1923) 350; Misc. No."IT (I92'0)
Cmd. 675; See also H.P.C.P., vol. VI, pp. 182-3; App. II,
Part I.
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the
given as to/future administration which H. M. Government pro-
(i)
posed to establish there.
A few days later he renewed his efforts to win H. M. Govern-
(2)
ment to his opinion. In answer to a telegram from H. M. 
Government, thanking him and his staff for their work, and 
stating that his recommendations marked an important stage to­
ward the definite form of administration, and that the ultimate 
Constitution must av/ait the coming of peace, the Acting Civil 
Commissioner answered in a telegram of 7 June, that it was 
difficult, if not impossible to proceed with constitutional 
organization, until the future of Mosul had been settled. He 
asked that he be permitted to make an announcement regarding 
Mosul on 21 June.
Lord Curzon, on the receipt of the telegram., which did not
(5)
officially reach the Foreign Office until 24 June, took the 
position that the creation of the sanctioned provinces,councils 
and advisory positions were steps in devolution and in decen­
tralization from the temporary military administration. He
(1) Text; Proclamations, 1914-1919, No. 49, pp. 38-9. The 
speech was the combination of a draft prepared by Col.
E. B. Howell, 7 May, and a draft prepared by the Acting 
Civil Commissioner, 21 May 1919. In view of this announce­
ment, reprinted in local papers and in official compila­
tions, it is difficult to understand the Acting Civil 
Commissioner's statement: !H. M. Government had firmly re­
fused either to make any public announcement themselves in 
regard to Mesopotamia, in amplification of the Anglo- 
French Declaration of 8th November, 1918, or permit me to
do so.1 Wilson, op^ . cit., p. 237.
(2) S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 6 June 1919.
(3) Young, op. cit., pp. 287-8.
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could not understand, moreover, why the application of such 
steps should be dependent on the inclusion of Mosul in * Iraq 
or on any particular combination of provinces. The original 
sanction for the Acting Civil Commissioner’ s proposals had not 
implied that any combination of provinces or that even the 
guardianship of H. M. Government would be permanent.
A telegram to this effect was despatched to Baghdad,
5 July, which stated in conclusion: ’Any action which would
give rise in Mosul Wilayet or elsewhere to the impression that
the future political status of ’Iraq has already been settled,
(1)
should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.1
Still unsatisfied, the Acting Civil Commissioner, instead 
of devoting his energies whole-heartedly to the execution of 
the proposals which he had himself drawn up, entered into 
further correspondence with H. M. Government, endeavouring to 
obtain their approval to the inclusion of Mosul in the new 
regime.
In the meantime, elements of opposition to British con­
trol had continued to grow. A letter In January, 1919, from 
the ’Iraqi officers in Syria, welcoming the Anglo-French Decla 
ation as an indication that no part of ’Iraq was to be under 
foreign rule, had been followed, in early June, by another 
letter, supposed to have been written by Amir Faisal himself,
(1) Telegram S/S for India to Civi}. Commissioner, Baghdad, 
5 July, 1919.
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and addressed to Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Political Officer 
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The letter suggested 
that the severity of the British officials in 1 Iraq had begun 
to turn away the regard of the people. There was a general 
feeling, that if the Anglo-French Declaration signified any­
thing, that the time had come for a change. His own officers 
felt strongly the need for acceleration of a National Govern­
ment, and fully understood that the longer the present system 
existed, the greater would be the difficulty in changing the 
system later.
Lord Curzon, hov/ever, believed that no further action was 
necessary. He had already, two months before, sanctioned what 
he believed was the limit of Arab self-government compatible 
with a military occupation. No reply was sent.
The incident of Naji Beg as-Suwaidi, in addition, confirmed 
both the Arabs and the British officials of the hostility and 
bad faith of those on the opposite side. The Acting Civil 
Commissioner, on his journey from London to Baghdad, had inter­
viewed two of the 1 Iraqi officers in Damascus. He had admitted 
that affairs in 1 Iraq were not perfect, and that he was ready to 
do what he could to meet their views. He had pointed out his 
difficulty in obtaining good men for positions in * Iraq. The 
two officers had then asked him whether he would consent to a 
representative being chosen from among their number to go to 
Baghdad and to make suggestions. Hb had at once agreed.
Accordingly, Naji Beg, a capable and ardent Nationalist,
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(1)
of an old Baghdad family, arrived in Baghdad, early in June,
He soon found, contrary to the expectaticns which the interview
with the Acting Civil Commissioner had aroused in himself and
(2)
in his fellow 11raqis, that he was to be merely a cog in the 
British machine and that his advice would not be heeded and 
was not even wanted. He therefore resigned and returned to 
Syria,
His resignation confirmed the opinion of the !Iraqis in 
Syria that the British authorities in ’Iraq regarded them as 
active enemies who were trying to undermine British influence 
in the country, and that no real opportunities would ever be 
given to the Arabs to manage their own affairs. The Acting 
Civil Commissioner, in his turn, was convinced that his view of 
the Arab Nationalists was the correct one: that they were in­
capable and inconstant and that nothing constructive might be 
expected from them. When, therefore, the Acting Civil Com­
missioner’s opinion was asked on a draft reply to a Memorandum 
which the ’Iraqi officers had sent to the Foreign Office de­
manding the immediate establishment of a National Government,
(1) Naji Beg, now known as Naji Pasha, was a son of Yusuf as- 
Suwaidi, who, as a prominent Arab Nationalist in Baghdad 
before the war, had suffered imprisonment at the hands of 
the Turks, (Events in Turkish ’Iraq,, July, 1913), and who 
took a large part In the post-war Nationalist movement in 
’Iraq. Naji Pasha had been a popular Quimmaqam of Najaf 
under the Turks (Ibid., April, 1913) . He was Acting Civil 
Governor of Aleppo under the Damascus Government, and has 
been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, etc., of ’Iraq.
(2) In an interview with the writer, Naji Pasha stated that he 
believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to 
assist and to advise in setting up a National Government.
On discovering his mistake, he, not unnaturally, resigned.
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he gave way to a characteristic outburst, deprecating in no un­
certain language, any notice being given by H. M. Government to 
’ such small fry1.
Nevertheless, some form of reassurance to the officers was 
deemed necessary both by Lord Curzon and by Mr. Montagu, al­
though Mr. Montagu himself agreed in the main with the Acting 
Civil Commissioner’s arguments. Another reply was drafted, 
again stating that it would be premature to attempt constitu­
tional experiments pending the decision of the Peace Conference 
as to the mandatory Power and the nature of the Mandate and 
that if the officers would visit the country they would find 
that Provincial and Divisional Councils were already being 
formed to ensure as much Arab participation as was possible 
under a military occupation of a country of which the political 
future was undecided. The appointment of Naji Pasha was men­
tioned as evidence of the good-will of H. M. Government.
This reply, dated 9 August, sent to Sir Gilbert Clayton
for transmission to the ’ Iraqi officers, was also repeated to
the Acting Civil Commissioner at Baghdad. Whatever its effect
may have been at the time, he was later to claim that it came
as a ’serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed
to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent ’Iraqi
officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of tele-
(1)graphic correspondence extending over four months.’
The facts available make it difficult to understand how he
(1) Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.
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( 1 )
could have regarded the telegram as a result of his own efforts
or as the outcome of his own ‘telegraphic correspondence ex-
(2)
tending over four months,1 which had been concerned mainly
with limiting Arab participation, not extending it, and with
the inclusion of Mosul in a British-administered ‘Iraq. The
reply was primarily addressed to the Arab officers, and had been
forwarded to him, as he was well aware, as a matter of official
routine to keep him in touch with matters pertaining to his
sphere, similarly as the original draft of the middle of July
had been forwarded to him for his comment.
It is not easy to understand just how the telegram was a
blow or check to the carrying out of the proposals with the
execution of which he had been entrusted in April. The excerpt
v/hich the Acting Civil Commissioner later extracted from the
telegram and presented in a setting of his own fashioning in
(3)
his apologia, The Clash of Loyalties, might well give the 
impression he desired to make, if he had not already been in­
formed in the telegram of 5 July that constitutional experiments, 
other than those already sanctioned, could not be approved.
The telegram taken as a whole and in its proper setting can be 
considered only as a blow to the demand of the ‘Iraqi officers 
for immediate national government. Far from being a rebuff 
to him, it was an indication that H. M. Government stood behind
(1) ‘I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from 
the Foreign Office (9th August) ...‘ Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Wilson, op. cit., p. 124.
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him in his attempts to realize the measures he proposed, since 
H. M. Government invited the officers to visit Mesopotamia and 
see there the measures of Arab participation being initiated.
It should, moreover, have been extremely welcome to the Acting 
Civil Commissioner in his attempts to combat any scheme of 
Arab Government as implied in the Anglo-French Declaration, 
since the telegram assured both parties that no further con­
stitutional changes could be expected in the near future.
So far was the Acting Civil Commissioner from being 
affected by the ’serious blow’, as he has endeavoured to indi­
cate, that he was assuring H. M. Government within the follow­
ing week that while the constitutional proposals sanctioned in
May would require a year to put into operation, they should
(1)
meet the need of the country for many years to come.
In Syria, the agitation for a National Government at
Baghdad continued, eventually overflowing into ’Iraq itself and
swelling the local movement there until it broke into a flood
of rebellion. The telegram of 9 August from the Foreign Office
had not satisfied the ’Iraqi members of Faisal’s staff. Naji
Pasha’s appointment had been no answer to their aspirations;
his resignation had been the confirmation of their fears. What
they wanted, they declared, was assurance that the existing
military administration was not to continue. They found
the attitude of the British officials was more than that 
of administrators of a foreign population who were incap­
able, and would always remain incapable, of governing
(1) Young, op. cit., p. 294.
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themselves than that to which the Baghdadi officers had 
become accustomed on the other side, of friendly advisers 
who started on the assumption that the Arabs were manag­
ing their own affairs, and that it was not for them to do 
more than make friendly suggestions for the improvement 
of their plans. (1)
The delay in setting up the various measures which had 
been sanctioned, seemed to point to lack of goodwill on the 
part of the Acting Civil Commissioner, and no real aid to the 
achievement of their aspirations could be expected from that 
quarter. Rumours were about that the mandate system was but 
annexation in a new form, and that colonization by the British 
and by the Government of India had not been abandoned. The 
coming of 550 Englishwomen, wives and relatives of officials, 
pointed to the establishment of the British for a long stay.
The establishment of farms for experimental work in cotton- 
growing were interpreted as further evidence of India’s inten­
tions towards ’Iraq. Confidence was difficult to maintain in 
the face of so many facts and rumours. The ’Iraqis, like 
their fellow Arabs, lacked patience to await developments. They 
desired results, and these immediately and in a tangible form. 
Cool and far-sighted heads were not lacking, but they were not 
always in control. The majority believed, as Ja’far Pasha
al-’Askari was to remark later to Miss Gertrude Bell, ’My Lady,
(2)
complete independence is never given, it is always taken.*
(1) Nuri Pasha as-Said to Major Sir H. W. Young, cited Young, 
op. cit., p. 297. Confirmed by Nuri Pasha to writer,
IB ‘December, 1934.
(2) Bell, Letters, vol. II, p. 569. Lawrence had continually 
drilled the same principle into the leaders of the Movement 
in Western Arabia: ’I had preached to Faisal, from our
first meeting, that freedom was taken not given.’ Lawrence, 
op. cit., p. 274.
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The establishment of the Syrian State, immediately follow­
ing the Armistice, encouraged the ’Iraqis to look to their own 
country where direct British administration continued. The 
growing insistence of the Syrians that posts in the Damascus 
Government be given to Syrians only made it necessary for the 
’Iraqi officers there to seek new outlets and opportunities for 
their energies. ’Iraqi officers, disguised as Bedouins, had 
already toured Mesopotamia during July. They had reported 
that the temper of the country was rising, and that active agi­
tation and continuous propaganda, backed with funds, might win 
independence from Great Britain if it were refused.
Propagandists began to slip over the desert. Societies, 
already existing throughout ’Iraq, became the channels of 
Nationalist agitation. Anti-Government and anti-British senti­
ment and discontent in the towns, in the religious centres, 
among the tribes and among the unemployed ex-officials, were 
stimulated and then skilfully assimilated to the nucleus of 
Nationalist feeling already existing among those who believed 
in Arab and in ’Iraqi independence as desirable in themselves. 
Appeals to religious fervour and fanaticism, to pride of race, 
to Nationalist feeling, to cupidity, and to all the elemental 
instincts in each of the component groups which had been drawn 
into the movement, were working their spell during the days 
when politicians of the West, like Joshua of old, bade the East 
stand still until the battle at Paris over the spoils should be 
ended.
H. M. Government was not entirely unaware that public
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opinion in ’Iraq during the last months of 1919 was not the
same as had prevailed in the final months of 1918. As early
as 23 August, when a police report of 7 July stated that
every Moslem Arab of education in Baghdad was a member of a 
society, with branches in all the important towns in 
Mesopotamia, which was described as simply a pan-Arab and 
anti-foreign organisation formed with a view to the expul­
sion of the British and the establishment of Arab rule. (1)
Mr. Montagu’s suggestion that an announcement should be
made that Great Britain would remain in the country, in some
form or other, was negatived by the British delegation at
Paris, who deprecated such action as injudicious in view of the
state of affairs at the Peace Conference.
In October and November, when even more disturbing news
was received of the temper of the country, of the attitude of
the ’Iraqi officers in Syria, and of the slowness with which
(2)
the constitutional proposals were being executed, Lord 
Curzon, in alarm, called a meeting of the Interdepartmental 
Committee, 10 November. There, all agreed that the first con­
dition for recovery of confidence and for the future settlement 
of the country was the return of Sir Percy Cox. This would be 
difficult, however, until the Mandate was announced and he
(3)
could act with complete authority. The Mandate would
(1) Cited Young, op. cit., p. 294.
(2) After six months, only four of the nine Divisional Councils 
and none of the Provincial Councils had been formed. On 
further inquiry, it was discovered that the Acting Civil 
Commissioner did not contemplate moving in the matter that 
year. Ibid., p. 298.
(3) Reference to Sir Percy Cox in Tehran, found him unprepared 
to return without complete authority.
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probably not be given before the New Year, but an early an­
nouncement of his impending return was desirable. Yet, since 
he could not be expected to return to ’Iraq from Persia with­
out a short leave at home, it was hardly possible that he could 
take up his new duties until the autumn.
In his turn, the Acting Civil Commissioner also realized
that the temper of the country was altering. He assigned,
correctly, much, of the change to trans-desert sources, but,
considering the authors to be unimportant, he was inclined to
under-rate their influence - a mistake which was to contribute
to his undoing. Resentful of the Western Arabia policy, he
v/as ready to believe that Sharif Husain’s inordinate ambition,
that England’s golden sovereigns and the Arabs’ love of plunder
were the sole motives behind the movement in the West. He
shut his eyes to the other factors. His contacts with the
Middle East had hitherto been primarily in Persia and the 
(1)
Persian Gulf. His first-hand acquaintance with Arabs and
his knowledge of their character had, therefore, been limited. 
He had no personal knowledge of the deep hold which Independ­
ence and Nationalism, as abstract ideas, had upon the ’Iraqi 
participants in the Arab Movement. He could not realize, 
therefore, that the motives which had helped to sustain them 
during months of desert warfare would continue to do so, even 
if their enemies were France or England.
(1) He had spent about ten days in Baghdad, July, 1911:
Events in Turkish ’Iraq, July, 1911.
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He did n o t  seem to realize that, however much the digni­
t a r i e s  o f  Baghdad might repudiate the officers as men of ime
(1)
p o r ta n c e  and position, many of the latter had been the life
of the pre-war Arab Movement and had been instigators of
(2 )
several disturbances in the Turkish army. Moreover, they
had created positions for themselves by their ability, first 
in the Turkish army and then in the Arab Movement, and, in 
consequence, had acquired a reputation in popular opinion 
equalling their actual importance. In addition, the Iraqis 
had, in Mosul, Basra, Baghdad and outlying districts, families, 
relatives and friends who cast up, at their instigation, waves 
of increasing size in the sea of * Iraqi Nationalism.
Outv/ardly paying lip-service to Arab participation, his 
real opinion, not only of Arabs, but also of those who advo­
cated their wide participation in the government and adminis­
tration of ’Iraq, came out in his note to Miss Bell’s report 
on Syria. He disagreed with her fundamental assumption that 
’an Arab State in Mesopotamia ... within a short period of 
years is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation 
o f  a logical scheme of government on these lines, in supersession
(1) Practically every ’Iraqi who served under Faisal has
occupied, upon his return to ’Iraq, positions of responsi­
bility in the ’Iraq Government. Their enemies declare 
that this monopolization of high office has been due to 
British influence, and to the fact that they have consti­
tuted themselves a ruling clique. Their friends maintain 
their position has been due to their ability and experience.
(2) As in Baghdad, from March to July, 1913: Events in
Turkish ^Iraq, March, April and July, 1913.
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of those on which we are now working in Mesopotamia, would be 
practical and popular.* He declared:-
My observations in this country and elsewhere have 
forced me to the conclusion that this assumption is errone­
ous, ... and I venture probably for the last time in my 
present capacity to lay before Eis Majesty's Government the 
considerations which have led me to this conclusion ...
Effective British administration is vital to the con­
tinued existence of Mesopotamia as an independent State or 
administrative entity. (1)
Nevertheless, he continued to express his conviction, in
(2)
telegrams to H. M. Government, that he was working on right 
lines and that good administration would counteract serious 
political discontent - a characteristic belief held by Anglo- 
Indian administrators.
In the end, however, he was forced to the reluctant con­
clusion that his 'right lines' were not those approved by H. M. 
Government nor those which would find acceptance in the country 
itself. The Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons 
on 23 February, reaffirming the Anglo-French Declaration; the 
discouraging attitude of the Foreign Office regarding his pro­
posals for further administrative and financial measures 
(August and March); the seizing of the bit into their own
teeth by the Arab Nationalists in Syria when Faisal was de-
(3)
clared King of Syria and 'Abdullah, King of 'Iraq; and the
(1) Cited Young, op. cit., pp. 302-3.
(2) As in telegram received by Foreign Office, 11 February, 
1920.
(3) By groups of Syrian and of 'Iraqi Covenantors at Damascus, 
11 March, 1920.
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rising temper in ’Iraq, convinced him, as he had never been 
convinced before, that his views, as expressed in the dispatch 
of 15 November, were unacceptable to H, M. Government, and un­
tenable in the new situation. Sharifian influence was still 
his bug-bear, however, and, in a last-hour attempt to exclude 
it, he approached H. M. Government in a series of telegrams,
19, 20, 21 Inarch, proposing measures which he had so long
opposed, as for instance ’a Central Legislative Chamber,. Arab
(1)
members in charge of Departments, with British Secretaries.’
In addition, believing that the declaration of the Prime
Minister, ’we shall claim the right as mandatory Power of
(2)
Mesopotamia, including Mosul, ’ signified the end of his long
struggle for the inclusion of Mosul, and that the assignment 
of the Mandates was not far off, he set about to prepare a con­
stitution which would both satisfy H. M. Government and effect­
ively block any Sharifian manifestos regarding ’Iraq, and at 
the same time would cast the administrative machinery in a 
mould of his own devising. He therefore appointed a Committee, 
with Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter as Chairman, to formulate
(1) Telegram No. 3517, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to S/S for 
India, 19 March, 1920.
(2) Pari. Debates, H. of C., 5th S., vol. 127 (1920), p. 664. 
This view was confirmed by a telegram, S/S for India to 
Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 26 March, 1920. The latter 
took advantage of the opportunity to urge that ’including 
Mosul’ should mean ’all the Mosul Wilayet as administered 
by the Turks’: Telegram No. 3883, Civil Commissioner,
Baghdad to S/S for India, 28 March, 1920.
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(1)
constitutional proposals.
In London, Mr, Montagu, in the light of recent events,
(2)
such as the Dair uz-Zur incidents, of the Acting High Com­
missioner’s telegrams, and of the imminent announcement of the 
Mandate of ’Iraq for Great Britain, again suggested that a 
statement should be made at once of the intention of Great 
Britain to set up a National Government in an Arab State in 
’Iraq.
The terms of the announcement, tentatively discussed by 
representatives of the Foreign Office and of the India Office 
26 March, were left to the Interdepartmental Committee. The 
Committee, on 13 April, agreed that ’Lord Curzon and Mr.
Montagu should formulate an announcement for Immediate publica­
tion in Mesopotamia.’ A telegram to this effect was dis­
patched to the Acting Civil Commissioner.
Seeing that his plans would go awry if the announcement, 
preceding his new Constitution, left no opportunity for its 
application, and feeling that K. M. Government were still pur­
suing the wrong policy, he begged that the announcement should
be deferred until they had seen and considered the answer
(3)
which he would send on 27 April. The report of the
Bonham-Carter Committee would be sent on that date.
(1) The committee, usually known as the Bonham-Carter Com­
mittee was also composed of Col. E. B. Howell, Major
H. H. F. M. Tyler, Col. F. C. C. Balfour, and Major R. W. 
Bullard.
(2) See Review C. Admin., 1914-1920, pp. 133-8. Also infra^pjp^
(3) Telegram No. 4848, Civil Commissioner to India Office, 
21 April, 1S20.
In the meantime, however, Lord Gurzon and Mr. Montagu had 
difficulty in reaching an agreement on the draft announcement. 
Mr. Montagu, in accordance with the personal belief which im­
pelled him to advocate Indian reforms, and under the influence 
of Miss Bell and others, wished to announce that a representa­
tive National G-overnment would be erected. Lord Curzon, al­
though professing himself converted to the idea of self-govern­
ing native states, could not overcome his life-long belief in 
England’s mission to rule nor his mistrust of native ability.
He hesitated to go as far as Mr. Montagu. The discussions 
were still in progress when Lord Curzon left London for the 
conference at San Remo. They were not resumed until after 
the Mandate for ’Iraq had been granted to Great Britain.
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CHAPTER XI.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR 1 IRAQ:
PROPOSALS, COUNTERPROPOSALS, ANNOUNCEMENTS: APRIL-JUNE, 1920.
The constitutional proposals of the Bonham-Carter Committee
had been intended by the Acting Civil Commissioner to form the
second stage in the transition from Civil Administration under
Military Occupation to a peace-time C-overnment. The Committee,
therefore, had been instructed ’to frame specific proposals...
for the establishment of constitutional Government In this
country consistent with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the Anglo-French Declaration and other public announce 
(1)
ments.’ Its attention was called to the past correspondence
between Baghdad and H. M. Government, especially to the India
(2)
Office telegrams of 28 November, 1918, and 14 February, 1919.
Although the Committee in preparing its Report apparently
(3) (4)
did not see the draft Mandate for ’Iraq, then in existence,
the proposals of the Committee represent the first embodiment
(1 ) Telegram No. 5110 , Civil Commissioner to s / s  for India,
26 April, 1920.
(2 ) Ibid.
(3) According to Sir E. Bonham-Carter, 28 November, 1935.
(4 ) Drawn up in the Spring of 1919 by Cmdr. D. G. Hogarth, Miss 
Gertrude Bell and Col. T. E. Lawrence, with the concurrence 
of the Acting Civil Commissioner.
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( 1 )
of the principle of the mandatory system in a Constitution, 
and, as such, foreshadowed the 1 Iraq Organic Law or Constitution 
of 1924, The conditions which the Constitution was, therefore, 
to fulfil were summarised by the Committee as follows:-
a- Subject to the tutelage of a Mandatory Power, the 
Government must bean indigenous Government •
b- The form of Government must be adopted by the free 
will of the inhabitants, subject to such powers as are 
necessary to enable the Mandatory Power to perform its 
mandate•
c- The constitution must contain necessary securities 
to enable the Mandatory Power to perform the trust confided 
to it of ensuring the well-being and development of the 
people. This implies the maintenance of peace and order.5 
(Para. 3) (2)
(1) Several points of similarity exist between the draft manda­
tory document and the Committeefs Proposals. Article I of 
the draft Mandate stated that the ‘Organic Law (or Constitu­
tion) shall be framed in consultation with native authori­
ties.* This principle formed the second of the three con­
ditions which the Committee believed the Constitution should 
fuIf i 1, losfray >pcx
Article I also stipulated ‘Provisions designed to fac­
ilitate the progressive development of Mesopotamia as an 
independent state.* Similar provisos in the Committee*s 
Report were : a- Initiation of the policy of employing
natives of the country in preference to any other persons 
(Para. 4, Sec. 7). b- The composition of the Council should 
be considered as tentative only (Para. 15, Sec. 5). c- The 
Educational and Political progress of the country should be 
periodically re-examined (Para. 19).
Article III reserved foreign relations to the mandatory 
Power. The proviso is reproduced in Para. II of the 
Report.
(2) Extracts and summaries here are from the official text if}
Report of the Baghdad Committee on Constitution for *Iraq 
(Secret), dated Baghdad, 26 April, 1920; (India Office
No. B. 343; Foreign Office No. E. 6011), made available by
the Foreign Office for the first time to the writer.
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The complete fulfilment of the second of these conditions:
the form of the new government to he adopted by the free will of
the inhabitants, was deemed to be impossible until the Mandate
had been granted and until more settled conditions had been
obtained when a consultation of public opinion could take place,
The latter, the Committee suggested, might be accomplished by
inviting the Legislative Assembly, which it was proposed to set
up, to voice its opinion on the Constitution, at not later than
(1)
the Assembly*s third session.(Para. 9).
Until that time the country was to be administered on the 
basis of the Constitution which they proposed in the full know­
ledge that it was provisional. In the meantime, the Committee 
claimed for its proposals the sanction of such native authority 
as existed, since the proposals had been formulated after con­
sultation with *local notables of weight and standing.’(2) In 
lieu of a more extensive expression of ’free will* the Committee 
may have well believed that such opinion formed an adequate 
background for their provisional Constitution.
The Report indicated, in addition, that the Committee was
(1) Review C. Admin., 1914-1920 is palpably in error when it
states: ’Within a period limited to two years, the Legisla­
tive Assembly was to draw up an Organic Law for the Permanent 
settlement of the country1 (p. 141). No such proviso was 
present in the proposals, nor was the duration of the 
sessions, referred to above, indicated in the Report. The 
failure to state the length of the sessions and to name a 
definite period in which the permanent constitution was to 
be considered drew down severe criticism, notably from Mr.
H. R. C. Dobbs, Infra, pp. 266 ff.
(2) Telegram No. 5110, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for 
India, 26 April, 1920.
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not unaware of the grave difficulties inherent In the conditions 
of the country itself: the religious divisions, the antagonisms
■between townsmen and tribesmen, the deplorable lack of education 
and of political morality, and the dearth of capable and honest 
Indigenous administrative personnel (Para 4). So strongly did the 
Committee feel that the gulf between the townsmen and tribesmen 
was, for the present, unbridgeable that it stated:
We desire to place on record definitely that in the 
tribal area, for many years to come, direct control by the 
British Officers in charge of Divisions is a sine qua non, 
since no one else commands the confidence of the people to 
a degree which will ensure obedience to the orders of the 
Government without the presence and not infrequent use of 
armed force, (Para, 4, Sec. 7).
With these observations and reservations, the Committee 
turned to the main problem: the devising of governmental machin­
ery which might be called indigenous but which would ensure, as 
much as possible, the initiative and direction and the definite 
ultimate control remaining in British hands. It was not an 
unfamiliar problem to British administrators. It had been 
practised in various Indian Native States and in Egypt with vary­
ing degrees of success. Familiarity with the general problem, 
however, did not make the specific task in 1 Iraq any the less 
difficult.
If insufficient power and responsibility were placed in the 
hands of the Arabs or If the machinery was too transparently 
dependent on British officials, there would be no satisfaction of 
Arab aspirations, and further agitation would continue. On the 
other hand, if sufficient means were not retained to ensure the
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acceptance of British direction in matters which the mandatory 
Power considered essential, not only for the‘well-being and devel­
opment of the people’ but also for the maintenance of its own 
position in the dual role of a Mandatory and an Imperial Power, 
the mandatory principle would be defeated and the British position 
would be rendered intolerable. Its position in the country 
would then rest on the force of arms alone, an undesirable alter­
native, the ultimate necessity of which, however had been recog-
(i)
nized. The expense of a large army would be objectionable to
British taxpayers and its enforced use would proclaim the failure 
of Great Britain to govern by civil measures alone.
In the establishment of a Council of State under British 
control, fashioned much on the pattern of the Council employed in 
Egypt before the war, the Committee sought the solution of the 
problem. The Council was to be, ostensibly, the principal 
executive authority and also the Second Chamber to a representa­
tive Legislature (Para. 15, Secs. 1 and 8). In its name were to 
be promulgated ‘state executive decisions, and executive decisions 
of the various departments issued to the public* (Para. 15, Sec.
8). It was to legislate and to impose taxes, normally with the 
concurrence of the Legislative Assembly (Para. 18, Sec. 2a). In 
cases of conflict or of necessity, however, the Council was to 
have power to legislate without the Assembly’s concurrence (Para. 
18, Sec. 2b). To the Council was also reserved the annual budget,
(1) Bell, Letters, vol. II, p. 578: ‘No Government in this
country, whether ours or an Arab administration, can carry 
on without force behind it.1
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on which advice only might he given by the Assembly (Para. 18, 
Sec. 6). Temporary Laws might also be issued, but these had to 
be submitted to the following session of the Assembly, as under 
the Ottoman Constitution (Para. 18, Sec. 5 ).
The President of the Council, who was not necessarily to 
have departmental duties, was to be an Arab. He was to be of 
good social status and prestige. (Para. 15, Sec. 3). Associated 
with him were to be 11 Council members. The Committee believed 
that ’the Constitution should not lay down how many members 
should be Arab and how many should be English’, but it contem­
plated that initially a majority should be English (Para. 15, 
Sec. 5).
British Officials were stipulated as the Chief Executive 
Officials of the Departments, with the exception of that of Auqaf. 
These officials under the title of Secretaries of Departments 
were to be the British members of the Council (Para. 15, Sec. 9;. 
The Arab members of the Council were to be Advisers to the De­
partments. Each Adviser was ’to be consulted by the Secretary
(1) The composition tentatively proposed included six British 
members with votes and five Arab members with votes divided 
among the various departments as follows:-
English. Arab.
(1)
President
Department of Interior 
Department of Justice 
Revenue (including lands) 
Education 
Finance
Public Works and Health 
Auqaf 1
1
1
1
1
1
6 6
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on all matters of importance and to have access to all depart­
mental papers; and to have the right to refer to the Council of 
State any difference of opinion between themselves and the Secre­
taries’ (Para. 15, Sec. 9). All departments, except purely 
technical departments, such as Public Works, having no represent­
atives on the Council were, nevertheless, to have Arab Advisers 
and Assistants (Para. 15, Sec. 9).
The functions delegated to the Council appeared to give it 
extensive powers and to make it what the Committee had claimed 
for it, the Chief Executive Authority of the State. Neverthe­
less, final effective authority remained in British hands through
the power of the High Commissioner to appoint and remove, at his
(1)
pleasure, members of the Council (Para. 15, Sec. 2), and through 
his power to overrule the decisions of a majority of the Council. 
His decision was ’to be deemed for all purposes the decision of 
the Council’ (Para. 15, Sec. 7). Control was also effected, 
more indirectly, by the predominance of British members on the 
Council, the Arab President being excluded from voting save in
equality of votes (Para. 15, Sec. 6).
I
The arrangements whereby British Officials became titular 
as well as actual heads of departments, with Arab Advisers, and 
whereby the former composed a majority of the Council, were not
entirely in accordance with the views of the Chairman, Sir Edgar
Bonham-Carter, as expressed earlier in his Memorandum on the 
Place of the Arab in Administration of 5 February, 1919, and in 
his Tentative Draft of Arab Institutions, drawn up in the spring
(1) In practise this would probably apply to Arab members only.
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( 1 )
of the same year. The arrangements suggested in the Report,
furthermore, were not in accordance with those of the Egyptian 
pre-war Council on which the proposed Council had been profess­
edly modelled.
No doubt Sir Edgar allowed his own views to be overruled
in deference to those of his colleagues or of the Acting Civil
Commissioner, It was perhaps unfortunate that he did so, for
it was precisely these proposed arrangements for the Council to
which H, M. Government took the greatest exception and which
caused the eventual rejection of the Report as a whole.
The Council of State, under British direction and control,
had been designed as the chief instrument of government. The
(2)
Committee hoped, however, that the elective Legislative Assembly,
for which the Body provided in the Egyptian Organic Law of 1913
(3)
was taken as a model, would give the 1 Iraqis the greatest 
impression that they were participating in the Government.
(1) But cf. views in his letter to the Acting Civil Commissioner, 
11 March, 1919, cited supra, p. 227. For text of draft 
see App. V.
(2) The Committee used both Council1 and Assembly1 in reference 
to this legislative body. ’Assembly’ is employed more 
frequently and in Paragraph headings, as in Para. 17, Secs.l, 
2, 3, 5, 7; Para. 18, Secs. 2b, 3, 5, 6, ’Council1 is used 
in Para. 17, Secs. 2, 4, and Para. 18, Sec. 2a. ’Assembly’ 
will be used here throughout in reference to this body.
(3) Organic Law of Egypt, 21 July, 1913, Parts II, III, IV.
Text: Acc’ts and Papers, 1913 (Cd. 6878) LXXXI, 307.
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In the Assembly all classes were to be Included, as 
follows i
(a) Elected members for the towns and country districts 
approximately proportionate to their population on the 
basis of one to 50,000 inhabitants;
(b) elected members representing the Jewish and Christian 
Communities;
(c) Arab members of the Council of State who, as we have 
already advised, should be ex-officio members. (Para. 
17, Sec. 2).
In addition to these members, estimated at 50, the Committee 
proposed that the British heads of Departments should be allowed 
to attend the Legislature, to speak and to introduce measures, 
but not to vote (Para. 15, Sec. 10, Para. 17, Sec. 5). A British 
Joint-Secretary for the Assembly, to assist in matters of proce­
dure was also stipulated (Para. 17, Sec. 6).
For the election of the members of the Assembly, alterna­
tive methods v/ere suggested. By the first method, members for 
the larger towns were to be elected by the Municipal Councils; 
for Divisions, by the Divisional Councils. In areas predomin­
antly tribal, tribal subsections were to elect their headmen, 
who in turn would elect the shaikh of the tribe, subject to con­
firmation by the authorities. By the second method, the muni­
cipal and divisional members were to be elected directly by the 
municipal and divisional voters, respectively. Tribal repre­
sentatives were to be elected much the same as under the first 
method (Appendix C).
Application of the elective principle to the Assembly 
removed, at least theoretically, one means of control which had
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been applied to the Council of State. The impotence of the
Assembly as a legislative body, however, stripped it of any real
power to oppose the will of the Council of State itself or of
the mandatory Power as expressed through the Council of State.
Its greatest influence over the Government would be its power to
ask questions in writing (Para. 18, Sec. 8) and in its reflection
of public opinion of the country. As such an agency it could
indirectly, especially when public opinion was too strong to be
denied, influence the Government, both through its power of pass-
(1)
ing resolutions on internal affairs (Para. 18, Sec. 5) and its 
refusal to co-operate with the Government.
For all posts, other than those directly controlling the 
administration, such as executive heads of Departments, who were 
to be British, the Committee advised that where an ’Iraqi could 
be found, capable of filling a post, he should be employed in 
preference to any other person. They stated that 'on this canon, 
it would be possible to employ more natives than hithertofore 
and in higher posts' (Para. 4, Sec. 7).
In conclusion the Committee expressed its opinion that 
periodic enquiries, perhaps every seven years, should be made 
Into the state of the country and into the desirability of ex­
tending or restricting self-government (Para. 19).
Another period of stalemate in setting up constitutional 
government was to follow the submission of this Report on
(1) On these resolutions the Council was not obliged to take 
action, other than to give reasons for not accepting them.
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( 1 )
26 April, Two days before its reception in London, the
principal Allied Powers, meeting at San Remo, 24 and 25 April,
had formally assigned the Mandates for ’Iraq and Palestine to
(2)
Great Britain and that for Syria to France.
No official announcement of the action at San Remo, for 
publication in ’Iraq, was forthcoming, however, until after 
3 May, when Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu composed their differ­
ences concerning the form of the statement of policy sanctioned 
13 April, which, they believed, should accompany the announce­
ment that Great Britain had accepted the Mandate for ’Iraq.
In the meantime, the Acting Civil Commissioner, who had 
received the news through Reuter’s, had withheld permission to 
publish it until 3 May. It was then issued, together with a 
communique of his own, couched in general terms, the only refer­
ence to the future government being: ’The establishment of
Civil Administration will give an ever widening field to native
(3)
energies•’
Two days later, on 5 May, the Acting Civil Commissioner 
received the official announcement from H. M. Government with 
instructions that it was to be published immediately. The 
first part of the statement referred in vague generalities to 
the action of the Powers at San Remo. It called attention to 
the previous declarations of H. M. Government’s ’firm intention
(1 ) Summarized in Telegram Nos. 5111, 5112 , 51 13 , Civil Commis- 
ioner, Baghdad, to s / s  for India, 26 April, 1920 .
(2) The Times, 26 April, 1920.
(3) Baghdad Times, 3 May, 1920; also Wilson, op. cit.,pp. 2 4 8 -9 .
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to promote the creation of a form of civil administration based
upon representative indigenous institutions which would prepare
the way for the creation of an independent Arab State of 'Iraq*
and to the important steps which had already been taken in this
(1)
direction.
In the second part it stated:
The time has now arrived for fIraq to reap the fruits of 
this course, and for a further forward step to be taken in 
the development of national life of the people. His 
Majesty*s Government have accordingly directed the Civil 
Commissioner to take immediate measures in consultation with 
the Councils and with approval of local opinion in all parts 
of the country to frame definite proposals with above named 
object.(2)
In conclusion, the Acting Civil Commissioner was notified 
that the Bonham-Carter proposals were under consideration.
The proposed announcement met with immediate and open
opposition from the Acting Civil Commissioner. The consultation
of opinion, he believed, would produce no proposals which could
(3)
guide H. M. Government and would, in fact, be fraught with 
danger. It would mean delay when speedy action was essential. 
The issue in any such consultation would become again, as in
(1) Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 4 
May, 1920.
(2) Ibid.
(3) H. M. Government, in reality, had little expectation that 
proposals from the inhabitants of ’Iraq would be of value, 
even if the Bonham-Carter proposals were submitted to the 
Councils as suggested.xxx The consultation had been sanc­
tioned in order to avoid the appearance of imposing a con­
stitution on the people, and to comply with the conditions 
of the Mandate. See also Young, op. cit., p. 309.
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1918-19, that of Arab independence versus British control. He 
was well aware that since the time he had suggested and carried 
out the earlier plebiscite, the temper of the country had changed 
and that no amount of official control or organization, such as 
had been employed on that occasion, could produce declarations 
for British control which would ring true, although many substan­
tial elements of the population were still pro-British. He voiced 
his opposition in a strongly worded reply, 8 May, stating in part:
It is with great regret that I find myself compelled to 
ask His Majesty1s Government to reconsider this portion of 
their announcement.
I submit that it is for H. M. G. as Mandatory Power to 
prescribe what form of Government shall be set up in the 
immediate future.(1) To refer the question afresh to 
Divisional Councils and to ’local opinion’ can have but one 
result. The extremists who following the example of their 
colleagues In Syria are demanding absolute independence for 
’Iraq with or without ‘Abdullah will by threats and by 
appeals during the coming month of Ramadhan to religious 
fanaticism win over moderate men who have hitherto looked to 
Government for a scheme offering a reasonable chance of 
success and which they can support.(2)
It was not merely the danger of excitement of public opinion 
which aroused his opposition. The announcement, to him, seemed to 
mean once again, the ruin of his plans and desires for the future 
of ’Iraq. He had already abandoned, partly from necessity and 
partly from personal motives, his first constitutional proposals, 
ostensibly based on 'Iraqi opinion obtained in the plebiscite of 
1918-1919, but in reality carefully designed to preserve the
(1) But C/f• his views, of three weeks later, on the imperative
necessity of consulting local opinion, cited infra, p p . 2 7 1 -2 .
(2) Telegram, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 
8 May 1920.
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pattern of the Anglo-Indian administration which he had so 
diligently created. His original attitude to Arab participa­
tion in the administration had been submerged in order to win 
the sympathetic attention of H. M. Government and of the mod­
erates among the ’Iraqis for his second attempt at drafting a 
Constitution which incorporated his views on the future admin­
istration of ’Iraq.
The announcement, however, implied that H. M. Government 
without reference or consideration to the Bonham-Carter pro­
posals, with which he was in full agreement, had settled on a 
policy which, if published, would sweep away all his efforts 
to check Arab Nationalism and to maintain his administrative 
machinery, would destroy what he believed to be the immediate 
means to consolidate the moderate party behind British policy 
and would give the final victory to the Western Arabia party.
In addition, therefore, to his request that H. M. Govern­
ment reconsider their announcement, he pressed for permission 
to announce as .an alternative, the Bonham-Carter proposals. He 
stated:
If during the next seven days I can be authorised to 
announce that H. M. G. provisionally approve of the Con­
stitutional proposals made by me and have instructed me 
to communicate them to leading inhabitants with a view to 
giving effect to them in the autumn, there are grounds for 
hoping that we shall be able to count on the support of 
a strong block of moderate opinion. Once this is done we 
shall be in a position to deal with extremists.
An announcement that Sir Percy Cox will shortly return 
as High Commissioner would also be of great value in this 
connection.
I beg for orders on these lines at the earliest
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(1)
possible date.
In conclusion, in an adroit attempt to obtain the support 
of the military authorities and of the War Office to whioh they 
were responsible for maintenance of order, he submitted:
As a staff officer of the G.O.C.-in-Chief I have a res­
ponsibility towards him also in that I could not properly 
without his approval take action which would imperil his 
forces and the numerous women and children and lengthy L. 
of C. in his charge. Further consultation with local 
opinion at this juncture will in my opinion have this re­
sult.
Additional opinion obtained from the Bonham-Carter Com­
mittee was also dispatched, on the same day, as confirmation of 
his viewpoint. The Committee, according to his telegram, had 
put forward views approximating his own and had called attention 
to its Report as supporting its opinions. It had also stated:
The Divisional Councils are constituted for local and 
not national purposes and have no authority to give an 
opinion on a national question: serious difficulties
would be caused if different Councils expressed opposite 
opinions. Committee draw attention to the fact that few 
members of Divisional Councils have any political knowledge 
or experience and to the possibility of a dangerous out­
break of extreme nationalism and religious fanaticism, and 
mention as an example of the state of education In the 
country that four out of six of the tribal members on the 
fAmara Divisional Council cannot read or write.(2)
In loyally supporting the Acting Civil Commissioner by 
thus repudiating the authority of the Councils, the Committee 
seemed to forget, however, that the initiation and development 
of the Councils had been originally suggested fto secure the
(1) Ibid.
(2) Telegram, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India, 
8 May, 1920.
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full benefit of co-operation by tribal leaders and large land-
(1)
owners in the administration of these territories,1 and in the 
expectation that ’the constitution of a future advisory of Legis­
lative Assembly for the whole of Mesopotamia, when the time is
ripe, will be much facilitated by the development of these bodies
(2)
and of the Municipal Councils, ’ The Councils had been sanc­
tioned by H. M. Government, in April, 1919, with that end in 
view: a preliminary step towards an indigenous government. The
Committee apparently overlooked the fact that the declaration by 
the Hilla Divisional Councils had already been used as evidence 
of the country’s desire for British control of the national des-
(3)
tiny.
Furthermore, the shaikhs of the ’Amara Council, repudiated
in the Committee’s statement, were the very shaikhs whose strong
pro-British declarations in 1918 had been put forward then as
indicating ’Iraqi public opinion on the three questions, national
(4)
in scope, which had been placed before them.
The Acting Civil Commissioner’s telegrams, including one
(1) Telegram No. 9696, Political, Baghdad to S/S for India, 10 
November, 1918.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Wilson, op. cit., p. 212; so also was regarded the later 
decision of the Basra Council, 22 June, 1920; Admin. Report, 
Basra Division, 1920, pp. 2-3; Wilson, op. cit., p. 265.
(4) Self-Determination, Sec. 3, Amara Declaration, p. 8; Bell, 
Memo on Self-Determination in Mesopotamia; Wilson, op. cit.,
p. 112.
-265-
received from him on 15 May, and the Bonham-Carter Committee 
Report itself, were considered by the Interdepartmental Committee 
on 17 May. In face of the strong objections made by the Acting 
Civil Commissioner and by the Baghdad Committee, the London Com­
mittee agreed that the second part of the announcement should be 
withheld.
The Committee was not so ready to recommend the Bonham-Carter 
proposals, which had been undergoing a close scrutiny in both the 
India Office and the Foreign Office, for immediate announcement 
in Baghdad as Great Britain’s policy for constitutional Government 
in ’Iraq, as the Acting Civil Commissioner urged*
The proposals, to the Interdepartmental Committee, seemed 
to set up a government based on an ’Anglo-Indian* ideal, whereas 
the Committee believed in something more approaching an ’Indian 
State’ ideal. Lord Curzon pointed out that the ’proposed consti­
tution was not an Arab Government inspired and helped by British 
advice, but a British Government infused with Arab elements to a 
gradually increasing extent.’ Mr. Montagu went further and sug­
gested that the Mandate should be exercised In the form of a
treaty with the people of the country rather than in accordance
(1)
with a mandate document.
The criticisms were not from Whitehall officials who had no 
personal knowledge of the country, its people or its administra­
tive difficulties. Major H. W. Young, secretary to the Inter­
departmental Committee, who had served both in Mesopotamia and in
(1) Major H. W. Young maintains that he himself had already pro­
posed the policy a month and a half earlier: Op. cit.,
p. 313. -------
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Western Arabia, believed that the necessary control in 'Iraq
could be secured to Great Britain as effectively through British
advice and. protection to the new state as by the retention of
direct executive control, as contemplated by the Bonham-Carter 
(1)
Committee,
Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, who, as Foreign Secretary to the Govern­
ment of mdia, had examined the Report on behalf of the India
(2)
Office, made the most detailed critical examination. He be­
lieved that no great objection would be found to the general 
premises of the first fourteen paragraphs of the Report (Sec. 1).
He maintained, however, that it would be
hardly advisable to make the President or Members of the 
Council removable at the pleasure of the High Commissioner 
for that would make the Council too obviously the High 
Commissioner's passive instrument. If removable, they 
should be removable by the British Secretary of State. In 
any case a period should be fixed for holding of posts 
(Sec. 2).
He went on to point out that
If a British Secretary has technically all the executive 
power and the Arab member is a mere adviser, the position of 
the Arab member will be so weak as to deceive no one. It 
would seem greatly preferable to make the Arab members tech­
nically responsible and to give the British Secretary the 
right to refer to the High Commissioner any important 
differences of opinion between themselves and their members. 
(Section 2).
He declared, moreover, that the relation of the High Commis­
sioner to the Council had been given only general definition.
Only his power of overruling decisions and his power of appointment
(1) Ibid., pp. 312-313.
(2) Memorandum by H. R. Dobbs, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India, on Proposals of Bonham-Carter Committee, 
Undia Office, B. 342).
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and dismissal bound him to the Council, No provisions were 
made for periodical reports from it to the High Commissioner,
Mr. Dobbs’ viewpoint as an Indian administrator and as an 
official of the Government of India was indicated in his criticism 
of the failure of the Committee to provide for the representation
of Indians on the Council and in the Legislative Assembly (Secs.
(1)
2 and 4). Room for criticism was also found in the failure
to provide for specific representation of Jews and Christians on 
the Council (Sec. 2) and of large commercial firms trading within 
the country, in the Assembly (Sec. 4); for adequate arrangements 
for appointment and dismissal of administrative officials (Sec.2) 
and a definite statement regarding the length of the sessions of 
the Legislative Assembly (Sec. 1). In addition, Mr. Dobbs 
objected to the methods of electing tribal representatives, as 
impairing the power and prestige of the shaikhs, who, he believed, 
should be given full support and backing. He approved of the 
reservation of tribal areas from the operation of the new Govern­
ment and maintained further that no law passed by the Government 
should apply to such districts without a specific statement to 
that effect at the time of its passage (General Section (2)).
In view of the above criticisms and of others made during 
the discussion of the Report, it seemed clear to the Interdepart­
mental Committee that the proposals were unsuitable; they did
(1) Mr. Dobbs stated in Section 2: ’In view of the very large
part which Indian officials and personnel must, for a long 
time to come, play in Mesopotamia, it would seem advisable 
to have one Indian Member of Council or at least one Indian 
Secretary.’
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not grant the degree of self-government to ’Iraq which H. M. 
Government was now ready to give and they were also inadequate in 
other respects. It was agreed that permission to announce them 
immediately in Baghdad should be withheld.
The decisions of the Interdepartmental Committee were 
conveyed to the Acting Civil Commissioner on 20 May In the 
following terms:
H. M. Government greatly appreciates the care and ability 
expended by Bonham-Carter1s Committee In preparation of 
scheme. Their recommendation will receive fullest andmost 
attentive consideration. Framing of the mandate for ’Iraq 
is now engaging the active attention of H. MJfe Government 
and as you have realised, orders on your proposal, which 
may have to take a different shape, cannot be passed until 
a decision has been reached on this point. Publication 
of the announcement conveyed In my telegram of 4th May may 
be postponed in view of your proclamation of May 3rd. 
Meanwhile no further action should be taken on announcement 
made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions 
shortly.(1)
The reply of the Interdepartmental Committee filled the 
Acting Civil Commissioner with apprehension. The reference to 
’framing the mandate’ seemed to presage new and disheartening 
delays at a time when action was imperative. The failure to 
approve of the Bonham-Carter Report left him little with which 
to combat the growing unrest in ’Iraq. His telegrams to H. M. 
Government were, however, not without results. At the second 
of the two meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee to re­
examine the draft Mandate In the light of recent developments,
Mr. Montagu’s suggestion of the establishment of a provisional 
Government with Sir Percy Cox in charge, on the lines proposed
(1) Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 
20 May, 1920.
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by the Bonham-Carter Committee but with increased Arab partici­
pation, was approved. The Interdepartmental Committee agreed 
that Mr. Montagu should draft the telegram along these lines.
Events had now begun to move more swiftly towards an 
announcement of British intentions regarding ’Iraq. They were 
not swift enough, however, to prevent open conflict between the 
inhabitants of ’Iraq and the forces of Great Britain.
Excitement had been running high in Baghdad following the 
announcement of the Mandate. Meetings organized by the Nation­
alists had been held in the mosques where orators in the name of 
independence, race and religion had urged their listeners to 
rise against the British. Clashes between Nationalists and the 
authorities had already taken place, and it had been necessary 
to patrol the streets with armoured cars. The group of 15 
Baghdad Nationalists, known locally as the Mandubln or Delegates, 
had approached the Acting Civil Commissioner asking for an 
opportunity to lay their proposals before him for transmission 
to H. M. Government. He had tried to avoid giving the inter­
view. He did not wish to give any opportunity for a demonstra­
tion and he felt that he had nothing definite with which to 
counter their demands. He held, moreover, that the Mandubin 
were unrepresentative, referring to them in his dispatches as 
self-elected Delegates, although they had received the approval 
of a public meeting held in one of the principal mosques. 
Realizing, however, that they had a large popular following and 
that they could sway great masses of public opinion, he finally
-270
gave them an appointment for the morning of 2 June, at the Turkish 
Sara! or Government headquarters. He took the precaution, how­
ever, of inviting by name about 40 other dignitaries of all
religions, supposed to be favourably disposed to the British 
/
regime. To cope with possible demonstrations or disorder among 
the expected crowds, special police arrangements were made, troops 
were held in readiness at the barracks and R.I.M.S. Comet with 
steam up and trained guns was stationed on the Tigris opposite 
the Sarai.
At the meeting, the Acting Civil Commissioner explained
the desire of H. M. Government to give a National Government and
the difficulties which had been encountered. He declared that
they were then about to make an announcement along the lines
proposed in the Bonham-Carter Report of which he gave an outline.
He reminded his hearers that nothing was to be gained by hasty
action, and that with the best will in the world an indigenous
National Government could not be set up at once. He warned them
that any attempts at disorder or violence would be met with force
(1)
and that the military authorities would be called in if necessary.
The Delegates professed themselves unsatisfied with the 
proposals and presented their own petition asking for the imme­
diate formation of a National Convention for fIraq, elected 
according to Turkish Electoral Law. The Convention would be 
empowered to draw up proposals for a National Government as prom­
ised in the Anglo-Prench Declaration. With these demands a 
number of the invited notables, contrary to the Acting Civil
(1) For text of speech: Wilson, op. cit., pp. 255-7.
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Commissioner* s expectations, associated themselves and declared 
that * Iraqi independence was the concern of the entire Arab 
people•
The meeting itself, although feeling ran high, had been con­
ducted with dignity. As those attending began to disperse, 
however, the immense crowd which filled the Court of the Saral 
hissed and shouted abuse at the British officials. The Mandubin 
were cheered and several of the leaders were carried out on the 
shoulders of the crowd. No clashes occurred, however, between 
the crowds and the police.
In forwarding the petition and an account o^ fche meeting, 
the Acting Civil Commissioner threw the entire blame for the 
* movement reaching its present uncompromising form, backed as 
it is by skilfully fomented public excitement* on the failure of 
H. M. Government to allow him to make the announcement of the 
Bonham-Carter proposals before the beginning of Ramadhan as he 
had requested on 8 May.
He then declared:
It is probable that in the present temper a proposal 
that the country should submit even for a limited period to 
a provisional Constitution as to which they had not been 
consulted would be met on the part of the Nationalists by 
a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be 
represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, 
the real meaning of which is little understood and widely 
misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, 
while if the present temper continues the proposed Legis­
lative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself(i) 
into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorized.
He submitted that the difficulty could be countered only
(1) Telegram, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India,
2 June, 1920.
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by calling a Constituent Assembly and by inviting Sir Percy Cox
to spend a few days in Baghdad, on his way to England from Tehran
that
and/his visit and the anticipation of his return would 1 do much
4 (i)
to restore public confidence, which has been shaken•*
(2)
Five days later, on 7 June, authority was sent from London
to make an immediate announcement of Sir Percy Coxfs return and
of the general application of the Bonham-Carter Proposals, which,
subject to reservations on points of details, were 1 accepted in
principle as furnishing a generally suitable basis on which to
construct provisional institutions such as are postulated by
(3)
Mandate.1 Permission to call a Constituent Assembly was with­
held.
In his acknowledgment of the telegram, the Acting Civil Com­
missioner stated that the authorized announcement would be made
(4)
at the end of Ramadhan, or about 18 June.
(1) Ibid.
(2) Telegram, S/S for India to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad,
7 June, 1920.
(3) It Is somewhat surprising that the Secretary of State for 
India should have used the words 1 subject to reservation on 
points of detail1 when the differences of opinion between 
Baghdad and London were fundamental, as, for instance, in the 
matter of a Council of State. The Baghdad authorities 
advocated a predominantly British Council; the India Office, 
a predominantly Arab Council and the Foreign Office a wholly 
Arab Council. Mr. Montagu, however, may have believed he 
was acting in the spirit of the decision of the Interdepart­
mental Committee, on 1 June, and that he was but recognizing 
the fait accompli of 2 June, when the Acting Civil Commis­
si oner~outTTned~The proposals in Baghdad. In any case they 
were not to be applied until Sir Percy Cox had returned to 
Baghdad as High Commissioner.
(4) Telegram, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India,
9 June, 1920.
-273-
Although he had just achieved his immediate aim: a public 
announcement of Great Britain1s intentions, the Acting Civil 
Commissioner's long suppressed misgivings as to the direction in 
which the policy of H. M. Government' was tending, could no 
longer be held back. The sanction of the Bonham-Carter propos­
als, with which he had identified himself, had come too late to 
be of value. He could not avoid seeing how his strenuous 
efforts of the past two years to determine policy in 1 Iraq had 
failed. Step by step, he had been forced out of every position 
from which he had attempted, on the one hand, to mould 'Iraq 
along the lines of an Indian province, administered and staffed 
in the best Anglo-Indian traditions, and, on the other, to defeat 
the Influence of Arab Nationalists, the Western Arabia party and 
other doctrinaires. In his opinion, H. M. Government, In 
weakly giving way to the policy advocated by such groups and in 
embracing a literal application of the League of Nation's manda­
tory system, had set out on a perilous path, illumined only by 
the broken lights of sentimentalism.
He gave vent to these views in his telegram of 10 June, in 
which he also pointed out that the failure of Great Britain to 
maintain adequate troops and administrative officers in 'Iraq 
had contributed to the growth of the opposition prevailing in 
the country. He declared in conclusion:
We cannot maintain our position as mandatory by a policy
(1) But cf•, his view expressed later: 'A substantial reduction
in the military forces in Mesopotamia during 1919 would have 
greatly facilitated the pacification of the country.' Wilson 
op. cit., p. 44.
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of conciliation of extremists. Having set our hand to the 
task of regenerating the internal Government, we must be 
prepared to furnish alike men and money and to maintain con­
tinuity of control for years to come. We must be prepared,
regardless of the League of Nations, to go very slowly with 
constitutional or democratic institutions, the application 
of which to Eastern countries has been attempted of late 
years with such a little degree of success. If His Majesty’s 
Government regard such a policy as impracticable or beyond 
our strength (as well they may) I submit that they would do 
better to face the alternative, formidable and, from the 
local point of view, terrible as it is, and evacuate Meso­
potamia. (1)
His telegram brought to an end, in effect, the long struggle 
between H. M. Government and the Acting Civil Commissioner over 
policy for ’Iraq. The alternatives he had proposed, control 
without reference to the League of Nations or immediate evacuation, 
were rejected as unacceptable by the Interdepartmental Committee, 
on 16 June. Lord Curzon believed that the middle course of 
maintaining Great Britain’s position through the goodwill of the 
people could be maintained. He had sympathy and admiration for 
the Acting Civil Commissioner, personally, but his latest tele­
gram, together with previous indications of his attitude, pro­
claimed him as unable to bring himself to carry out the policy 
which H. M. Government, through the Interdepartmental Committee, 
had consistently advocated. Lord Curzon*s views found support 
in the Committee, and following a Cabinet decision on the subject, 
17 June, the text of an announcement to replace that sent on 7 
June, and a request for Sir Percy Cox to come to England at once, 
were telegraphed to Baghdad.
(1) Telegram, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to S/S for India,
10 June, 1920.
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The text of the announcement made in Baghdad on 20 June, 
is as follows:-
His Majesty*s Government, having been entrusted with the 
Mandate for Mesopotamia, anticipate that the Mandate will 
constitute Mesopotamia an Independent State under guarantee 
of the League of Nations and subject to the Mandate of Great 
Britain, that it will lay on them the responsibility for 
the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and 
will require them to formulate an organic lav/ to be framed 
in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia and with due 
regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the com­
munities of the country. The Mandate will contain provis­
ions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia as a self- 
governing state until such time as it can stand by itself,
when the Mandate will come to an end.
The inception of this task H. M. Government have de­
cided to entrust to Sir P. Cox, who will accordingly return
to Baghdad in the autumn, and will resume his position, on 
the termination of the existing Military Administration, as 
Chief British Representative in Mesopotamia.
Sir P. Cox will be authorised to call into being, as
provisional bodies, a Council of State under an Arab Presi­
dent and a General Elective Assembly, representative of and 
freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia. And it 
will be his duty to prepare in consultation with the General 
Elective Assembly, the permanent organic law.(1)
It was the first straightforward public announcement of a 
concrete and specific policy which H. M. Government had made in 
’Iraq since the Armistice, a year and eight months before. Even 
so, another five months were to elapse before the policy could 
be put into effect. In the interval, the temper of Nationalism 
in ’Iraq was to rise to the point of armed rebellion which was
to shake the country to its foundations.
(1) Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, Etc... Relating to
... Mesopotamia, 1st September, 1919 to 50 September, 1920, 
(Baghdad, 1920) (Hereafter Proclamations, 1919-1920) 
Announcement No. 49, dated 17 June, 1920.
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CHAPTER XIX.
ARAB NATIONALISM IN ’IRAQ BEFORE 1914.
Nationalism as an organized movement in the name of the 
Arab peoples first arose in the Lebanon and in Syria. In 
Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and Jaffa, the imaginative and volat­
ile Syrians, influenced primarily by French education and 
political thought, and, to a lesser extent, by the American
theory of government by ’consent of the governed1, inculcated
(1)
by American missionary schools, began to work for Arab sep­
aration from the Ottoman Empire. The movement gathered con­
verts throughout the Arabic-speaking world. In Arabia, the 
revolt of Imam Mahmud Yahia of Yemen, of Saiyid Idriss of 
Assir in 1906, and the defeat of Turkey’s ally, Amir ibn Rashid 
of the Shammar by Ibn Sa’ud in the same year, were taken as 
indicating the Arabs’ desire for independence. The revolt at 
Port Said of 400 Syrian troops on their way to Yemen was also 
taken as evidence of the unity of the Arabs. In Paris, a group 
of Syrians, including Najib Azuri who had been forced to leave 
Turkey in 1904 because of his pro-Arab activities, agitated for 
Arab independence through the French press and through Arab 
committees in France and Egypt. Through the Ligue de la 
Patrie Arabe, founded in 1904 by Najib Azuri and Eugen Jung, 
an ex-official of the French Colonial Service, who saw the
(1) Chief among these was the Syrian Protestant College,
founded in 1866, now the American University at Beirut.
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great benefits which would accrue to Prance through the Arab
(1) (2) 
movement, stirring appeals were made to the Arabs and to
(3)
the peoples of Europe and America, Najib Azuri also founded,
in April, 1907, with the collaboration of M. Jung, L! Independ­
ence Arabe, through which, as well as through other avenues, 
he continued to work for the Arab Nationalist cause.
By 1908, however, little remained of the once promising 
Arab Movement. In spite of its sudden flowering, it had not 
yet taken sufficient root. The gendarmes and troops of ’Abdul 
Hamid, brought into operation against the rebellious chiefs 
and revolutionaries, had not been the only cause of its failure. 
The Young Turks by more subtle means had undermined it. The 
Committee of Union and Progress, by promising much in reforms 
and in privileges to every community, to be fulfilled once the 
Hamidian regime should be overturned, had obtained the support 
not only of Arab leaders but also of other non-Turkish groups, 
for the bloodless Revolution of 24 July, 1908.
The new regime did indeed seem to foreshadow a new era of 
liberty, fraternity and equality. The Committee, commonly
(1) His viewpoint is apparent in his works: Les Puissances
devant la Revolte Arabe (Paris, 1906) and La Revolte Arabe 
(2 vols., Paris, 1924-5). ' ” ..... .
(2) Text: Najib Azuri, La Reveil de la Nation Arabe dans
l’Asie Turque (Paris, 190S), pp. 1-3; Jung, E., Les “ 
Puissances devant la Revolte Arabe, pp. 24-9; Kampffmeyer, 
G. , Damaskus. Dokumenfcs zum Kampf der Araber urn ihre 
Unabh&ngigkeit (Berlin, 1926), pp. 99-lOQ.
(3) Text: Jung, op. cit., pp. 22-4; Kampffmeyer, op. cit.,
pp. 100-01.
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known as the C.U.P., had proposed to consolidate the revolution 
by instituting parliamentary self-government in which all 
nationalities in the Empire were to participate in proportion 
to their numbers. Throughout the Empire, rival communities, 
bitter enemies and revolutionary leaders vied in praising the 
new order. Najib Azuri, in a valedictory number of 1! Independ­
ence Arabe, September, 1908, declared that all for which Arabs 
had been striving would be attained under the aegis of the
Committee. His work for the Arab cause had therefore come to
(1)
an end.
The first auspicious augury, however, was short-lived. 
Within the Western concept of nationality, then in the ascend­
ancy in the Near East and nov/here more so than in the C.U.P.
itself, existed contradictions which produced irreconcilable
(2)
antagonisms in the heterogeneous and polyglot Empire, and
which contributed to its final break-up. The non-Turkish
groups could not and would not permanently renounce the ideal of
an independent state for every nation: part and parcel of the
Western concept. The Young Turks, on the other hand, could
not abandon the ideal of sovereignty over the whole population
and territory within the frontiers of the State, equally a part
(3)
of the same concept. Thus, while ! Ottomanism’ in the
(1) Declaration cited: Jung, La Revolte Arabe, p. 23.
(2) For political effect of language differences in the Ottoman 
Empire, see note by Mary Mills Patrick in Mears, E. G., 
Modern Turkey, (New York, 1924), pp. 35 ff.
(3) Toynbee, A. J. and Kirkwood, K. P., Turkey, p. 53.
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programme of the Committee of Union and Progress meant in 
theory that all sections of the Umpire were to enjoy equal 
cultural liberty and that all were to be represented in 
Parliament and in government services on a proportional basis, 
in reality it came to mean that the non-Turkish elements were 
to be enfranchised and tolerated only in so far as they accept­
ed the Committee’s programme in full. In Arab lands, the 
*Ottomanising1 policy involved a ban on Arabic language and 
literature, - the original basis of the Arab revival, the com­
pulsory use of Turkish in official circles an d in schools, and 
the abandonment of all institutions and customs which Arabs 
cherished.
In Syria, the effect of the programme of the C.U.P. was to 
revive the Arab Movement and to increase the resentment of the 
Inhabitants against the Turks. A section, largely but not 
exclusively Catholic Christians, turned to Prance, their tradi­
tional protector and cultural mentor, for support and interven­
tion on their behalf. France, nothing loth to increase her 
influence in a region which she had long coveted, welcomed the 
overtures. Through her consuls and diplomatic officials, 
secret negotiations were carried on with the Nationalists, which, 
when discovered by the Turks, after the outbreak of the war,
brought death and imprisonment at the hands of Djemal Pasha,
(1)
to those Involved.
(1) Thirty-four Syrians were sentenced to death, five to im­
prisonment and four to exile, largely on the evidence of 
documents taken from the French Consulate In Beirut. 
Facsimiles of some of the documents may be seen in the
(continued over)
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Another group, principally Druses and Muslims of the
Lebanon and of Damascus whose part Great Britain had taken after
the massacres of 1860, approached the British Consul General
in Beirut, requesting that Great Britain, not France, should
(1)
assist them in their struggle against the Turks, A delega­
tion of Syrian Muslim notables was also reported to have visited 
Lord Kitchener, High Commissioner in Egypt, petitioning Great
Britain to annex Syria to Egypt, and to give Syria an independ-
(2)
ent administration, Sharif 1Abdullah, on behalf of his
father, Sharif Husain of Mecca, also visited Lord Kitchener in
(3)
1913 and again in 1914, seeking British assistance against 
the Turks.
The British Government was not unwilling to make its in­
fluence paramount among the Arabs, Such influence was essen­
tial if its still nebulous projects of a Trans-Arabian Railroad 
to the Persian Gulf and of the creation of a Khalifate,
(1) (Continued): 7 f
Turkish Red Book, La Verite sur la Question Syrienne 
(Stambul, 1916). On Georges Picot, French Consul General 
in Beirut, and a co-negotiator of the Sykes-Picot Agree­
ment, must rest the onus for allowing these documents to 
fall into the hands of the Turks. On the declaration of 
war, M. Picot, unlike his British colleague, who spent the 
night burning the British Consular files, merely placed 
official seals on the safe containing the incriminating 
papers. The Turks, as might have been expected, dis­
regarded the seals and burst open the safe,.
(1) Figaro and Le Temps, 18 November, 1912; L!Eclair,
& December, 1912.
Le Temps, 18 November, 1912; L*Echo de Paris, 28 February, 
1913; also Najib Azuri to Qua! d«0rsay, 16 March, 1913, 
cited Jung, op. cit., pp. 60-1.
(3) Hart, H. B. Liddell, op. cit., p. 61.
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( 1 )
Independent of Turkish control and of German influence, were 
ever to be realized. The Foreign Office, however, considered 
that the moment was not opportune. The Nationalist advances 
were tactfully received, the way being left open for further 
negotiations. Thus, at the outbreak of war, the laconic 
message from Sharif‘Abdullah*The time has come* was sufficient 
to pave the way for the negotiations which brought the revolt 
of Sharif Husain in its wake.
Still another section of Syrians hoped to obtain decentral­
ization by means of agitation and by exerting pressure both 
locally and on the authorities at Constantinople. Another 
revolutionary group, for the most part Muslims of Damascus and 
of the Syrian hinterland, aimed at complete independence and 
membership in a confederation of Arab states.
Behind the movement were ranged the Arabic press and the
Arabs domiciled in Egypt, in Paris, in the United States, in
(2)
South America and in Australia. In Syria, including
Palestine and the Lebanon, Arab journals increased 850>i> in the
(3)
period 1904 to 1914, over the preceding 10 years, 33 journals
(1) For an indication of the influence of this policy on war­
time negotiations, see Aufteilung der Asiatischen Turkei, 
especially No. 32, Nicolson to Sasanov, 20 March, 1915, p. 30.
(2) Tarazi, Vicomte Philippe, Arabic Periodicals (Beirut, 1934)
(3) Newspapers and magazines established in Arab countries, dur­
ing the periods, 1894-1904 and 1904-14, are given below, 
arranged according to their present political divisions:
1894-1904 * 1904-14.
News. Mags. News. Mags.
Syria 1 2 73 14
Lebanon 15 14 117 51
Palestine 1 0 26 5
1 Iraq 1 1 61 9
Hi jaz 0 0 6 0
Total 17 283 79
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"being established from 1894 to 19D4 and 286 in the period 1904
(i)
to 1914. In Egypt and in the United States, the Arabic
(2) (3)
press, with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,
was a powerful agent by its constant and bitter denunciation
of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab
(4)
peoples.
In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 1Ottoman- 
izing1 policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist 
movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the movement 
across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. Cut 
off by its geographical position and by its lack of communica­
tion from the West, ’Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich 
Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the 
stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed 
along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the 
Sunni Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance
from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established
(5)
as their religious head. The Shi’a priesthood, Persian
(1) The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often 
not long, particularly if in opposition to the Government. 
Suppressed journals frequently reappeared under new names.
(2) Prom 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines 
were founded in Egypt, North and South America; Ibid.
(3) Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through 
the foreign post offices.
(4) Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by 
the Arabic Press abroad; Turkish Red Book, La Verit& sur 
la Question Syrienne, pp. 12-13.
tnfra, P* £93 for typical view on the sanctity of the 
Ottoman regime.
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for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnis and as 
oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the 
Arabs, although Arabs of the Shi1 a sect formed a majority of 
the population of ’Iraq.
The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and 
not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for National­
ism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs 
desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. 
Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single 
element in the land, had little deep feeling for either Turk 
or Arab, except as productive of order, stable finance and 
equity in the courts, essential for their commerce. There 
were few professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, teachers 
and civil officials, who formed the backbone of the movement 
across the desert. Nevertheless, from them and from the Arab 
army officers came the leaven of pre-war Nationalism in 11raq. 
Trained, for the most part, in the professional and technical 
schools of Constantinople, they had been touched by the Western 
political theories permeating the capital. They had been in 
contact with separatists from Syria and from other parts of the 
Empire. The Arab officers of the army, in particular, as mem­
bers of the only numerous and organized class in the Empire 
which received a systematic Western training and which, there­
fore, was exposed to Western thought, assumed important roles 
in the movement.
Not merely the policy of crushing Arab feeling and senti­
ment and of turning Arabs into good Turks aroused the ’Iraqis..
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The secularizing policy and the irreligiousness of the Young 
Turks had offended many religious dignitaries who wielded 
great power and influence. The Naqib of Baghdad, Saiyid Abdur 
Rahman al-Gailani, for instance, found little to command his 
respect or obedience in the new regime. Although he himself 
habitually refrained from political activities, his son,
Saiyid Mahmud al-Gailani, described as an Arab of the Arabs, 
and knowing no Turkish, took a prominent part in the opposition 
to the C.U.P.
In spite of the discontent in ’Iraq, rife and acute as it 
was, little trace appeared on the surface before late 1910.
The measures employed by the C.U.P. to stamp out disaffection 
were too vigorous and too harsh for opposition to show itself 
openly. In the Chamber of Deputies, however, from the midst of 
the group of Arab Deputies, to which all the ’Iraqi members, 
except Isma’il Haggi Beg Baban, the Kurd, had attached them­
selves, ’Iraqi feeling was publically voiced.
Underground, however, the movement had taken on form and
(1)
substance. At Constantinople, Arab army officers, among
whom ’Iraqis were the most prominent, formed A1-’Ahd. a secret
group pledged to work for Arab independence. Its membership,
(2)
throughout the Empire, was said to number 4,000. Allied in
purpose was the Assibat al-Hamra, the ’Iraqi counterpart of the
(1) La Question Syrienne, p. 12, A fairly comprehensive history 
of several Arab secret societies is to be found in the same 
work, pp. 9-123.
(2) La Question Syrienne, p. 12; Jung, op. cit., p. 32.
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(1)
Committee of Decentralization, with its headquarters in Cairo.
The separatist tendencies shown by other non-Turkish por­
tions of the Empire were not without influence on Nationalism in 
11raq as well as in Syria. The detachment from the Empire of 
Bosnia, of Bulgaria and Crete,the demand for reforms and de­
centralization in Macedonia, supported by the Great Powers, the 
revolt of the Druses in the Hauran and of the Arabs in Trans­
jordan in 1910-11, and the demand of the Albanians for fiscal 
reforms in 1909 and 1911, while regretted by Muslims as weaken­
ing the strength of Islam, encouraged the Arabs as a whole to 
demand decentralization for themselves. Rashid al-Umari, head 
of the powerful ’Umari family of Mosul, a member of v/hich was
advocated by the Acting Civil Commissioner in 1918-19 as head of
(2)
the 1 Iraq state, expressed the views of many Arabs with whose
sentiments he was in close touch, when he said, in October, 1911,
to the British Vice Consul: ’As the Albanians have demanded and
(3)
got what they wanted, I hope we shall do the same.1 It was
generally believed that the end of the Turko-Italian war would
find the Arabs united in a protest against the Turks and in an
(4)
attempt to set up an Arab dynasty and an Arab Khalifate.
The convening of Parliament at Constantinople also encour­
aged ’Iraqi Nationalists by bringing them into contact with the
(1) Alleged to have had 10,000 members and 75 branches in Syria 
and Palestine alone: Jung, op. cit., p. 61.
(2) Telegram, No. 10250, Political, Baghdad to S/S for India, 
November, 1918, cited supra, pi. 19.2, 194.
(3) Events in Turkish ’Iraq, October, 1911.
(4) Ibid., November, 1911.
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ardent Nationalists of other parts of the Empire, who, in spite 
of the great care with which the C.U.P, had conducted the elec­
tions, found seats in the Chamber. With them the 1 Iraqis made 
common cause in the Moderate Liberal party, founded by Prince 
Sabah-ed-Din in opposition to the C.U.P., and later in the 
Itilaf or Coalition Party. These parties were not merely sec­
tional groups, although the ’Iraqi branches of the former, 
founded in Basra and Baghdad in August and September, 1911, 
were known in ’Iraq as the Hurr-i-Mtt’tadil, while branches of 
the Itilaf to which the Moderate Liberal party gave way in early 
1912, were known as Hurriya wa Itilaf. The organization of the 
parties extended throughout the Empire, the branch in Basra, for 
instance, being formed by Saiyid Talib Pasha in obedience to a 
telegram sent by a person unknown.
In the years 1910 and 1911, ’Iraqi feeling also sought
means of outlet through the press. In these two years were
established 36 or 60% of the 61 Arabic newspapers founded in
’Iraq during the period 1904 to 1914; 22 or nearly 40,6 being
(1)
founded in 1911 alone. Of these, 19 were founded in Baghdad.
In the same two years, were founded 6 of the 9 magazines estab­
lished in the same period of 1904 to 1914. A number of these 
papers were periodically suppressed by the Turks, after which 
the owners re-issued them under new names.
In the years 1912 and 1913, the movement firmly established 
itself in ’Iraq. The British Resident in Baghdad in an official
(1) Based on Tarazi, op. cit.
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report in early 1912 stated:
I have "been much struck of late by the increasing 
freedom with which anti-C.U.P. and anti-Turkish sentiments 
are expressed here. Hitherto this was regarded as treason 
to the State ... This growing political confidence of non- 
Turkish Muhammadan elements is noticeable even among 
officials ... It is clear also that the eldest son of the 
Kiliddar of Najaf and ’Abdur Rahman Pachachi, welcome the 
formation of a new party which would assert Arab interests. 
If political developments here follow a normal course and 
if the people of the country have any real political con­
victions and courage, - two conditions of which the fulfil­
ment is doubtful, the support of the Baghdad province will 
bye and bye be lost to any party which does not concede to 
the Arabs political equality with the Turks. (1)
Nowhere did the rising opposition show itself more clearly
than in the local elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1911
and in the following years. Pressure was used by the C.U.P.
to secure the return of its candidates. Nevertheless, Sayid
Mahmud al-Gailani, whose anti-Turkish sentiments were well
known, was elected, as well as Fuad Effendi, a Baghdad lawyer,
known to be in opposition to the C.U.P. In Basra, the elections
represented both local opposition to the C.U.P. and the personal
ascendancy of Saiyid Talib Pasha, son of the Naqib of Basra.
All the deputies elected, in addition to himself, were his
partisans, being his cousin, his father1s clerk, a friend of the
Naqib1s family and another member of the Hurriya wa Itilaf.
According to the British Vice Consul at Basra, 1 no pressure was
used, however, all the Ittilafjis representing the free choice
(2)
of united suffrage.1
(1) Ibid., March-April, 1912
(2) Ibid., October, 1912.
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Saiyid Talib Pasha ibn Saiyid Rajab was one of the out­
standing figures in pre-war Turkish Arabia, and, until his en-
(1)
forced removal from Baghdad by Sir Percy Cox, 16 April, 1921,
(2)
played a prominent part in the creation of modern ’Iraq. He
came of an old family of Basra, doubly influential because of 
its wealth and its hereditary religious leadership. His native 
ability, enhanced and developed by a fair education, by resi­
dence at Constantinople and travel in Europe, found full scope 
in political activities. A vigorous personality, of great 
charm and dignity, although given occasionally to tempestuous 
anger, he had collected around him a band of followers and ad­
herents, bound to him both by fear and affection. His gener­
osity to the poor was proverbial, but it was the liberality of 
a Robin Hood: his funds for his benefactions and for his retin­
ue, as he himself was not wealthy, were not infrequently ob­
tained by levies, reminiscent of blackmail, on wealthy Arabs in 
southern ’Iraq.
His personal ambitions, not necessarily of an unworthy 
character, were undoubtedly strong. To ’Abdul Hamid he had 
submitted a comprehensive scheme for the inclusion within the 
Empire, and under his personal authority, of Al-Hasa of which 
he had been Mutasarrif, and of a large portion of central Arabia.
(1) Infra, p. 40 7.
(2) His interment at Zubair, following his death in Munich,
July, 1929, drew an immense crowd from every part of ’Iraq 
and was made the occasion of eloquent tributes to his work 
for Arab Nationalism.
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The proposal was not unnaturally rejected at Constantinople,
After the Revolution in 1908, which he, in company with 
many other Arabs, had hopefully supported, he turned against the 
C.U.P. and its programme. He assumed, in the name of Arab 
Nationalism, the leadership, both in the Chamber of Deputies 
and in southern ’Iraq, of the opposition to the Turks in Basra 
V/ilayet. So closely did his efforts on behalf of Arab separa­
tion and his own ambitions seem to coincide, however, that even 
now it is debateable whether his actions were primarily designed 
to further the Arab cause or to carve out a portion of the 
Ottoman domain for himself, as the Shaikh of Kuwait had already 
done, and as Ibn Sa’ud was In the process of carrying out in 
Al-Hasa. His many enemies, including Shaikh A jaimi as-Sa’dun, 
which his ruthlessness and his energy had made for him, sub­
scribed to the latter view. They constituted one of the princ­
iple handicaps to the Nationalist movement as led by Saiyid 
Talib, since they would not have acquiesced without a struggle 
in any measure of decentralization by which Saiyid Talib profited. 
These charges of personal ambition were to be recalled and en­
mities rekindled in 1920-1, when Saiyid Talib put forward, with 
some justification, his claim to the headship of the ’Iraq state.
Whatever his motives, Saiyid Talib pushed forward Arab 
Nationalism both in Basra Wilayet and throughout ’Iraq in the 
years immediately preceding the war. On 20 Pebruary, 1913, at a 
meeting in his house, attended by all the principal Arabs of 
Basra, a madhbata or petition was drawn up. It asked for per­
mission to summon the Provincial Council with the view of
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elaborating a scheme of reforms needed in the Wilayet, which,
it was urged, should be similar to that recently sanctioned for
Syria. It proposed that all taxes be devoted to local needs.
Despite its veil of temperate and courteous language, the
madhbata, to which about 300 of the leading citizens of Basra
added their signatures, was in reality a demand, the first to
(1)
be made, for autonomous government for Basra.
The future government and administration of ’Iraq, were 
the primary subjects of discussion at an Arab Conference held 
at Mohammerah, March, 1913, attended by the Shaikh of Mohammerah, 
himself an Arab although a Persian subject, by the Shaikh of 
Kuwait, by Saiyid Talib and by a highly-placed Turkish official. 
It was agreed that each leader should do all in his power to ad­
vance the claim of ’Iraq to independence or, at least, to self- 
government. Emissaries were commissioned and dispatched to 
Karbala and Najaf to stir the people there and to prepare them 
for further activity. The Arab Nationalists in Baghdad,
Constantinople, Syria, Egypt and Arabia, with whom Saiyid Talib
(2)
had already maintained correspondence, were informed of the 
decision of the Conference.
In the following month, Saiyid Talib made a test of his 
power. On 23 April, a deputation of Basra notables, headed by 
himself, visited the Acting Wall. They demanded the dismissal
(1) Events in Turkish ’Iraq, February, 1913; Ibid., March, 1913.
(2) For Saiyid Talib Pasha’s relations with the Decentralization 
Committee in Syria and Egypt, see La Question Syrienne.
pp. 102-3.
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of certain officers of the Gendarmerie, who, they believed, be­
longed to an anti-Arab society. The demand, when referred to 
Constantinople, was rejected, whereupon Saiyid Talib hinted 
that the Arabs might resort to force. The British Vice-Consul,
in alarm, immediately asked for a ship of war for the protection
(1)
of British interests. H.M.S. Alert arrived at Basra on
4 Hay. Saiyid Talib, however, finding that Shaikh Ajaimi had 
moved with his Muntafiq tribesmen towards Basra, with the inten­
tion of supporting the Government, and that a new Wilayet Lav/ 
had been promulgated, agreed on 12 May to press Arab demands 
with moderation.
Although the new Wilayet Law, together with an official cir­
cular from the Ministry of Interior conceding wide official use 
of Arabic in ’Iraq, had supposedly granted self-government on 
paper, neither Saiyid Talib nor other Arab leaders were misled 
as to its real nature. The new law, if ever applied, v/hich 
they doubted, still kept real power in the hands of the Wali or 
Governor, while they had in mind actual participation by Arabs 
in the Government. In spite of the momentary check to the 
Nationalists at Basra, the Arabs elsewhere redoubled their 
efforts to obtain the full measure of their demands.
The Arab movement had developed faster in Basra than in 
Baghdad, due to the efforts of Talib Pasha, but Nationalism was 
not lacking in strength in the latter city. In closer contact 
than Basra with the outside world and consequently in closer
(1) Events in Turkish ’Iraq, May, 1913.
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relation with the Nationalist movement at Constantinople and 
among the Syrians and Egyptians, the Baghdad Nationalists had 
divided themselves into four groups. One section consisted of 
partizans of Saiyid Talib and the Basra Nationalists. Another 
looked to Syria for leadership and assistance. Still another 
group was in correspondence with Egypt, from which it was ru­
moured that the Khedive would be elected King and Khalifa of 
the Muslims. The fourth group formed a separate Baghdad party, 
relying chiefly on their own efforts and on their own leaders. 
These groups, however, were without hard and fast lines, and in 
the spring of 1913, when a concerted effort was made to unite 
the Arabs of ’Iraq, Syria and Egypt in presenting demands to 
Constantinople, the groups apparently sank their differences 
and began to work together. The local secret Patriotic Society, 
formed in 1912 to expel the Turks and to establish autonomous 
government, had as members the principal Arabs, including more 
than a hundred Arab officers of all ranks. Manifestos and 
literature from Basra and Constantinople attacking the Turkish 
Government circulated in the city. Placards appeared on the 
walls of Baghdad, as on IB March, exhorting Arabs to rise against 
their oppressors and to demand autonomy or decentralization.
The reforms announced in April and May were dismissed as being
(1)
inadequate. The newspapers Bain an-Nahrain and Misbah took 
courage and demanded further reforms and decentralization. A 
delegate, Taufiq as-Suwaidi, son of Yusuf as-Suwaidi, an
(1) Founded in Baghdad by Muhammad Kamil, 9 December, 1909, and 
by Abdul Husain al-»Uzri, 7 March, 1911.
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outstanding leader in the movement, was nominated to the first 
Arab Congress held in Paris, 18 June, 1913. Even more signifi­
cant was the growing hostility between the Turkish and the Arab 
officers of the 13th Army Corps in the Baghdad Barracks, and
(X)
between the Turkish and Arab civil officials of the Wilayet.
The Turks were not inactive in the face of these manifes­
tations of Arab feeling. Arab teachers and mullas were ap­
pointed to advocate faithfulness to the Government, inspired
(2)
articles appeared in the press, and reforms were promised. 
Spies were increased and following a search in Baghdad by the 
police for a supposed emissary of Egyptian and Syrian National­
ists in early June, a sudden arrest of Arab leaders was made,
14 June. Among them were: Yusuf as-Suwaidi, Saiyid Kamil
Effendi, proprietor of the suppressed Bain an-Nahrain, Shukri 
Effendi, and Salman Effendi. Mahmud Effendi, editor of Bain
an-Nahrain, was also arrested at !Amara. All were released two
(3)
days later with the exception of Saiyid Kamil.
(1) Events in Turkish »Iraq, March to October, 1913, passim.
(2) Al-Zuhur (Baghdad) published the following, 14 March, 1913, 
under the heading 1 Decentralization*:
Some Muhammadans want decentralization. They ought 
to know that decentralization is not permissible accord­
ing to the Muhammadan Law because the centre of the 
whole Islamic world is the town of the Khalifa.
Christians are said to be making great progress by means 
of decentralization, but Muslims must recollect that 
Christians have three Gods and can, therefore, have more 
than one centre. Muslims having only one God can have 
but one centre.
(3) Events in Turkish 1 Iraq, June, 1913
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The murder at Basra of Farid Bey, Gendarme Commander, who,
it was reported, had come to Basra to kill Saiyid Talib and
' (1)
twelve other Arabs in opposition to the C.U.P., and of Badi1
Nuri Bey, Mutasarrif of Muntafiq, by followers of Saiyid Talib,
on 20 June, intensified the anti-Turkish aspect of Saiyid Talib1s
agitation in Basra. The failure of the Turkish Government to
bring him to book emboldened Arabs, both at Basra and at Baghdad.
The official circular from the Minister of Interior, extending
special considerations to Arabs, such as three Ministers of
(2 )
State, five Waliships, ten Mutasarrifships, etc., was dismissed
without confidence. In Basra, the Reform Committee with
(3)
Saiyid Talib at his head, published its programme which, if
realized, meant the transfer of the real authority from Con­
stantinople to the Administrative Council of Basra Wilayet. In 
addition, the Reform Committee issued a long appeal to troops 
and Arab tribes in the Wilayet, denouncing the Turkish Govern­
ment, and calling upon all Arabs to arise and throw off the 
Turkish tyranny by asserting the independence of 1 Iraq.
In Baghdad, all of the seven members elected by Baghdad 
city on 8 September, as its members to the first General Council 
of Baghdad Wilayet, were in opposition to the C.U.P. Manifestos, 
including especially virulent ones from Aleppo, demanding de­
centralization, continued to circulate. A new vernacular news­
paper, An-Nahdha or The Awakening, published by Mudhahim
■  — — — -  - .   ■■ —  ■ ■ — ■ • ■ ■■ ■
(1) So 1Izzat Beg, sent as successor to Farid Beg, declared. 
Ibid., July, 1913.
(2) The Times, 3 and 4 July, 1913.
(3) Al-Dastur (Basra), 22 august, 1913.
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al-Pachaji, one of the Arab leaders began to appear in the first
(1)
week of October. The quarrel between the Turkish and Arab 
officers would have burst into a violent rupture without the 
intervention of General Muhammad Dagistani, who appealed to 
their military honour.
In spite of arrests in the middle of October of leaders of 
the Arab movement, including Yusuf as-Suwaidi, Shaikh Sat id 
Effendi, Hamdi Bey Pachaji, Mahmud Bey, head of Nadi-al-yyatani, 
or Native Land Club, and Bahjat Bey, fresh demands for decen­
tralization were formulated. A general conference to meet at 
Kuwait in early 1914, to consider Arab questions, was proposed 
in November. Representatives of Amir Ibn Sa»ud and of the 
Sharif of Mecca, with whom Saiyid Talib had long been in corre­
spondence, and Amir Ibn Rashid of the Shammar, Shaikh Ajaimi of 
the Muntafiq, the Shaikh of Kuwait and Saiyid Talib were to be 
among the delegates. Ibn Satud, In response to the invitations,
replied that when the time came to rise he would be ready, but
(2)
that the moment had not come. Neither he nor the other Arab 
potentates were as yet able to sink their personal ambitions 
and enmities in the common cause. The conference was never 
convened.
In this 3ame inability to make common cause seems to lie 
the failure of Arab Nationalism to make even greater progress
(1) Baghdad, 3 October, 1923.
(2) The statement in The Times, 27 December, 1913, that the Arab 
chiefs had composed their differences proved to be unsub­
stantiated by facts.
